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Abstract 
Much academic debate in the tradition of economic geography has focused on how to 
design successful strategies to trigger local and regional development. How a more 
effective economic policy to tackle regional imbalances and inequalities should be 
developed remains hotly discussed. Too frequently, however, the effective delivery 
and implementation of policies across all cities and regions fail not simply because of 
wrong policy tools. Often, one of the challenges is, also, to sort out the institutional 
process so that incentives to achieve effectiveness arise among politicians and 
bureaucrats. This thesis specifically focuses on pork-barrelling and distributive 
politics, that is, how politicians selectively target cities and regions with more or less 
governmental goods to reinforce their electoral advantage. While a significant 
number of contributions have been made to this field of enquiry, numerous gaps 
remain in understanding the implications of distributive politics on regional economic 
development policymaking and performance. The dissertation critically examines 
four different aspects and effects of distributive politics, drawing from the case of 
post-2002 Turkey. 
In spite of a significant burgeoning of this line of research across the world, questions 
about the extent to which ‘tactical allocative games’ prevail over technical policy-
making criteria are frequently left unanswered. The first theme concerns the extent to 
which electoral factors prevail over technical considerations in the allocation of 
public investment by the central state to Turkey’s provinces. The evidence suggests 
that, while the government has allocated spending to reward its core constituencies, 
socioeconomic factors nonetheless remain the most relevant predictors of investment.  
Relatedly, almost no research has so far explored whether pork-barrelling has any 
economic consequences on regional economies. The second theme explores whether 
votes for the incumbent party can ‘buy’ preferential policy treatment and regional 
economic growth. The results show how, after addressing potential endogeneity, 
economic performance is almost entirely explained by ‘standard’ drivers, primarily 
human capital endowment. 
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Third, the literature on distributive politics has frequently been legislature centric, in 
the sense that it has not paid adequate attention to the role played by bureaucratic 
agencies. The third paper explores whether the institutional characteristics of the 
agency in charge of the project cycle condition the attainment of publicly-oriented 
goals. Results point towards the argument that, to enhance policy effectiveness, 
bureaucracies must be not only capable an autonomous, but also accountable.   
Finally, the literature still provides unclear evidence on whether shifts from highly 
competitive electoral environments towards electoral one-party hegemony may lead 
to higher – or to lower – levels of pork-barrelling. The fourth theme therefore 
explores whether the constant surge of power enjoyed by Turkey’s AK Party has 
determined any change in the way public investment is allocated for tactical 
redistribution. Findings unexpectedly uncover decreasing levels of ‘punishment’ 
against opponents’ strongholds. Such reduction, however, is accompanied by 
increasing populist spending throughout the country. 
Overall, by providing novel evidence on the links between elections, public 
investment, and regional economic growth in post-2002 Turkey, the thesis contributes 
to advancing the understaning of the political economy of local and regional 
development.  
 
Keywords: Public investment; electoral politics; pork-barrelling; regional economic 
growth; bureaucracies; state effectiveness; Turkey. 
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1. Introduction 
Much academic debate in the tradition of local and regional development has focused 
its attention on how to design successful strategies to trigger development. How a 
more effective economic policy to tackle regional imbalances and inequalities should 
be designed remains hotly discussed (inter alia: Barca, 2009; OECD, 2009; World 
Bank, 2009). Too frequently, however, the effective delivery and implementation of 
policies across all cities and regions fails not – only – because of wrong technical 
solutions. Rather, the problem is often – also – to transform the institutional 
environment so that developmental resources are equally and efficiently shared 
among social groups, and politicians and bureaucrats are held accountable to deliver 
sound policy outputs. In other words, the problem is not simply what kind of policies 
have been selected but, rather, whether the purported measures have been adequately 
implemented. 
This thesis critically examines four different aspects and effects of distributive 
politics, that is, how politicians selectively target constituencies with more or less 
governmental monies and goods to reinforce their electoral advantage. A number of 
studies in political economy demonstrate that, in parallel to grand/programmatic 
redistribution based on technical rationales, a second type of redistribution is 
constantly taking place. This form of ‘politically-driven’ tactical redistribution (Dixit 
and Londregan, 1996) is likely to be carried out even when the same general 
development policy framework remains constant. According to the public choice 
literature, the reason behind the influence of politics on policy-making is that 
politicians are instrumental in their behaviour (Dunleavy, 1991) and are likely to 
deliver more to those voters who can keep them in power.  
A significant number of contributions have been made to this field of enquiry. In their 
extensive analysis of the literature Golden and Min (2013), for example, have 
identified more than 150 studies on this topic. Nevertheless, numerous gaps remain in 
understanding the implications of distributive politics on regional economic 
development policymaking and performance.  
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The thesis draws from Turkey as a critical case study. In spite of Turkey’s long 
established developmental state, the effectiveness of the country’s development 
policies has been frequently questioned (inter alia: Barkey, 1990; Gezici and 
Hewings, 2004; Güneş-Ayata, 1994a, 1994b; Heper and Keyman, 1998). The 
literature provides two contrasting explanations for such potential ineffectiveness 
(Filiztekin, 2008). According to the first strand, the main issue behind the lack of 
clear policy success has been one of policy tools designed in a way not suitable to 
solve Turkey’s socioeconomic problems. In other words, the stress of this first point 
of view is on the ‘mismatch’ between the problems faced by Turkey, and the policies 
implemented, frequently following one-size-fits-all solutions borrowed from 
international organisations (Ersoy and Taylor, 2012). The second explanation, by 
contrast, focuses on the gap existing between policy design and policy 
implementation (Gezici and Hewings, 2004).
1
 This thesis explores this latter 
perspective.  
Turkey has frequently suffered from political fragmentation and weak state autonomy 
from the government, resulting in policy-making flawed by poor governance, 
patronage, and political factionalism. Following the 2001 economic crisis, the 2002 
elections witnessed the unexpected victory of the Justice and Welfare Party (Adalet ve 
Kalkınma Partisi, AK Party or AKP hereafter), led by former Prime Minister and 
current President of the Republic R.T. Erdoğan. After almost a decade of rampant 
corruption, poor economic performance and infighting under coalition governments, 
2002 elections are considered as a real turning point in Turkish politics (Işık and 
Pınarcıoğlu, 2010; Zeyneloğlu, 2006).2 The following years marked the start of the 
Accession Negotiations to the EU, while the newly elected government committed to 
significant public governance reforms. Yet, the concrete scope of change in the 
management and delivery of public policies has not been fully evaluated.  
                                                     
1
 Interestingly, both views converge on the existence of a trade-off between the reduction of 
regional imbalances and the rate of overall national growth, and suggest that the Turkish state has 
significantly paid more emphasis on the latter than on the former.  
2
 The combined share of votes for the five main parties in 1999 elections was for example 81 
percent, while it dropped to a mere 24 percent in 2002 (Akarca and Başlevent, 2011). 
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The four analyses which form this dissertation concretely focus on the allocation and 
management of public investment. Similarly to other countries around the world, 
public investment in Turkey has constituted one of the main regional development 
policy tools adopted by the state. The role of governments in providing public capital 
is particularly relevant in developing and middle-income countries. In these contexts, 
states have frequently been the main economic game in town, in the sense that, along 
with their regulating prerogatives, the scope of their functions had to complement the 
gaps left by insufficient private capital accumulation (Evans, Huber, and Stephens, 
2014; Kohli, 2004). 
Overall, by providing novel evidence on the links between elections, public 
investment, and regional economic growth in post-2002 Turkey, the thesis contributes 
to advancing the understaning of the political economy of local and regional 
development. 
The remainder of this introduction is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses the 
conceptual framework driving the overall research. Section 3 sketches the structure of 
the thesis. Section 4 describes the methodology adopted in the empirical analyses. 
Section 5 provides a detailed overview of each of the four main themes explored in 
this dissertation. Section 6 leads the discussion to an end, drawing the thesis’ overall 
conclusions and implications, and identifying potential future areas of research.   
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2. Conceptual framework  
The research is interdisciplinary. Its goal is to cut across the disciplines of economic 
geography, development studies, and political economy.  
The thesis follows Pike, Rodríguez-Pose, and Tomaney's (2014) call. It aims to bridge 
the traditional divide existing between the economic geography literature on local and 
regional development – traditionally focused upon localities and regions in the 
historically lagging areas of the advanced capitalist world economies – and 
development studies – traditionally concerned with more recently industrializing  
nations and developing economies. As argued by Pike et al. (2014), each strand of 
literature has evolved with little or no interaction. Yet, such disconnect constrains 
synergies in the development of common explanations and policy formulation in 
addressing challenges which are not unique to either group of countries.    
The research is also set within the broad literature interested in the link between 
institutions and regional economic development (Farole, Storper, and Rodríguez-
Pose, 2010). In the last two decades, and particularly since the second half of the 
1990s, the study of institutions as a fundamental explanatory element behind 
economic growth has extensively come to the fore, determining what was named as 
an ‘institutional turn’ in social sciences (Evans, 2005). Although the unitary essence 
of such ‘turn’ has been questioned (Jessop, 2001),3 a common element is the 
intuition, hypothesis or (re)discovery about the importance of institutional factors 
behind economic processes. Institutions are considered to influence economic growth 
through three main channels: they have an effect on the efficiency of economic 
exchange by altering transaction costs; they influence the rate of technological 
change; and, last but not least, they influence the economy through political issues of 
redistribution, and ‘state effectiveness’ (Azulai et al., 2014). It is exactly the latter 
channel the one within which the current research topic is set. 
Besley (2006) identifies two main classes of problems which may undermine good 
government and state effectiveness: government failures, and political failures.  
- 15 - 
Government failure may arise in any system of government, and may occur when the 
state intervening in the economy lacks the omniscient knowledge necessary to avoid 
policy mistakes being made, or when governments are pliable from powerful 
organised groups and hence develop policy benefits skewed towards such groups. 
Phenomena such as corruption, lobbying/bribing, and rent-seeking belong to this 
category. Political failure, more narrowly, relates to the set of problems arising when 
such power to control is allocated in democratic political systems. The current 
dissertation specifically focuses on the latter. Following Diaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and 
Magaloni (2012), it places electoral politics and electoral targeting – which we 
conceptualise as a ‘strategy of vote buying’ – at the core of the study of local and 
regional economic development. The selection of any policy goals and tools is 
inherently political, in the sense that it is based on different perceptions of what 
constitutes the societal goals. Nevertheless, forms of narrow electoral targeting signal 
the failure to promote the aggregation of all individuals’ interests into a ‘more public’ 
interest and to achieve long-term developmental ‘programmatic’ objectives (Piattoni, 
2001b).  
Electoral targeting should not be seen in monolithic terms but, rather, as a ladder that 
climbs upward according to the level at which narrow, particular interests are 
aggregated (Piattoni, 2001). This can occur at the lowest possible level, determining 
clientelism and cronyism networks pivoting around individuals and families; at a 
higher level, leading to pork-barrelling practices based on constituencies and local 
communities; and yet at higher levels. Such levels include consociationism based on 
religious or ethnic groups, and corporatism, based on professional groups. The 
interaction of tactical versus programmatic forms of redistribution with the level to 
which interests are aggregated leads to the matrix presented in Table 1. The thesis 
specifically addresses the second row, that is, it focuses on the provision of a public 
good such as public investment.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
3
 Jessop (2001) in particular argues that we should not speak about just one institutional turn but 
about at least three, respectively theoretically, empirically and policy-relatedly driven.   
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Table 1. Types of developmental policy programmes. 
 Tactical Programmatic 
Private Clientelism Entitlements 
Public Pork-barreling, 
consociationism, corporativism 
Functionalistic, formula-based 
allocations 
Source: adapted from Diaz-Cayeros et al. (2012), Piattoni (2001a).  
In line with the majority of studies on distributive politics, the thesis focuses on the 
forms of strategic redistribution influenced by the most common type of organized 
political interest groups, that is, political parties. This choice is grounded on the 
numerous contributions which have stressed the key role of parties behind Turkey’s 
political life and cleavages (De Leon, Desai, and Tuğal, 2009; Kalaycıoğlu, 2001; 
Özbudun, 2013). As Kalaycıoğlu for example stresses:   
 “All political institutions are effectively penetrated by patronage, including nepotism (akrabalik), 
favoritism (torpil), regional-communal bonds (hemsehri networks), religious solidarity, and other 
gemeinschaftlich links of agricultural and post-agricultural society. However, political parties 
stand out as the penultimate political institution of populist patronage” (Kalaycıoğlu, 2001, p. 63). 
Indeed, in spite of periods such as the 1990s during which fragmentation and 
volatility weakened the role and coherence of the party system, throughout Turkey’s 
republican history political parties have in general displayed a high degree of saliency 
in the political arena (De Leon, Desai, and Tuğal, 2009). Furthermore, sharing 
similarities with other Southern European countries such as Italy and Greece (Lanza 
and Lavdas, 2000), Turkey’s interest politics and party politics have frequently shown 
strong links. 
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3. Structure of the thesis 
The dissertation is structured into four papers, each attempting to answer a specific 
research question.  
While advance in data availability has allowed the extension of research on 
distributive politics to a large number of countries, questions about the extent to 
which such ‘tactical allocative games’ prevail over technical policy-making criteria 
are frequently left unanswered. The first theme hence concerns the extent to which 
electoral factors prevail over technical considerations in the allocation of public 
investment by the central state to Turkey’s provinces.  
Paper 1.        Distributive politics and regional development: Assessing the 
territorial distribution of Turkey’s public investment. 
Co-authored with Andrés Rodríguez-Pose 
Published in the Journal of Development Studies  
 
Relatedly, almost no research has so far explored whether electorally-driven 
‘allocative games’ have any economic consequences. Indeed, in spite of a burgeoning 
interest in the politics of economic growth, the research specifically exploring the 
impact of political articulations on regional economic development has been 
considerably scarcer. The second theme explores whether votes for the incumbent 
party can ‘buy’ preferential policy treatment and regional economic development.  
Paper 2.           Votes and regional economic growth: Evidence from Turkey. 
Published in World Development  
Third, the literature exploring how politicians strategically use public resources has 
frequently been legislature centric, in the sense that it has mostly focused on the role 
of governments and parlamentarians, and much less on the specific role played by 
bureaucratic agencies. The third research theme shifts the attention to the latter. It 
explores whether the institutional characteristics of the economic bureaucracy in 
charge of managing the investment project cycle condition the extent to which public 
- 18 - 
policies remain effectively focused on publicly-oriented goals, as opposed to being 
used as a tool for particularistic redistribution and electoral rewarding. 
Paper 3.     Do bureaucracies enhance or constrain development policy 
effectiveness? Evidence from Turkey’s central management of public 
investment. 
Finally, the literature still provides unclear evidence on whether shifts from highly 
competitive electoral environments towards electoral one-party dominance may lead 
to higher – or to lower – levels of pork-barrelling. The fourth theme therefore 
explores whether the constant surge of power enjoyed by Turkey’s AK Party and his 
leader Erdoğan has determined any change in the way public investment is allocated 
for tactical redistribution.  
 Paper 4.    Does electoral hegemony increase pork-barrelling? Evidence from 
Turkey’s public transport investment. 
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4. Methodology 
The intellectual environment within economic geography during the last decades has 
been increasingly marked by a division between two main lines. On the one hand, the 
latest phase of the broader intellectual evolution of geography has been propelled by 
an increasing diversity of ‘heterodox approaches’ sharing renewed attention on the 
social and cultural elements in which economic processes are embedded. This 
process, broadly defined as a ‘socio-cultural turn’, was inspired by constructivist 
epistemologies, and called for a rethink of the balance/relation between the economic 
and the non-economic, socio-cultural elements in geographical explanations. On the 
other hand, particularly following the development of New Economic Geography, 
mainstream economists have increasingly turned their attention to spatial analysis 
and, strongly rooted in positivist epistemologies, have conceived abstract economic 
landscapes studied via formal mathematical models.  
If such division has stimulated a relatively lively debate on the epistemological values 
that geography should achieve (inter alia: Amin and Thrift, 2000; Martin, 1999; 
Overman, 2004; Rodríguez-Pose, 2001; Storper, 2001), empirically these evolutions 
have been increasingly marked by the adoption of qualitative analytical methods by 
the former strand, and of quantitative statistical approaches by the latter one. Such 
methodological and epistemological debate is not unique to economic geography. 
Other disciplines, such as political science, have experienced similar long-standing 
debates about the inherent trade-offs between statistical ‘large-N’ analyses and in-
depth, ‘small-N’ approaches (Lieberman, 2005).  
As a way to contribute overcoming such methodological and epistemological 
deadlock, the current dissertation calls for the mixed use of both quantitative and 
qualitative research methods. This thesis hence rejects views according to which 
qualitative and quantitative research techniques are incompatible and, instead, follows 
methodological pluralism, that is, the use of different techniques to uncover different 
facets of the same social phenomenon (Elwood, 2010; Olsen, 2004).
 4
   
                                                     
4
 Interestingly Elwood (2010) stresses how, in spite of the significant division described above, 
geographers and other social scientists have been conducting mixed methods research for decades.  
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The first and second papers are deeply rooted in the quantitative approach. They take 
advantage of econometric analyses carried out on a panel dataset covering Turkey’s 
81 provinces over the period between 2004 and 2012. In both cases, the identification 
strategy first relies on a fixed-effects (FE) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
robust estimator with province and annual time effects. The within-estimator has the 
advantage of controlling for unobserved characteristics which are time-invariant and 
province-specific, as well as for cross-sectional common shocks occurring over time. 
While in the first paper the analysis further controls for potential reverse causality 
between dependent and explanatory variables through a generalised-method-of-
moments (GMM) system estimator, the second paper aims to identify the genuine 
direction of causality through a two-stage least square (2SLS) estimator and the 
development of a shift-share instrument which draws on Bartik's (1991) seminal 
work. These two papers have the advantage of uncovering general trends, but failed 
to provide an adequate explanation to the trends they expose.   
The third paper aims to complement the research with more qualitative, in-depth 
analysis, where the ‘small-N’ approach is used to explain the quantitative results from 
the first paper. The analysis relies on fieldwork research carried out in Turkey’s 
central economic bureaucracy. It specifically features 32 elite, in-depth semi-
structured interviews, where the interviewees were selected integrating purposive and 
chain sampling techniques.      
Finally, the fourth paper features a two-step mixed-methodology. It first draws on the 
econometric analysis of a sub-set of the panel used in the first two papers. In absence 
of robust instrumental variables to control for potential endogeneity, the triangulation 
of quantitative and qualitative data is then used to complement and validate the 
results obtained from the former. The paper is partly inspired by Lieberman's (2005) 
guidelines for nested analysis.  
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5. Aims and themes of the thesis 
5.1. Elections and the provision of public investment   
The first aim of the thesis is to explore the link between elections and the 
geographically heterogeneous distribution of public investment across the provinces 
of Turkey. The territorial targeting of public resources as a means of political tactics 
has been reported by an increasing number of studies (Hopkin, 2006). Such literature 
has explored factors ranging from regional grants and federal spending (Alperovich, 
1984; Grossman, 1994; Case, 2001; Faguet, 2008; Tekeli and Kaplan, 2008;  Luo et 
al., 2010; Larcinese, Snyder, and Testa, 2012), trade and industrial policy 
(McGillivray, 2004), infrastructure investments (Crain and Oakley, 1995;  Castells 
and Solé-Ollé, 2005; Cadot et al., 2006; Golden and Picci, 2008; Kemmerling and 
Stephan, 2008), investment incentives schemes (Kemahlioğlu, 2008; Yavan, 2012), 
and the EU Cohesion Policy (Kemmerling and Bodestein, 2006; Crescenzi, 2009; 
Bouvet and Dall’erba, 2010).   
At the same time, however, questions about the extent to which strategic distributive 
politics prevail over programmatic, technical criteria, are frequently left unanswered. 
As Golden and Min (2013, p. 14) point out: “indeed, it is perhaps surprising that any 
politician ever loses elected office given the impressive evidence that has been 
amassed showing the politicisation of the public purse.” Drawing from Turkey as a 
critical case study, the first theme concerns the extent to which electoral factors can 
prevail over technical considerations in the allocation of public investment. 
The case of Turkey is particularly interesting for exploring this research puzzle. As a 
middle-income country with frequent episodes of poor governance, its conditions are 
ripe for pork-barrelling, clientelism, and patronage. At the same time, however, its 
long state and developmental traditions have led to the development of a 
comparatively capable central bureaucracy. As early as 1963 Turkey established an 
ad-hoc institution and a specific policy agenda aimed at curbing the high regional 
disparities which, however, still persist. 
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Paper 1. Distributive politics and regional development: Assessing the territorial 
distribution of Turkey’s public investment 
Turkey is often perceived as a country with low bureaucratic capacity and prone to 
political manipulation and ‘pork-barrel’. The article tests whether this is the case, by 
analysing the extent to which politics, rather than equity and efficiency criteria, have 
determined the geographical allocation of public investment across the country’s 81 
provinces between 2004 and 2012. It empirically answers to the following questions: 
(1) is the allocation of public investment determined primarily by political criteria? If 
so, which ones? And, (2) to what extent does the spatial allocation of central fixed 
capital investment also reflects functional economic criteria? 
In spite of a few earlier related pieces of work analysing different kinds of 
governmental goods (Kemahlioğlu, 2008; Tekeli and Kaplan, 2008; Aytaç, 2014), 
this study is the first to explore the allocation of public investment executed by the 
central government in Turkey following the electoral victory of the AK Party in 2002.  
In line with the theoretical predictions for a polity with closed-list, proportional, 
multi-member electoral districts, results show that the government has indeed 
rewarded its core supporters with additional expenditure. At the same time, 
socioeconomic factors remain nonetheless stronger predictors of public investment. 
Moreover, in contrast to redistributive regional development policy principles, the 
Turkish state seems to favour areas with a higher level of development over those 
with the most critical ‘socioeconomic need’. Hence, the state is consciously or 
unconsciously pursuing a strategy of fostering agglomeration in relatively better-off 
areas (World Bank, 2009; Venables, 2010), rather than channelling more resources 
towards the poorest areas.  
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5.2. The link between electoral politics and regional economic 
performance 
The impact of electoral rules and other national political institutions on 
macroeconomic performance has been increasingly explored by scholars in the last 
twenty years (inter alia: Boix, 1998; Persson and Tabellini, 2003; Rajan and Zingales, 
2006; Sen, 2013). In parallel to such political economy literature carried out at the 
national level, a considerable amount of research has been conducted at the sub-
national one. This second corpus of work has frequently stressed the role of local 
political coalitions and local political entrepreneurialism in shaping governance 
structures conducive to economic growth (Apaydın, 2012; Bayırbağ, 2011; Wood and 
Valler, 2004; Wood, 2008). In spite of the existence of these two separate bodies of 
literature, very little research has been carried out to cross-fertilise them and 
specifically explore how votes and partisan articulations may influence local and 
regional economic development via their role in the construction of societal cleavages 
and the distribution of state goods.  
Recently, the work by Buğra and Savaşkan (2012, 2014) has provided prima facie 
evidence suggesting that in polities lacking inclusive political institutions and where 
businesses are more reliant on state intervention – that is, many emerging and middle-
income economies around the world – governments may influence sub-national 
economic performance. This may occur through the privileged provision of state 
goods to constituencies and people with the ‘right’ political affiliation (i.e. those that 
tend to vote for the incumbent government), at the expenses of opponents (i.e. those 
that tend to vote for the opposition). Yet, such hypothesis has not been the object of 
extensive empirical attention.  
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Paper 2. Votes and regional economic growth: Evidence from Turkey 
The paper empirically asks: in countries where governments’ disproportionate power 
over the bureaucracy is coupled with a strong political polarisation, can votes for the 
national incumbent party ‘buy’ preferential policy treatment and faster regional 
economic growth? The analysis answers such question by defining a political 
economy model of regional growth and testing it in Turkey’s 81 provinces over the 
period between 2004 and 2012.  
The results of the analysis can first of all inform the burgeoning literature on 
distributive politics by providing a preliminary assessment of whether such 
‘allocative games’ have any economic consequences. The research can also 
contribute to the academic debate about the link between institutions and regional 
economic growth (Farole et al., 2010) by assessing whether, and to what extent, votes 
and partisan articulations may influence subnational economic performance. Last but 
not least, if in the last fifteen years Turkey has undergone a significant number of 
institutional reforms aimed at strengthening the public governance, recent literature 
(Buğra and Savaşkan, 2014; Meyersson and Rodrik, 2014) has underlined – once 
again – the strong links between politics and economic development in the country. 
Assessing to what extent political cleavages between opponents and supporters of the 
central government influence sub-national economies can therefore shed further light 
on the form of such links. 
Baseline results, obtained with a fixed effect (FE) estimator, confirm the existence of 
a reduced-form relationship between votes for the central government and regional 
economic growth. The preferential allocation of developmental government goods to 
provinces Yet, the overall effect of electoral politics on economic growth is very 
modest. Besides, once the potential endogeneity between the dependent variable and 
the regressors is accounted for with an instrumental variable strategy, regional 
economic performance appears as almost entirely explained by standard socio-
economic factors, primarily human capital endowment. The results are robust to the 
inclusion of standard variables which may drive regional economic growth, as well as 
to the inclusion of factors specifically able to control for the structural change that 
Turkey’s emerging economy is undergoing.  
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5.3. Politicians, state bureaucracies, and policy effectiveness 
As Bertelli and Grose (2009) stress, the literature exploring how politicians 
strategically use public resources has usually been legislature centric, in the sense that 
although it recognises that allocations are made in the byways of bureaucracies, it has 
mostly focused its attention on the role of executives and legislative bodies. The third 
theme hence shifts its attention to the former, and explores whether the institutional 
characteristics of the economic bureaucracy in charge of managing the investment 
project cycle condition the extent to which public policies remain effectively focused 
on publicly-oriented goals, as opposed to being used as a tool for particularistic 
redistribution and electoral rewarding. 
The importance of such research puzzle relates to the significant debate on how to 
foster state capacity, that is, the state’s ability to provide sound policy outputs and 
deliver collective goods effectively, particularly in view of the potential or actual 
opposition of powerful social groups (Evans, Rueschmeyer, and Skocpol, 1985). In 
spite of the widespread agreement on how state capacity plays a key role for 
economic and social change (Evans et al., 2014; World Bank, 1997), the 
identification of the factors allowing the state to effectively provide such services and 
goods remains one of the central puzzles of development.  
On the one hand, the literature on the developmental state (Amsden, 1989; Evans, 
1995; Evans et al., 2014; Rauch and Evans, 1999; Wade, 1990) has argued that strong 
and insulated bureaucracies are key to the design of effective policies, particularly in 
countries where the political class is oriented to short-term, populist decision-making. 
On the other hand, however, the public choice literature (Huber and Shipan, 2001; 
Huber, Shipan, and Pfahler, 2001; Niskanen, 1971, 2001) has suggested that 
bureaucrats are motivated by self-interest, and hence need to be controlled by 
legislators to avoid predatory and rent-seeking behaviour. The article tries to 
reconcile these two distinct views, using the case of Turkey’s management of public 
investment as a critical case study.  
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Paper 3. Do bureaucracies enhance or constrain development policy 
effectiveness? Evidence from Turkey’s central management of public investment 
While Turkey’s use of public monies has been frequently considered to be marred by 
populism, clientelism, and short-term electoral rewarding, the results from the first 
paper suggest that the allocation of public investment across Turkish provinces during 
the last decade has been more responsive to socioeconomic needs than electoral 
politics. The third paper hence aims to understand this empirical puzzle by: (1) 
exploring the extent to which the management of Turkey’s public investment is 
effectively focused on publicly-oriented goals, as opposed to being used as a tool for 
particularistic redistribution and electoral rewarding; (2) explaining whether the 
institutional characteristics of the economic bureaucracy condition the attainment of 
publicly-oriented goals.  
The analysis draws on elite, semi-structured interviews among Turkey’s economic 
bureaucracy, as well as on the examination of national and international policy 
documents. To the best of my knowledge, the study is the first attempt to critically 
explore the micro-foundations of the Turkish public investment project cycle.  
Results suggest that the existence of a capable and authoritative organisation directing 
the project cycle – the Ministry of Development (formerly State Planning 
Organisation) – has positively contributed to the technical management of 
investments. Empirical evidence also indicates how the organisation is insufficiently 
insulated vis-à-vis the government, and hence its ability to implement ‘sound’ 
policies is contingent on the political context. Such results confirm the literature on 
developmental states, which suggests how a key precondition for state effectiveness 
is bureaucratic autonomy. Nevertheless, the analysis also uncovers significant 
resistance from the bureaucrats against measures which would increase bureaucratic 
efficiency and transparency. Overall, the findings suggest that, to enhance policy-
effectiveness, bureaucracies, in general, and the Turkish bureaucracy, in particular, 
must be not only capable and autonomous, but also accountable.  
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5.4. Strategic targeting and electoral hegemony   
An increasing body of research has showed how virtually every government provides 
distributive transfers for electoral purposes. Advances in the literature on distributive 
politics have started exploring why such strategic targeting is more intense under 
some institutional conditions than others. Different electoral systems, for example, 
provide different incentives to politicians, which may respond by providing different 
quantities of public goods. Yet, in spite of the increasing interest in the link between 
institutional conditions and distributive patterns, the literature still provides 
contrasting expectations on whether highly competitive electoral environments may 
be characterized by higher – or lower – levels of discretionary strategic allocations of 
public goods compared to institutional settings with one-party hegemonic political 
power.  
On the one hand, the literature on public good provision under different political 
regimes suggests that nondemocratic rule is often accompanied by lower public good 
provision and quality (inter alia: Deacon, 2009; Kroth, Larcinese, and Wehner, 2015; 
Lake and Baum, 2001). On the other hand, Golden and Min (2013) point out how 
there is reason to surmise that distributive politics and pork-barrelling may be 
quantitatively more important in democratic than authoritarian regimes, and in 
settings with a large number of competing parties than in ones with low electoral 
competition (Lizzeri and Persico, 2005).  
The thesis’ final theme hence explores the extent to which these different hypotheses 
help explain how the use of Turkey’s public transportation investment to reward 
supporting constituencies and punish opponents’ ones has evolved along with the 
increasing authoritarian stance adopted by the incumbent AK Party and his 
charismatic leader and current President of the Republic R.T. Erdoğan. The analysis 
specifically focuses on the transportation sector because of its role in AKP’s 
distributive politics. In other words, as the paper aims to study changes in pork-
barrelling patterns, it follows a ‘selection of the extreme case’ (Gerring, 2007; 
Seawright and Gerring, 2008) where such dynamics are most evident. 
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Paper 4. Does electoral hegemony increase pork-barrelling? Evidence from 
Turkey’s transport infrastructure investment  
After its initial, unexpected electoral victory in 2002, Erdoğan’s AK Party has 
constantly experienced an upsurge in its hegemonic power over Turkey’s state, 
politics and society, turning progressively more authoritarian. As a result, 
commentators have recently argued that Turkey increasingly resembles a ‘quasi-
electoral authoritarian’ regime (cf. Arbatlı, 2014). While a conspicuous amount of 
studies has explored the societal and political consequences of the country’s recent 
authoritarian drift (inter alia: Acemoğlu, 2014; Arbatlı, 2014; Meyersson and Rodrik, 
2014; Müftüler-Baç, Keyman, 2012), little research has been conducted to assess the 
transformations occurred in the management of Turkey’s public resources. The paper 
draws from the analysis of public transport investment between 2004 and 2012, and 
aims to answer the following interrelated questions: (1) is the constant upsurge of 
power by Erdoğan and his party correlated to a change in the way public investment 
is allocated to provinces for tactical redistribution? (2) If yes, what potential 
dynamics may explain such result? 
The empirical analysis suggests how the increase in the government power is 
unexpectedly correlated to a reduction in the way investment allocations to Turkish 
provinces is used to reward supporters and punish opponents. Such reduction in pork-
barrelling was nonetheless determined only partly by a virtuous increase in policy 
effectiveness. By contrast, the analysis points to a shift from pork-barrelling to 
geographically less targeted populist spending. Such trend possibly reflects the 
government’s desire to show their grand ‘New Turkey’ – a term rhetorically used to 
describe the allegedly ‘new era’ the country is experiencing under the AKP ruling –, 
as well as the rise of new powerful special-interest groups, as documented by Buğra 
and Savaşkan (2014).  
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6. Conclusions 
This thesis has provided new evidence on the political economy of regional economic 
development by exploring four research questions related to the links between 
elections, public investment policy, and regional economic growth in post-2002 
Turkey. 
Exploring the geographical distribution of public investment by the central state 
across Turkey’s provinces, the first paper shows that politics plays a non-negligible 
role in influencing investment allocations. The governing AK Party has not been 
immune to the temptation of favouring regions that voted for it with additional 
investments. Nonetheless, similarly to the results discussed by Hopkin (2001) for the 
case of clientelism in Spain, the magnitude of pork-barrelling is relatively low in 
comparison to the role played by socioeconomic factors. Indeed, after controlling for 
electoral politics variables, socioeconomic measures remain the most relevant 
predictors of public investment. 
Relatedly, the second paper’s results suggest the existence of a positive, bell-shaped 
relationship between the provincial votes for the central government and the rate of 
regional per capita GVA growth. They also provide preliminary evidence that such 
link is driven, at least in part, by the heterogeneous distribution of state goods across 
provinces, as theoretically foreseen. Such outcomes contrast, for example, with the 
case of France studied by Cadot et al. (2006), who did not find any effect of pork-
barrelling on the economic performance of French regions. At the same time, 
however, the magnitude of such influence is small, not robust in one of the three 
empirical specifications tested, and in any case considerably less relevant than the one 
of the other socio-economic controls. Once the potential endogeneity between votes 
and regional growth is controlled for, the causal effect of the government’s 
preferential treatment to electorally aligned constituencies in driving faster regional 
economic performance is even smaller. In other words, most of the correlation 
uncovered in the baseline specification is likely to be driven by the electoral support 
given by fast-growing provinces to the incumbent party. This finding confirms earlier 
research on the role of positive economic performance in reducing electoral volatility 
(Akarca and Tansel, 2006). If further research in this area is perhaps needed, the 
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results provide a preliminary picture of Turkey’s economy where partisan 
factionalism has had modest effects and has not toppled standard drivers of regional 
growth.  
Trying to explore the mechanisms which may explain the findings from the first 
paper, the third article has focused its attention on the role played by the economic 
bureaucracy in ensuring that investment decisions remain focused on publicly-
oriented goals. In line with the developmental state literature, results suggest that the 
Ministry of Development’s nature, comparatively more capable and authoritative than 
many other Turkish public organisations, has positively contributed to the sound, 
technical management of public investment. Results also show how the organisation 
and the project cycle are relatively well insulated from individual legislators, but not 
autonomous vis-à-vis the government, and hence the effective management of funds 
is strongly dependent on the political elite’s ‘will to deliver’. The first paper’s results 
may therefore be contingent on the stable political environment of the 2000s and the 
fiscal reforms implemented following the 2001 economic crisis. In comparison, in 
periods such as the 1990s, when the political system was ‘in a state of flux’ (Sayarı, 
2002), the bureaucracy was unable to shield from executives’ pressure and deliver. 
Overall, results confirm Biddle and Milor (1995), who argued that it is less the 
absence of bureaucratic capacity than the lack of bureaucratic insulation to undermine 
Turkey’s development policies effectiveness. At the same time, however, in line with 
the democratic accountability literature, the analysis also uncovers significant 
resistance from the bureaucracy against the implementation of reforms which would 
increase the organisation’s efficiency and transparency. Furthermore, in contrast to 
conventional principal-agent models, which stress the potential for conflict between 
bureaucrats and politicians, the analysis discloses the over-sensitivity of part of the 
top bureaucrats to signals emanating from the political class (see Page, 2010, for a 
similar case).  
While the analyses provided in the first two papers have shown a relatively positive 
picture about the impact of political cleavages on Turkey’s economic policymaking 
and outcomes, the third paper provides a more nuanced view. Commentators have 
increasingly documented the autocratic and authoritarian stance adopted by Turkey’s 
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former Prime Minister and current President of the Republic Erdoğan in recent years 
(Arbatlı, 2014; Meyersson and Rodrik, 2014).  
The final paper describes how the increase in government powers is correlated with 
the use of public investment to reward supporting constituencies and punish political 
opponents. In contrast to expectations, the AKP’s increasingly hegemonic powers are 
associated with a reduction in the way transport infrastructure investment is 
strategically targeted following electoral politics considerations. As Filiztekin and 
Bakış (2015) point out, the continuous ballot-box victories experienced by the AKP 
since its unexpected 2002 result deserve careful investigation. While earlier research 
has frequently linked such political success to the country’s positive economic 
performance experienced in the 2000s, and to Turkey’s rooted ideological cleavages 
(inter alia: Akarca and Tansel, 2006; Çarkoğlu, 2008),5 the findings of the current 
analysis underline the ability of the government to, somehow, deliver public goods as 
a further reason (cf. Müftüler-Baç and Keyman, 2012, for a partly similar argument). 
At the same time, the analysis offers preliminary evidence suggesting that such trend 
was driven only partially by a virtuous increase in policy effectiveness. By contrast, 
the untargeted provision of transport infrastructure projects – mostly motorways – 
seems to have simply marked a shift from pork-barrelling to populist spending, a 
development which raises concerns about its long term economic sustainability and 
efficiency. 
 
Implications for policy 
Although the data and the analyses come from Turkey, lessons learned from this 
specific case are relevant for other countries with comparable conditions.  
First, the results from paper number one unveil a state which tends to allocate more 
investment to areas with a higher level of development over those with the most 
critical socioeconomic need. This aim clashes with the developmental policy 
                                                     
5
 As Filiztekin and Bakış (2015) further point out, structural explanations are also influenced by 
location, in the sense that the same variables seem to have different impacts on voting behaviours 
depending on the context where voters live. 
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principles set out in the constitution and in the main planning documents about 
reducing regional imbalances. This finding is relevant for regional development 
policy-makers and planners if we consider the current debate on the potential 
existence a trade-off between aggregate economic efficiency and promoting 
convergence (cf. Farole, Rodríguez-Pose, and Storper, 2011; OECD, 2009; World 
Bank, 2009). The evidence from the analysis reveals that, in presence of scarce 
resources and a severe developmental gap between rich and poor areas of the country, 
the Turkish state has privileged the concentration of public goods in areas with a 
minimum level of development, possibly with the goal of privileging efficiency over 
redistribution.  
Second, the overall results point out how one of the challenges of (regional) 
development policies is not only to figure out technical solutions but, also, to sort out 
the political process so that incentives to achieve effectiveness arise among 
politicians and bureaucrats. The influence of politics in the territorial allocation of 
public investment is hardly likely to be erased, neither something that is, if conducted 
in moderation, completely undesirable. It follows that any attempt to commit to a 
design of intergovernmental transfers exclusively based on technical criteria is not 
credible (Leon, 2010). At the same time, however, the design of measures able to 
reduce the politically discretionary use of funds and to increase the overall efficient 
use of public resources is a condicio sine qua non for public policy. Following 
Lohmann (2003), we suggest that the likely solution is to tame the issue at the 
margins, i.e. ridding of the excessively discretionary forms of political interference.  
Such goals can be achieved by reforms aimed at de-politicising the civil service, 
separating the political sphere from the administrative tasks, and instilling new 
management practices within the public administration (Milio, 2010). Findings from 
the third paper indeed confirm that bureaucracies can play a significant role in 
promoting state effectiveness and taming the use of public goods for electoral 
targeting. Results in particular suggest that effective bureaucracies need to strike a 
balance between the two opposing dimensions of bureaucratic autonomy and 
accountability. As Azulai et al. (2014, p. 8) argue, good institutions “need to solve the 
conflict of interest between bureaucrats and politicians on one side and citizens on the 
other by providing mechanisms for political accountability, guaranteeing that 
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society’s interests prevail over bureaucrats’ and politicians’ interests”. If the balance 
between these two dimensions is tipped too far in favour of either of them, 
bureaucracies will face the risk of either becoming too powerful and seek rents (as 
seminally foreseen by Niskanen, 1971), or to become too weak to oppose the use of 
public goods by politicians for purely-strategic goals.  
Relatedly, while most countries around the world have progressively moved towards 
an incipient decentralization (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2003), results from 
contemporary Turkey confirm earlier research (Özcan, 2000, 2006; Prud’homme, 
1995) on the risks of horizontal and vertical decentralization measures carried out in 
absence of a strong and competent state administration. The thesis does not argue the 
case for a traditional ‘top-down’ developmental state. Yet, results are a reminder of 
how a capable, shielded from political power, and accountable bureaucracy is a 
prerequisite to limit the problems which frequently cause ‘democratic failures’ 
(Besley, 2006) around the world. As suggested by Heper (1992), Turkey needs 
reforms aimed at increasing democratic participation in the policy process and 
taxpayers’ monitoring over public spending. Actions which reduce the powers of the 
old top bureaucracy to increase the control by the ruling government – as occurred in 
recent years – will not otherwise lead to stronger institutions, but simply produce 
different – and in some ways more pernicious (Meyersson and Rodrik, 2014) – 
ineffective and unsustainable structures.   
 
Extensions to the research 
As with any research, there is a series of limitations to this thesis, which offer a 
number of areas for future explorations.  
First, the thesis has specifically focused on party politics, grounding such choice on 
the literature analyzing how parties capture Turkey’s key social and political 
cleavages (Acemoğlu and Robinson, 2013; De Leon et al., 2009; Kalaycioğlu, 2001; 
Özbudun, 2013). Yet, the analyses cannot rule out that there may be other forms of 
non-electoral cleavages potentially affecting the political economy of public 
investment. Buğra and Savaşkan (2014) have, for example, pointed to the role played 
- 35 - 
by business associations in influencing state-economy relations. Although they 
acknowledge how the impact of parties and business organisations on Turkey’s 
contemporary economic environment is closely knitted, and data on business 
organisations is extremely scarce, further quantitative research on the latter 
organisations would ideally complement the analyses carried out in this thesis. 
Relatedly, economic and political studies conducted at electoral levels are naturally 
not equipped with tools to offer answers to the question of who is potentially able to 
extract rents out of public projects and goods, even when these are allocated to areas 
most in need of them. Further research could, for example, build on Buğra and 
Savaşkan's (2014) and Özcan and Gündüz's (2015) seminal contributions and explore 
the extent to which the effects of the government’s ‘preferential treatment’ have 
influenced individual people and business groups, rather than entire territories.  
Second, although sub-national tiers of government do not play a major role in 
Turkey’s public investment project cycle, further research on the effects of multilevel 
governance on investment decisions could perhaps provide insightful results, 
particularly considering how the lack of coordination between central and sub-
national administrative units has been discussed as a problem in the literature (cf. 
Karadağ, Deliktaş, and Önder, 2004).   
Last but not least, as discussed in Section 2, the thesis has focused its attention on the 
analysis of a public good such as public investment. By its own nature, such good is 
not excludable, meaning that the logics driving its use for electoral rewarding may be 
different from the ones driving the use of other state goods. Diaz-Cayeros et al. 
(2012) and Posner and Kramon (2011) for example argue that governments may use 
different types of goods to reward different groups at the same time. Further research 
on the management of private, excludable goods such as public tenders and 
investment incentives to the private sector may hence complement this thesis by 
testing whether in Turkey different types of government goods have indeed been used 
for different political objectives.     
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1. Introduction 
One of the most important decisions that governments face, both in rich and in 
emerging countries, is how to geographically allocate the public resources necessary 
for development, given each country’s budget constraints. In contrast to conventional 
regional development approaches, which have seen public interventions as purely 
driven by technical socioeconomic considerations, a body of theoretical contributions 
and empirical studies at the interface between economics and political science has 
explored in the last two decades how the spatial distribution of public resources and 
government programmes is driven not only by efficiency and equity, but also by 
electoral concerns. Advances in data availability in the last decades have allowed the 
extension of this line of research to a large number of countries (Golden and Min, 
2013). While much of economic and regional development literature has tended to 
overlook issues related to electoral politics and its influence on policy-making, the 
literature on distributive politics has precisely put how electoral politics shapes the 
allocation of governmental goods at its heart.  
This article tries to make sense of contradictory hypotheses that can be found in the 
literature on regional development policy and on distributive politics, using Turkey as 
a critical case study. It will do so by analysing the extent to which electoral factors 
prevail over technical, functionalistic considerations in the allocation of public 
investment. The case of Turkey is particularly interesting. As an emerging country 
with frequent episodes of poor governance, its conditions are ripe for pork-barrelling 
and patronage. At the same time, however, its long state and developmental traditions 
have led to the development of a comparatively capable and, to a certain extent, 
independent central bureaucracy. As early as 1963 Turkey established an ad-hoc 
institution and a specific policy agenda aimed at curbing the high regional disparities 
which, however, still persist. In spite of a few earlier related pieces of work analysing 
different kinds of governmental goods (Kemahlioğlu, 2008; Tekeli and Kaplan, 2008; 
Aytaç, 2014), this study will be the first to explore the allocation of public investment 
executed by the central government in Turkey following the electoral victory of the 
Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002.  
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Empirically, the paper aims to answer to the following questions: (1) is the allocation 
of public investment determined primarily by political criteria? If so, which ones?; 
and, (2) in parallel we ask the extent to which the spatial allocation of central fixed 
capital investment also reflects functional economic criteria? Our estimation strategy 
is based on the adoption of both fixed-effects and generalised method of moments 
(GMM) (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) estimators in a dataset 
for Turkey’s 81 provinces over the period between 2005 and 2012.  
The literature has frequently stressed how Turkish politics has not revolved around 
the design of sound socio-economic policies, but has been fundamentally motivated 
by a desire by politicians to develop and sustain networks of clientelism and 
patronage (Heper and Keyman, 2006). Yet our results, which are robust against 
possible endogeneity, suggest a more nuanced picture. In line with the theoretical 
expectations for a polity with proportional, multi-member electoral districts, they 
show that while the Government does indeed reward its core supporters with 
additional expenditure, socioeconomic factors remain nonetheless stronger predictors 
of public investment. Moreover, in contrast to redistributive regional development 
policy principles, the Turkish state seems to favour areas with a higher level of 
development over those with the most critical ‘socioeconomic need’. Hence, the State 
is consciously or unconsciously pursuing a strategy of fostering agglomeration in 
relatively better-off areas (World Bank, 2009; Venables, 2010), rather than 
channelling more resources towards the poorest areas.  
The outline of the paper is as follows: section two provides an overview of the 
literature on the political economy of regional development policies and sets the 
research hypotheses. Section three introduces Turkey’s institutional background. 
Section four discusses the data, the empirical variables, and the estimation strategy. 
Section five explores the results. Section six draws the discussion to a conclusion. 
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2. Electoral politics and the territorial distribution of public 
investments  
The political economy of regional development policies 
The design of policies aimed at regional development has traditionally tended to 
focus on the trade-off between equity and efficiency. How a more effective economic 
policy to tackle regional inequalities should be designed remains hotly discussed (for 
example, Barca, 2009; OECD, 2009; World Bank, 2009). The debate has, however, 
not paid adequate attention to the impact of electoral politics on the design of public 
policy. A growing body of research linking economics and political science has 
explored how in the real world public grants and investment programmes are also 
distributed on the basis of ‘purely political’ considerations (Persson, 1998). A number 
of studies in political economy demonstrate that, in parallel to grand/programmatic 
redistribution, a second type of redistribution is constantly taking place. This form of 
‘politically-driven’ tactical redistribution (Dixit and Londregan, 1996) is likely to be 
carried on even when the same general development policy framework remains 
constant. According to the public choice literature, the reason behind the influence of 
politics on policy-making is that politicians are instrumental in their behaviour 
(Dunleavy, 1991) and are likely to deliver more to those voters who can keep them in 
power. Electoral politics may thus topple economics when it comes to the territorial 
distribution of public funds.   
Such a ‘political market bias’ may be defined as even more relevant in contexts where 
the legitimacy of the state, as well as a strong civil society and formal institutions, are 
not fully developed, such as in many developing economies (Richardson and 
Townroe, 1986). In such environments, lower levels of bureaucratic capacity and 
stronger informal consensus building practices (Özcan, 2000, 2006) reduce the 
incentives/capacity to prevent the political use of public monies (Evans, 1995). It can 
therefore be expected that distributive politics maybe more pervasive in emerging 
countries characterised by lower state capacity, rather than in strong states. In the case 
of Turkey, for example, it has been frequently stressed that the implementation of 
sound public policies by the State has been affected by both pervasive bureaucratic 
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corruption, as well as by ubiquitous and inefficient networks of political clientelism 
and patronage (Danielson and Keleṣ, 1985; Heper and Keyman, 2006).  
Overall, the specific geographical targeting of public resources as a means of political 
tactics has been reported by an increasing number of studies (Hopkin, 2006). Such 
literature has explored factors ranging from regional grants and federal spending 
(Alperovich, 1984; Grossman, 1994; Case, 2001; Faguet, 2008; Tekeli and Kaplan, 
2008;  Luo et al., 2010; Larcinese, Snyder, and Testa, 2012), trade and industrial 
policy (McGillivray, 2004), infrastructure investments (Crain and Oakley, 1995;  
Castells and Solé-Ollé, 2005; Cadot et al., 2006; Golden and Picci, 2008; 
Kemmerling and Stephan, 2008), investment incentives schemes (Kemahlioğlu, 2008; 
Yavan, 2012), and the EU Cohesion Policy ( Kemmerling and Bodestein, 2006; 
Crescenzi, 2009; Bouvet and Dall’erba, 2010).   
At the same time, however, questions about the extent to which distributive politics 
prevail over technical policy-making criteria, are frequently left unanswered. As 
Golden and Min (2013, p. 14) argue: “indeed, it is perhaps surprising that any 
politician ever loses elected office given the impressive evidence that has been 
amassed showing the politicisation of the public purse”. Drawing from the literature 
this article puts forward a model of resource allocation to assess the extent to which 
the geographical distribution of public investments aimed at the economic 
development of Turkish provinces depends on electoral politics or on functional 
economic criteria. We model public investment as driven by: 
I = f (Electoral politics, functional economic factors)                                                (1) 
We thus assume that the Turkish government may allocate public investment driven 
by either ‘tactical political redistribution’ considerations or by functional 
socioeconomic criteria.  
 
The alternative allocative hypotheses  
We divide each of the two main principles into specific operational criteria. Each is 
explored through a separate research hypothesis. Drawing from the literature, we 
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identify three alternative distributive politics hypotheses, as well as two functional 
ones.  
Within the literature on the links between politico-electoral systems and the 
geographical targeting of public resources, a ‘classic’ debate has flourished on 
whether distributive politics is carried out to cement existing or to buy new votes. 
According to the first explanation, the districts most likely to be favoured in the 
distribution of public resources will be the strongholds of the central governing party 
– at the expense of those supporting opposition parties – because risk-averse 
politicians will prefer strengthening their core electorates’ loyalties rather than 
embarking on politically-risky electoral investments (Cox and McCubbins, 1986). 
McGillivray (2004), in particular, has argued that the most relevant hypothesis behind 
distributive prediction will vary according to the political system. In line with her 
expectations for a country with a close-list, multi-member proportional representation 
electoral system, the first empirical hypothesis states: 
Hypothesis 1: The higher the electoral support for the party in government in a 
Turkish province, the higher the public investment allocated to that province. 
Conversely, the higher the votes cast for opposition parties, the lower the amount of 
public investment. 
By contrast, other scholars foresee models where utility-maximising politicians will 
first favour groups – or districts (Golden and Min, 2013) – with the highest potential 
electoral productivity gains (Dixit and Londregan, 1996), such as those most willing 
to switch their votes following economic favours. The second empirical hypothesis 
thus states: 
Hypothesis 2: Investments are disproportionally allocated to electorally competitive 
districts, that is, those where the vote difference between the incumbent government’s 
party and its challenger is lower. 
Last but not least, a recent work by Aytaç (2014) has stressed how the debate 
between core- versus swing-voter-models is only appropriate for analysing two-party 
competition settings, but falls short of accounting for distributive politics dynamics in 
presence of multi-party competition. His argument is that, in a setting of multiparty 
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competition, the incumbent party may have incentives to channel preferential 
resources to districts with both a high level of electoral competition and an 
ideologically close challenger, because in such places there may be more voters 
willing to switch their votes. As a consequence, the third empirical hypothesis states: 
Hypothesis 3: Investments are disproportionally allocated to districts which are 
electorally competitive and where the main challenger is ideologically close to the 
incumbent party. 
In contrast to the first three ‘electorally-motivated’ allocation criteria, functional 
principles would suggest that the allocation of developmental resources is driven by 
socioeconomic rationales. In particular, if the government is concerned with 
addressing regional economic imbalances, it should target investment spending 
towards poorer areas:  
Hypothesis 4: the central government preferentially targets capital investments to 
regions where socioeconomic disadvantage is higher, that is where developmental 
needs are most urgent.  
Alternatively, and in line with the findings of the New Economic Geography 
(Ottaviano and Puga, 1998; Venables, 2010) – conveyed in the policy 
recommendations of the World Bank’s World Development Report 2009 (World 
Bank, 2009) – emerging countries governments may, under the constraint of scarce 
resources, prefer to aim for national efficiency by targeting core regions and large 
agglomerations first, on the ground that growth and spatial redistribution goals are 
often difficult to reconcile. This was the strategy officially pursued by the Turkish 
state during the first decades of the Republic (see next paragraphs). The last empirical 
hypothesis therefore states:  
Hypothesis 5: Investments are allocated according to socioeconomic criteria. In 
contrast to what stated in hypothesis 4, however, higher allocations are positively, 
rather than negatively, associated to higher levels of development.  
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3. Turkey and its institutional background 
Turkey offers an interesting case for analysing the link between electoral politics and 
public expenditure for different reasons. First, it was an early mover among 
developing countries in being concerned and addressing territorial disparities. As 
early as 1963, the country established an ad-hoc institution and a specific policy 
agenda aimed at curbing the high regional inequality that, however, still persists. In 
spite of such a long history of regional development policies, interventions have 
recorded a limited effectiveness – a fact strongly stressed by the European 
Commission since the start of Turkey’s EU-accession negotiations (Luca, 2011) and 
also acknowledged by the State bureaucracy (SPO, 2003b).  
Second, the strong dependence of the allocation of investment on central government 
allows identifying programmatic and tactical redistribution trends more easily than in 
countries where multiple institutional levels are important political arena and play a 
role in the spatial distribution of resources. The fact that investments are spent by 
local branches of the central state also reduces the risk of omitted variable bias related 
to the different absorption capacity of regions in more decentralised systems.  
Third, as Posner and Kramon (2011) empirically show, governments are likely to 
favour constituencies through targeting multiple goods at the same time. If such 
allocations are done to accommodate more than just one interest group, that is, if 
distributive patterns are not constant across types of goods, the results will likely 
become dependent on which good – among the range of pork types used by the 
government – researchers are focusing on. Research has already been conducted on 
the distribution of public incentives to foster private investments – one of the two 
main regional development policy tools adopted by the Turkish government – by 
Kemahlioğlu (2008) and Yavan (2012). To our best knowledge no research has yet 
concentrated on public fixed capital investments – the other key tool. 
Last but not least, following Yeung (2001)’s call for social scientists to pay more 
attention to ‘neglected regions’ of the world, our analysis allows shedding more light 
on a country whose coverage in the international literature is rather low, in spite of its 
increasing role as a key Mediterranean and Eurasian power, as well as its status of 
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EU-candidate country. Investigating the causes that limit Turkey’s success in 
reducing regional economic disparities is also relevant in the context of EU accession 
negotiations. Considering the size of the country and its extremely high territorial 
disparities between its Western and Eastern regions, if ever accepted into the 
European Union, the country may become the biggest recipient of Structural Funds. 
 
Regional development policies in Turkey 
The specific balance between territorial equity and overall national efficiency that 
governments consider when implementing territorially-redistributive regional 
development policies differ from country to country, depending on societal values 
and on constitutional provisions (Solé-Ollé, 2010). During the four first republican 
decades of the Turkish State (1923-1962), the official priority was the concentration 
of investments in major urban areas with the aim of fostering the overall national 
growth (Eraydın, 2000). The shift in attention to regional inequalities happened 
however relatively early. In 1963 the country set up an ad-hoc institution in charge of 
multi-annual planning – the State Planning Organisation (Devlet Planlama Teșkilatı, 
SPO), recently transformed into the Ministry of Development – with a specific 
agenda aimed at reducing regional disparities. Article 166 of the 1982 Constitution 
explicitly calls for public policies to tackle regional imbalances through a “speedy, 
balanced, and harmonious development of industry and agriculture throughout the 
country”. The starting of the planning era was induced by the National Unity 
Committee following the 1960 military coup. As Özbudun and Ulusan (1980) stress, 
the military rulers were rather sympathetic to the concept of planning and the idea of 
an organism aimed not merely at the physical growth of the nation, but also at a 
peaceful transformation of the existing systems. Since then, the Ministry of 
Development (former SPO) has been in charge of preparing multiannual development 
plans highlighting the priorities and strategies of all Ministries and other public 
agencies. The plans are then implemented through annual programmes detailing out 
the budgetary allocation of public investments. While the plans are prepared by a 
supposedly independent, technical bureaucracy, their final approval is the prerogative 
of decision-makers.  
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Figure 1. Shares of public fixed-capital investment on total fixed-capital investment 
and on Gross National Product (GNP) (1950-2010).  
 
Source: own elaboration on data from the Ministry of Development’s database. 
Figure 2. Geographical distribution of average per-capita public investment (2004-
2012).  
 
Source: own elaboration on data from the Ministry of Development’s database. 
Since the 1980s and particularly during the last decade, Turkey has also taken 
progressive steps towards an incipient decentralisation (Özcan and Turunç, 2008). 
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However, the country still remains one of the most centralised public finance systems 
among OECD countries (Blöchliger and Rabesona, 2009).  
Figure 1 shows the share of public gross fixed capital investments in the Turkish 
economy. Despite a recent reduction, public investment still accounts for around five 
percent of the total GNP. This is higher than other OECD countries such as Germany, 
Italy, PorTuğal, or the United Kingdom (Gönenç et al., 2005).  
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the average amount of fixed-capital public 
investments during the period of analysis. The average mean across 2004-2012, 
expressed in logarithmic terms, is 5.19 Turkish Lira per capita, with a standard 
deviation across provinces of 0.41.  
 
The evolution of regional disparities 
Despite the spread of wealth to some new regions during the last decades, particularly 
to areas neighbouring the traditional cores, Turkey continues to have a highly unequal 
spatial distribution of economic activities and, most importantly, of many social 
developmental indicators (Filiztekin and Celik, 2010).
6
 In 2003, for example, the 
GDP per capita in the richest NUTS2 region (TR10, Istanbul) was 1.43 times the 
national average while in the poorest region (TRB2, Bitlis, Hakkari, Muș, Van) it 
represented only 0.35 times the national medium value (Turkstat, 2006). Moreover, 
the majority of recent studies – all analysing the period up to the early 2000s –  do not 
find evidence of inter-regional convergence (Karaman and Doğruel, 2011), neither in 
terms of per-capita GPD (Gezici and Hewings 2004, 2007), nor new firms creation 
(Gaygısız and Koksal, 2003), or unemployment rates (Filiztekin, 2009). Gezici and 
Hewings' (2007) results in particular indicate how a contrasting trend of reduction in 
intra-regional disparities has been accompanied by an increase in inter-regional ones.  
                                                     
6
 In 2010, the country’s Human Development Index was ranked 83rd in the world, behind any other 
EU, Eastern European and Balkan country. In the same year, Turkey’s Gender Gap Index ranked 126 th, 
well behind several Asian, African and Arab states (Bardak and Majcher-Teleon, 2011). All these low 
rankings closely reflect the spatially uneven human and economic development in the country, with all 
five poorest NUTS2 regions located in the east and the southeast of the country, that is, the area with 
the highest concentration of ethnic Kurdish people. 
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Figure 3. Change in regional disparities: population-weighted coefficient of variation 
of NUTS2 regions’ per-capita Gross Value Added (1995-2008). 
 
Source: own elaboration on data from OECD’s regional database. 
Figure 4. Scatter plot of per-capita public investment (Ln) and per-capita regional 
Gross Value Added (GVA) (2004-2012). 
 
Source: own elaboration. 
Figure 3 shows the population-weighted coefficient of variation for regional gross 
value added for recent years. It confirms the lack of clear reductions in inter-regional 
disparities among provinces.  
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Figure 4 shows the correlation between per capita fixed-capital investments annually 
allocated to each province between 2004 and 2012 and the levels of provincial per 
capital Gross Value Added (GVA. Yearly values are pooled). While a correlation 
between economic outputs and the amount of investments allocated is visible, there is 
considerable variation above and below the fitted line. The empirical analysis will 
uncover which factors explain such variation. Figure 4 suggests that the allocation 
patterns of public investment may be more complex than those behind a simple 
regional redistributive framework. 
 
Turkey’s institutional background 
Despite a history of more than 16 multiparty elections and parliamentary rules, 
Turkey has had a difficult time being accepted as a democratic regime by 
international political and academic circles (Sayarı, 2002). Frequent military coups, 
internal armed conflicts and human rights abuses have traditionally tarnished its 
reputation. Nonetheless, Turkey has enjoyed relative political stability and democratic 
elections since 1983. In its current form, the Turkish Republic is a closed-list 
proportional-representation electoral system democracy, with the d’Hondt formula 
and a national threshold of 10percent used to translate votes into parliament seats. As 
such, electors vote only for a political party, with the party itself controlling which 
candidates are seated in parliament. Electoral districts coincide with provinces. In the 
2011 national elections the number of MPs elected from each province ranged 
between one (Bayburt) and 85 (Istanbul), with a mean value of 6,8.  
In the 1980s and 1990s the Turkish political landscape was characterised by political 
fragmentation, extremely high electoral volatility (Hazama, 2003) and a party system 
‘in a state of flux’ (Sayarı, 2002, p. 17).  The 2000s brought about a neater and more 
stable political panorama. The 2002 elections can be considered a real watershed in 
Turkish politics, marked by the rapid rise of a newly formed party (AKP), which has 
remained in power since.  
Similarly to contemporaneous changes in many other countries, the last two decades 
also witnessed a decrease in the Turkish political polarisation based on left/right 
ideologies. Many analysts suggest an increase in the cleavages built around two main 
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social dimensions: religiosity versus laicism and Turkish versus ethnic Kurdish 
nationalisms (Öniş, 1997; Güneş-Ayata and Ayata, 2002; Çarkoğlu and Hinich, 
2006).
7
 The first social fault line is likely to be captured by the contraposition 
between the pro-Islamic ruling party and the main, secular opposition one; the 
second, instead, will need to be controlled for in the empirical analysis.  
 
                                                     
7
 Kurds make up Turkey’s most populous minority. Depending on different estimates, they 
constitute between 12 and 20 per cent of the population (Mutlu, 1996; Güneş-Ayata and Ayata, 2002). 
Exact counts are not available since 1965. 
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4. Empirical analysis 
Empirical model and variables 
In order to test our hypotheses, the overall per capita commitments to each province 
are regressed on their potential political and socioeconomic determinants. The 
analysis will focus on Turkish provinces (NUTS3 level), because this is a) the 
specific level coinciding with central electoral districts; b) the sub-national level at 
which investments allocations are recorded; and c) the most meaningful 
administrative partition between local municipalities and the central State. 
Following the literature and the theoretical discussion of section (2), the empirical 
model adopts the following form: 
Yi,t = β1Pi,t-1 + β2Xi,t-1 + αi + nt + ɛi,t                                                                                                                 (2) 
Where (i and t denote provinces and years respectively); Yi,t is the total amount of per 
capita national fixed-capital investment allocated to each province; Pi,t-1 and Xi,t-1 
represent vectors of electoral and socioeconomic factors respectively;
8
 αi and nt are 
respectively province and year fixed-effects, and ɛi,t is the error term. 
The dependent and the explanatory variables, summarised in Appendix 1, are 
described in the following paragraphs.  
Dependent variable 
Per capita fixed public investments: total values to each province include investments 
in agriculture, manufacturing, transport, housing, education, health and other public 
services. Investments in mining and energy are not included on the basis that they are 
more likely to be allocated according to first nature geographical characteristics and 
to national priorities respectively. All the values are expressed in 1000 Turkish Lira 
                                                     
8
 Investment projects are very likely to stretch over many years so allocations, as well, may be 
correlated over time. While this fact may support the inclusion of the dependent variable’s lagged 
value Yi,t-1 among the regressors, we reject such choice because of the bias that affects FE estimators of 
dynamic models in the order of 1/T, that is a level too high for our short time span. Tests available on 
request confirm that the inclusion of lagged investments into regressions do not alter the results.  
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(TL) at 2012 prices and in logarithmic terms in order to control for non-linear 
relations.
9
  
Political independent variables 
Party vote shares. Party percentage vote shares at national elections are the first, most 
immediate variables able to capture the political clout of provinces. By including both 
the incumbent party as well as the main opposition ones, we can also test whether 
funding allocations following electoral criteria mainly reward constituencies aligned 
with the incumbent governments and/or punish those voting for the opposition. We 
exclusively focus on the central political level, as the main regional development 
decisions are still strongly in the grip of Ankara’s powers.  
Kurdish nationalism. The variable is proxied by the share of votes cast for the pro-
Kurdish party. While the literature based on European countries suggests that regions 
with strong separatist parties are likely to receive more resources (Kemmerling and 
Stephan, 2008), our expectation in the case of the Kurdish party
10
 will be opposite 
(Danielson and Keleṣ, 1985), since constant armed tensions in Kurd-inhabited areas 
and armed conflict may have limited public investment (Yeğen, 1999). 
Electoral competition. Such variable is constructed as the negative of the absolute 
value of the vote difference between the incumbent party and its main challenger in 
each province. The challenger is the second party where the AKP has garnered the 
                                                     
9
 A significant proportion of investments are registered as part of multi-provincial projects, so it is 
not possible to match it with any specific province. Over 2004-2012, multi-provincial projects 
accounted on average for 45.67 per cent of the total public investment portfolio, with an annual 
standard deviation from the period’s overall mean of 5.10. Typical multi-provincial projects are the 
construction of roads linking more than one province, the setting up of network of laboratories, or the 
national wholesale purchase of equipment and machineries. Our analysis only concentrates on the 
investments that can be attributed to a single province. Data limitation is – alas – one of the biggest 
problems in empirical research, particularly in emerging countries. Aware that the data may potentially 
be imprecise and in absence of any other viable solution, we follow the same approach as earlier 
researchers who have worked on public investments in Turkey (Deliktaṣ et al. 2008; Karadağ et al., 
2004; Celebioğlu and Dall’erba, 2010). 
10
 Under the allegation of supporting the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the main Kurdish 
parties have been repeatedly banned over the years. We therefore consider, at each election, the party 
in place at that moment. Since running as independent candidates and then agglomerating into a single 
group after elections has been a strategy to circumvent the seat allocation minimum national 
thresholds, we jointly consider Kurdish and independent votes.  
- 59 - 
greatest number of votes or an opposition party, when this is not the case. As we take 
the negative of the absolute value, we will expect the variable to show a positive sign, 
meaning that provinces where the vote difference is lower receive comparatively 
more funds. 
Malapportionment. This variable consists in the Ln of the ratio between the total 
provincial population (as a proxy for the number of voters) and the number of seats 
allocated in each constituency. It is an indicator of electoral productivity, measuring 
the profitability for politicians of ‘investing’ in a constituency, depending on how 
many votes are needed to win a seat. 
Close competitor. Following Aytaç (2014), we first create a dummy equal to one for 
the provinces where the AKP competes with ideologically close parties. These 
include the MHP, as well as the True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi, DYP) and the 
Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP) in the 2002 elections. The variable is 
then constructed as the interaction of the dummy with electoral competition.  
Socioeconomic independent variables 
Due to changes in early 2000s in data collection by Turkstat, provincial data on GDP 
for the whole period of analysis does not exist. We then try to control for the 
contextual socioeconomic disadvantage through two alternative variables.  
Contextual development level. The first variable is the Provincial Development Index 
(PDI), a composite indicator developed by the Ministry of Development through 
principal component analysis. It takes into account economic (statistics on 
manufacturing, constructions, agriculture, value added, investments and finance) and, 
to a lesser extent, social factors (demographic structure, employment, education, 
health and various developmental parameters). While we are aware that the index 
may not fully be a proxy for contextual wealth, there is no viable alternative to 
control for contextual development levels at provincial level.   
Wealth. To check for the robustness of our results, we also include the annual growth 
rate of per-capita GVA. This variable is, however, only available for NUTS II regions 
and not for provinces. 
- 60 - 
Wealth variables measure potential contextual disadvantage, without either 
questioning the structural reasons behind poverty, or the possible ways to get away 
from it. We therefore also control for key growth-retarding/enhancing socio-
demographic characteristics (Rodríguez-Pose, 1999) which may drive allocative 
choices, namely: sectorial economic structure, educational attainment, rural/urban 
imbalances, and total population.  
Manufacturing employment. We concentrate on the % of employment in 
manufacturing on total employment because of the central role that industrialisation 
has played in the structural transformation of Turkey’s economy in recent years.  
Education attainments. We use the percentage of students in higher education 
(vocational training and university) on total population, as a proxy for the level of 
education in each province.  
Rural population. In a country such as Turkey characterised by late development and 
a rapid, recent urbanisation, the regional developmental inequalities are likely to be 
correlated with the urban/rural divide, which we proxy by the percentage of 
population living in rural areas. 
Population: while the other socioeconomic regressors, as well as the dependent 
variable, are normalised by population of the province, population is included in the 
equation as it is considered as an important driver of investment allocations.  
  
Sample and data 
The analysis employs a panel data set covering 81 Turkish provinces over the period 
2005-2012. Basic data on national public investments per province was derived from 
the Ministry of Development.  
Electoral data for the 2002, 2007, and 2011 elections was gathered from the European 
Election Database, as well as from Turkey’s Electoral High Committee. We 
annualised political variables by extending electoral results over each legislature. 
Electoral wards within metropolitan provinces are not taken into account and 
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therefore national elections’ data are collected for provinces, which constitute the 
power bases of political parties and one of the most important units of political 
representation (Güvenç and Kırmanoğlu, 2009).  
Population information was obtained merging 2005-2009 OECD figures with 
Turkstat regional database’s 2007-2011 figures. Data on the Provincial Development 
Index comes from interpolating the values from the State Planning Organisation 
(1996, 2003) and Baday-Yıldız et al. (2010). Other socioeconomic data where 
obtained from Turkstat’s regional database and interpolated in case of missing years.  
A review of data sources as well as summary statistics for each variable are provided 
in Appendices 1 and 2. 
 
Identification strategies 
Our research hypotheses aim to test to what extent, and through which channels, 
political factors can be treated as determinants of the allocation of investments. Our 
strategy to explore such questions requires the use of two different estimators, both of 
which exploit the panel data variation between the three different electoral contests. 
We first adopt a fixed-effects (FE) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust 
estimator with province and annual time effects. Such an estimator has the advantage 
of controlling for all the possible omitted variables that are idiosyncratic to provinces. 
To control for potential serial and spatial correlation, we estimate robust standard 
errors adjusted for clustering at the provincial level (81 clusters). Considering that 
plans for time t are prepared in advance and then approved by fall/winter of time t-1, 
we include a one-year lag between right and left-side variables, which will also help 
minimise the endogeneity between dependent and explanatory variables.  
Although grounded in an ample body of works, our first estimation strategy may 
suffer from potential endogeneity caused by reverse causality, since higher/lower 
investments by the central government at election t may increase/decrease the votes 
given to the governing party at subsequent polls (Larcinese et al., 2012). To control 
for the robustness of FE results, our solution is to transform equation (2) using first 
difference 
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Δ Yi,t = Δ β1Xi,t-1 + Δ β2Pi,t-1 + αi + nt + ɛi,t                                                                       (3) 
and then to use Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond's (1998) GMM 
robust system estimator, which instruments differences – equation (3) – with past 
levels, and levels – equation (2) – with past differences. The adoption of GMM-
system rather than GMM-difference (Arellano and Bond, 1991) is motivated by the 
latter’s severe constraints in presence of time series persistence, since lagged variable 
levels are extremely weak instruments for subsequent first-differences (Bond et al. 
2001). The issue of low within-unit variance is particularly relevant in the case of 
political, electoral and institutional factors, which are by nature rather persistent over 
time (Plumper and Troeger, 2007).
11
 Robust, cluster and small options are adopted to 
obtain heteroscedasticity- and autocorrelation-robust standard errors as well as small-
sample corrections to the covariance matrix estimate (Roodman, 2009b).  
While system-GMM is an attractive technique to handle regressors’ potential 
endogeneity, internal instrumenting is also known for suffering from a series of 
limitations, including the risks of accepting results that are invalid because of weak 
instruments (Roodman, 2009a). In order to minimise such risks, the analysis restricts 
the range of lags to two and five,
12
 while also collapsing the instrument matrix as 
proposed by Roodman (2009b).  
 
                                                     
11
 We also considered the use of a Fixed-Effect Vector Decomposition estimator (Plumper and 
Troeger, 2007), eventually discarded for the inconsistency risks underlined by Breusch et al. (2011). 
12
 As a further check, we have also tried different instrument solutions, such as adopting lags two to 
six, lags to two to four or only lags two and three. In spite of such changes, both estimates and 
significance levels were overall constant. 
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5. Results 
Baseline results 
Table 1 presents the results obtained with the linear FE estimator. The first three 
columns show the estimates corresponding to the distributive politics hypotheses H.1, 
H.2 and H.3. The fourth column presents the results for hypotheses H.4 and H.5 
(which refer to the same variables, but foresee opposite signs). The final column 
shows the full regression, which represents our preferred model.  
Table 1. Fixed Effects (FE) estimation of the empirical model. 
 (H.1) core-
voter 
(H.2) electoral 
competition 
(H.3) close 
competitor 
(H.4/5) equity/ 
efficiency  
Full model 
      
AKP votes 0.0216**    0.0126* 
 (0.0100)    (0.00675) 
CHP votes -0.0374***    -0.0107 
 (0.0139)    (0.00711) 
MHP votes 0.0234    0.0157 
 (0.0170)    (0.0119) 
Kurdish party votes 0.0130    0.0120* 
 (0.0134)    (0.00701) 
Electoral competition  0.000940 0.00142  -0.00151 
  (0.00366) (0.00349)  (0.00302) 
Malapportionment  -3.377*** -3.363***  -0.00395 
  (0.885) (0.883)  (0.234) 
Close competitor   -0.00261  -0.000404 
   (0.00449)  (0.00434) 
Development index    0.455** 0.365* 
    (0.188) (0.187) 
Per-capita GVA growth    2.073*** 1.800** 
    (0.778) (0.838) 
Manufacturing empl.    0.00149 0.00480 
    (0.0136) (0.0140) 
Education attainment    -0.00887*** -0.00839*** 
    (0.000877) (0.000872) 
Rural population    0.0747*** 0.0730*** 
    (0.0235) (0.0228) 
Total population    -3.36e-07 -2.82e-07 
    (2.05e-07) (2.18e-07) 
Constant 4.519*** 44.07*** 43.91*** 2.120** 1.578 
 (0.571) (10.24) (10.22) (0.879) (3.015) 
      
Observations 567 567 567 567 567 
R-squared 0.133 0.136 0.137 0.175 0.184 
Number of id 81 81 81 81 81 
Province FE yes yes yes yes yes 
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes 
Notes: The dependent variable is expressed in logarithms. All explanatory variables are lagged by 
one year. Robust, clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Starting from the first research hypothesis – which argues that opportunistic 
distributive politics aims at cementing the electoral support of the incumbent party’s 
core voters – the results in column one show clear and statistically significant 
evidence of a preferential allocation of public investment to provinces where votes for 
the AKP are higher. The finding is robust to the inclusion of socioeconomic controls 
(last column). By contrast, the coefficient indicating how provinces voting for the 
main opposition party – the CHP – receive fewer funds is only significant in the first 
model, but not robust to the inclusion of the other political variables and the 
socioeconomic controls.  
The coefficient for the third party – the MHP – is not significant, suggesting that the 
main redistributive politics are played around the two main parties. This may be 
because the MHP has limited support and this support is concentrated in a limited 
number of provinces. The coefficient for the variable indicating support for the pro-
Kurdish party is positive and insignificant when taken alone (first model), but turns 
statistically significant in the final model. Considering that Kurdish votes are highly 
concentrated in areas with a high degree of underdevelopment, we consider the 
second estimate – that is, where development differentials are controlled for – more 
precise. This result s contradicts earlier research, which suggested that, during the 
1980s and 1990s, mostly Kurdish-inhabited areas were significantly disadvantaged in 
the allocation of public investment.  
Model two addresses the electoral competition hypothesis, according to which a 
disproportionate amount of resources will be allocated to provinces where the 
electoral race is tight. The variable shows the expected positive sign, yet is not 
significant across any of the specifications. Similarly, the result for 
malapportionment, despite having the expected negative sign, are not statistically 
significant after introducing the socioeconomic controls. The last distributive politics 
hypothesis is explored in model three. In contrast to Aytaç‘s (2014) results for the 
allocation of conditional cash transfers to Turkey’s low-income population, in our 
estimates the close competitor variable is insignificant and does not display the 
expected sign.  
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Overall, our distributive politics estimates support McGillivray (2004)’s theoretical 
predictions that in a closed-list, proportional multi-member electoral system 
distributive dynamics are mostly pursued with the aim of cementing the loyalty of 
core supporters, rather than to win swing constituencies or win over close 
competitors. 
The last two hypotheses refer to functional economic criteria. As we stressed earlier, 
the reduction of regional developmental disparities has been one of Turkey’s 
developmental policy principles since 1963. We have therefore argued in hypothesis 
H.4 that public investment may have been used as a tool to address territorial 
imbalances. The results show contrasting evidence. Out of the six indicators adopted 
to control for socioeconomic disadvantage, four are statistically significant, namely 
the composite indicator of contextual development, the per-capita regional GVA 
growth rate, the education attainments, and the rate of rural population. By contrast, 
the rate of manufacturing employment and the total population are insignificant. 
Within the four significant variables, the estimates seem to suggest that two 
contrasting trends are occurring. While the ratio of rural population is positively 
correlated to investments and the level of education negatively – thus confirming the 
progressive role of the development policy – the provincial development index (PDI) 
is strongly and positively, rather than negatively, correlated to the amount of funding 
received by regions. Holding other variables constant, a one point increase in the 
index is correlated to an increase (column four) of nearly 40 per cent of per-capita 
investments. The result is robust against the inclusion of the electoral variables 
(column five). Such a fact, in particular, seems to support those who suggest that 
investments are indeed allocated according to socioeconomic criteria but, rather than 
with the aim of reducing regional disparities, with the objective of concentrating 
resources in already developed areas. In this respect, the results support the final 
hypothesis H.5, as well as the earlier findings by Danielson and Keleṣ (1985) and 
Gezici and Hewings (2004). An important difference from such earlier studies 
however exists: on the one hand, the progressive character of investments is blurred 
into a strategy based on privileging areas with a minimum level of development. On 
the other hand, however, the Ministry of Development also seems to be channelling 
investments towards areas with higher levels of socioeconomic structural 
disadvantage, that is, characterised by a lower level of education and a higher degree 
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of rural population. A one point increase in the percentage of rural population, for 
example, is correlated to an increase (column four and five) of more than 7 per cent in 
per-capita investments. Aggregate fiscal flows may hide heterogeneous policies, as 
policy-makers have a range of tools at their disposal and are likely to use them to 
achieve different goals at the same time. We can therefore expect to find different – 
even contradictory – drivers of aggregate public investment. In the specific Turkish 
case we believe that an explanation of the apparently contradictory results may lie in 
the role that Anatolian, middle cities have played in recent development trends. 
Results are coherent with the Growth Centres Strategy put in place in recent years 
(particularly in the 9
th
 National Development Plan covering the period 2007-2013), 
according to which specific growth poles have to be selected for the concentration of 
public investments in underdeveloped areas. Economic development studies have 
frequently discussed whether there is a trade-off between reducing regional inequality 
and fostering overall efficiency (Hewings, 1978; Osberg, 1995; Martin, 2008). The 
‘New Economic Geography’ strand has in particular provided evidence supporting 
the existence of such trade-off by exploring the economic benefits originating from 
the concentration of activities and resources in areas with economies of 
agglomeration (Ottaviano and Puga, 1998; Venables, 2010). Drawing on such corpus 
of literature, the 2009 World Development Report (World Bank, 2009) made a strong 
case for the adoption of agglomeration-enhancing policies by emerging countries. 
Interestingly, our results for Turkey suggest a ‘middle-ground’ policy scenario, where 
the ‘standard’ regional development principle of reducing regional inequalities by 
targeting the worst-off regions is coupled with a strategy of concentration in areas 
with a minimum level of development. In other words, our results suggest that the 
government has favoured ‘the better off among the most in need’.    
 
Robustness checks 
Testing for the robustness of the FE estimator’s results to possible endogeneity issues, 
GMM-system outputs are provided in Table 2. The specification tests on the validity 
of instruments are included in the lower section of the Table. As required, the AR 
serial correlation tests show that only first-order but not second-order serial 
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correlation is detected. The Hansen J-test also confirms the appropriateness of the 
instruments, whose count does not overfit the models.  
Table 2. GMM-system estimation of the empirical model.  
 (H.1) core-
voter 
(H.2) 
electoral 
competition 
(H.3) close 
competitor 
(H.4/5) 
equity/ 
efficiency  
Full model 
      
AKP votes -0.00444    0.0212** 
 (0.0101)    (0.00981) 
CHP votes -0.0117    -0.0110 
 (0.0116)    (0.0111) 
MHP votes -0.0412***    -0.00795 
 (0.0110)    (0.00974) 
Kurdish party votes -0.0141*    0.0155** 
 (0.00725)    (0.00695) 
Electoral competition  0.000407 0.000780  0.00784 
  (0.00443) (0.00433)  (0.00473) 
Malapportionment  -0.773*** -0.861***  -1.112*** 
  (0.168) (0.164)  (0.206) 
Close competitor   0.00687*  0.00332 
   (0.00386)  (0.00375) 
Development index    0.435** 0.409*** 
    (0.204) (0.141) 
Per-capita GVA growth    -1.128 -1.055 
    (1.283) (1.176) 
Manufacturing empl.    0.0284* 0.000194 
    (0.0154) (0.00711) 
Education attainment    0.00409** 0.00378*** 
    (0.00168) (0.00140) 
Rural population    0.0593*** 0.0157 
    (0.0192) (0.0119) 
Total population    [dropped] [dropped] 
      
Constant 5.429*** 13.52*** 14.59*** 2.105** 17.41*** 
 (0.596) (1.980) (1.931) (0.894) (3.045) 
      
Observations 567 567 567 567 567 
Number of id 81 81 81 81 81 
Province FE yes yes yes yes yes 
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes 
F-test 18.64 23.28 20.36 13.72 13.24 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR (1) -5.37 -5.41 -5.44 -5.37 -5.41 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR (2) -0.20 -0.03 -0.00 0.36 0.84 
 (0.843) (0.980) (0.997) (0.717) (0.399) 
N. of instruments 28 14 19 36 67 
Hansen 18.40 6.32 11.22 23.67 42.56 
 (0.301) (0.177) (0.189) (0.481) (0.694) 
Notes: The dependent variable is expressed in logarithms. All explanatory variables are lagged by 
one year. Robust, clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Total 
population was automatically dropped because of multicollinearity. 
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The political variables of hypothesis H.1, when analysed without controlling for 
developmental divides (that is, taken alone, in column one), are only partly consistent 
with the FE estimates. Yet, once the socioeconomic variables are accounted for 
(column five), the GMM-system estimator provides results similar to those of Table 
1. The coefficient for the governing party regains the expected sign and statistical 
significance, while also witnessing an increase in magnitude. The coefficient for the 
third party continues to be insignificant, while Kurdish nationalism turns again 
positive and significant. The coefficients for hypotheses H.2 and H.3 now show the 
expected sign across all specifications. Yet, electoral competition is insignificant both 
on its own (column two) and when introducing controls, while the close competitor 
variable is now significant when considered alone (column three), but not in the full 
model. Among the socioeconomic variables of hypotheses H.4 and H.5, the level of 
development and the ratio of rural population maintain the same signs of the FE 
estimator (although the latter turns insignificant after the inclusion of the electoral 
variables). Manufacturing employment now becomes significant in column four, but 
not in the full model. Interestingly, the annual growth rate of regional per-capita GVA 
is now strongly insignificant, while education attainments remain statistically 
significant but display a positive, rather than negative sign, providing further 
evidence in support of the efficiency hypothesis. Our preferred model is again that 
accounting for both electoral and socioeconomic variables. The full-model GMM 
results are broadly consistent with those of Table 1, suggesting that the endogeneity 
of electoral results is not a serious issue in the first, linear estimates. Considering this, 
as well as the higher reliability of the FE estimator compared to GMM, our preferred 
results remain the FE ones. 
In Section 5, we have interpreted the socioeconomic results as evidence supporting a 
state policy favouring efficiency. At the same time, however, the fact that investment 
tended to flow more towards areas with higher levels of development may hide a 
tendency by Turkey’s socioeconomic elites to capture public investment. A second 
robustness test hence addresses the efficiency hypothesis H.5. We have strong 
reasons to expect that in Turkey elites largely tend to live in the main cities, mostly 
Istanbul, Ankara and, to a certain extent, also Izmir. The role of Istanbul as the 
economic hub of the country is well documented. Political power is concentrated in 
Ankara, the capital. An analytical way to disentangle the efficiency hypothesis from 
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an ‘elite capture story’ is thus to run the whole model excluding the three main cities 
from the sample. The estimates of running this regression are presented in the second 
column of Appendix 4. They confirm the validity of the main results: the coefficients 
maintain the same signs and degree of statistical significance, while the overall fit of 
the models increases slightly. 
Finally, we run a placebo regression where the one-year lag between dependent and 
explanatory variables is excluded. If our theoretical framework is correct, the 
electoral results should only influence future allocations – and not current ones – 
because of the time needed to translate strategic political decisions into allocation 
plans.  The third column of Appendix 4 shows that, while socio-economic variables 
retain very similar coefficients and statistical significance – suggesting that socio-
economic variables change slowly over time – political ones now turn insignificant 
altogether.   
 
Discussion 
According to the literature exploring the pervasiveness of Turkey’s patronage politics 
and poor governance, we would have expected that the geographical allocation of 
public monies would have been prevalently determined by political machinations. 
Our results, however, show a more nuanced picture.  
On the one hand the analysis provides robust evidence in support of core-voter 
distributive politics patterns, confirming the literature’s theoretical predictions. We 
uncover statistically significant evidence showing how provinces supporting the 
incumbent government have, ceteris paribus, received more per-capita public 
investment. In light of the political protests that sprung in Turkey since summer 2013, 
such outcomes confirm the picture of Turkey as a country with a socio-political 
fracture between pro-government supporters and anti-government, secular supporters. 
On the other hand, however, and in spite of their relevance as a driver of investments, 
political factors are less important than socioeconomic criteria. So, how can this 
conundrum be explained?  
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The most straightforward answer is to interpret our results as a proof of the ‘relative 
strength’ of the Turkish State. Such explanation relates to the concept of embedded 
autonomy (Evans, 1995; Kohli, 2004) put forward to explain the factors that account 
for successful state intervention in promoting economic development. Evans (1995), 
in particular, argues that the developmental state’s effectiveness rests upon two key 
factors: first, the extent to which a competent bureaucracy, autonomous from 
powerful rent-seeking groups, exists; and, second, the embeddedness of the state in 
society. Compared to other emerging countries, Turkey has indeed a long and 
established tradition of comparatively strong (and centralised) bureaucracy. Such 
discourse may be particularly relevant for planning which, since the creation of the 
State Planning Organisation (currently Ministry of Development), has been staffed by 
a trained and competent state bureaucratic elite. Besides, following the economic 
crisis of 2001 and the start of the Accession Negotiations to the EU, Turkey has 
undergone a series of public reforms inspired by good governance principles 
(Özdemir-Tsarouhas, 2013) which may have increased its bureaucratic capacity. At 
the same time, the extent to which Turkey’s state is effectively characterised by 
embedded autonomy is a topic on which the academic debate has not reached a 
conclusion. Given our findings, the question remains open to further explorations.  
Two analytical caveats need, nevertheless, to be considered. First, while partisanship 
is likely to capture a relevant political fault line, there may be other dimensions as 
relevant as partisan articulations. In spite of the literature showing the key role played 
by political parties in Turkey (De Leon et al., 2009), other forms of non-electoral 
political competition may be shaping the geographical distribution of public 
investment. Buğra and Savaşkan (2014) have for example pointed to the role played 
by business associations in influencing state-economy relations. Although they 
acknowledge how the impact of parties and business organisations on Turkey’s 
contemporary economic environment is closely knitted, further quantitative research 
on business organisations would ideally complement our analysis on partisanship. 
Furthermore, research has shown how, particularly in emerging countries, preferences 
in the allocation of public monies may be related to ethnicity or religious allegiance 
rather than to organised interests (for example, Banerjee and Somanathan, 2007). 
While the partisan fault line between the AKP and the main secular opposition party 
is likely to run parallel to other societal divisions – and hence should also capture 
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non-partisan interests based, for example, on religiosity – lack of quantitative data 
does not allow us to fully explore and rule out alternative dimensions of political 
competition. Second, economic and political studies conducted at electoral levels – 
such as this article – are naturally badly equipped with tools to offer answers to the 
question of who, within a given district, is able to extract rents out of public projects 
and goods, even when these are allocated to areas most in need of them. 
Consequently, political manipulations may occur not in the allocation of investments 
across provinces (pork-barrelling) but at much smaller scale, such as in the local 
management of resources and in micro-level clientelistic networks. The cases of local 
economic development initiatives studied by Özcan (2006) in the new industrial 
Anatolian town of Kayseri provides evidence in this direction – a process difficult to 
be captured unless adopting a qualitative, in-depth approach.  
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6. Conclusions  
This article has provided new evidence on Turkey’s political economy of 
development by examining whether in the last decade the geographical allocation of 
public investment has followed the socioeconomic policy principles officially set out 
by the State, or electoral political criteria.  
In line with much of the literature on distributive politics, our results show that 
politics plays a non-negligible role in influencing public investment allocations. The 
governing AK Party has not been immune to the temptation of favouring regions that 
voted for it with additional investments. Nonetheless, similarly to the results 
discussed by (Hopkin, 2001) for the case of Spain, the magnitude of pork-barrel is 
relatively low in comparison to the role played by socioeconomic factors. Indeed, 
after controlling for electoral politics variables, socioeconomic measures remain the 
most relevant predictors of public investment. In spite of the earlier evidence showing 
high levels of widespread political patronage and clientelism (Heper and Keyman, 
2006), and idiosyncratically controlled group loyalties (Özcan, 2006) occurring in 
Turkey, our findings point to Turkey’s bureaucratic capacity and embedded autonomy 
(Evans, 1995).  Our results may hence suggest that Turkey’s state tradition has 
stopped electoral politics from completely dominating over technical policy criteria. 
Compared to other emerging countries, Turkey possesses a long tradition of 
bureaucratic elite ‘who acted in the name of the state by assuming virtually complete 
autonomy from other groups in the polity, including the political elite’ (Heper and 
Keyman, 2006, p. 259). Our results may thus confirm the comparative strength of the 
country’s centralised and bureaucratic state apparatus, as well as the effectiveness of 
the public governance reforms implemented in the early 2000s (Őzdemir Tsarouhas, 
2013).  
The results also unveil – somewhat unexpectedly for a country which has placed great 
emphasis in addressing territorial disparities – a state which tends to favour areas with 
a higher level of development over the ones with the most critical socioeconomic 
need. This aim clashes with the developmental policy principles set out in the 
Constitution and in the main planning document about reducing regional imbalances. 
This finding is relevant for regional development policy-makers and planners in that 
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it shows how, in presence of scarce resources and a severe developmental gap 
between rich and poor areas of the country, the state has privileged the concentration 
of public resources in areas with a minimum level of development, possibly with the 
goal of privileging efficiency over redistribution.  
Finally, although our results provide considerable food for thought, a methodological 
caveat has to be taken into consideration. Following the literature showing the 
importance of parties in shaping Turkey’s political arena (De Leon et al., 2009), our 
analysis has focused on electoral political cleavages. Yet, there may be other forms of 
non-electoral political competition affecting the territorial distribution of public 
investment that the analysis is unable to capture. Buğra and Savaşkan (2014) have, 
for example, pointed to the role played by business associations in influencing state-
economy relations. While the partisan fault line between the AKP and the main 
secular opposition party is likely to run parallel to other societal divisions – and hence 
capture certain forms of non-partisan interests – lack of data limits our capacity to 
fully rule out alternative hypotheses. Moreover, quantitative analyses as those 
performed in the current article, while having important advantages, are ill-equipped 
to explore the informal channels which may be at the heart of the patronage and 
clientelistic networks behind pork-barrel decisions – a topic which opens up further 
room for research, based on the use of quantitative as well as qualitative analysis.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Description of variables and sources of data.  
Variable Variable description  Source 
Dependent variable: 
fixed capital public 
investment 
Ln of the per-capita fixed capital 
investment annually allocated to each 
province 
Ministry of Development (former 
State Planning Organisation) 
AKP votes % of votes for the AKP Turkey’s electoral High 
Committee, European Election 
Database 
CHP votes % of votes for the CHP Turkey’s electoral High 
Committee, European Election 
Database 
MHP votes % of votes for the MHP Turkey’s electoral High 
Committee, European Election 
Database 
Kurdish party votes % of votes for the Kurdish party and for 
independent candidates 
Turkey’s electoral High 
Committee, European Election 
Database 
Electoral competition Negative absolute value of the vote 
difference between the incumbent party 
and its main challenger in each 
province 
Own calculation on data from the 
Turkey’s electoral High 
Committee, European Election 
Database  
Malapportionment Ln of the ratio between the province’s 
total population and the number of 
parliamentary seats allocated to it. 
Own calculation 
Close competitor Interaction between electoral 
competition and a dummy variable 
equal to 1 when the AKP’s main 
competitor is the MHP, and the DYP 
and ANAP (in the case of 2002 
elections) 
Own calculation 
Development index Provincial Development Index Own calculation from: State 
Planning Organisation (1996, 
2003a), Baday-Yıldız, Sivri and 
Berber (2010) 
Per-capita GVA growth Annual growth rate of NUTS II 
regional per-capita Gross Value Added 
Own calculation on data from the 
Turkstat Regional Database 
Manufacturing 
employment 
% employment in manufacturing Turkstat Regional Database 
Education attainments % high education (vocational training 
and university) students on the total 
population 
Turkstat Regional Database 
Rural population % of rural population Turkstat Regional Database 
Total population Total number of inhabitants per 
province 
OECD, Turkstat Regional 
Database 
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Appendix 2. Summary statistics. 
Variable Mean St. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Log Investments 5.257 0.728 1.728 9.542 
AKP votes 45.037 14.811 6.5 84.82 
CHP votes 18.541 9.506 2.01 52.5 
MHP votes 12.759 7.129 0 44.9 
Kurdish party votes 9.345 16.417 0 70.8 
Electoral competition -26.18 15.363 -70.4 -0.1 
Malapportionment 11.582 0.287 10.524 12.151 
Close competitor -8.804 15.969 -56.6 0 
Development index -0.001 0.987 -1.659 4.138 
Per-capita GVA growth 0.359 0.456 -0.097 0.164 
Manufacturing employment 20.963 9.444 4.7 46.3 
Education attainments 4.557 19.931 0.039 254.955 
Rural population 37.849 13.5677 1.01 70.084 
Total population 898500.2 1538670 65126 1.40e+07 
Source: own elaboration. 
Appendix 3.  Pairwise correlations among variables. 
 Invest. AKP 
votes 
CHP votes MHP votes Kurdish  
votes 
El. comp. Malapport. Close 
compet. 
Dev. index GVA growth Manuf.  
Empl. 
Ed. 
attainments 
Rural  
pop. 
Total  
pop. 
Investments 1              
AKP votes 0.1562* 1             
CHP votes 0.0424 -0.3043* 1            
MHP votes 0.0068 0.0719 0.1888* 1           
Kurdish votes 0.0002 -0.3959* -0.3106* -0.5377* 1          
El. Comp. -0.1190* -0.6412* 0.4297* 0.1167* 0.0645 1         
Malapport. -0.2540* 0.0015 0.2536* -0.0878* -0.0416 0.1657* 1        
Close comp. -0.0013 -0.3673* 0.3808* -0.2492* 0.2398* 0.4149* 0.1922* 1       
Dev. Index -0.001 -0.0733 0.4839* 0.2723* -0.5231* 0.2206* 0.4123* 0.0944* 1      
GVA growth 0.0179 -0.0781* -0.0828* -0.1897* 0.1037* -0.0005 0.0028 0.009 -0.1093 1     
Manuf. Empl. -0.0373 -0.0049 0.3014* 0.0721 -0.3048* 0.05 0.3874* -0.0074 0.5961* -0.0441 1    
Ed. Attain. 0.1145* 0.0008 0.1220* 0.0508 -0.0950* 0.0676 0.0527 0.0384 0.1593* -0.0384 0.2646* 1   
Rural pop. -0.0115 -0.0872* -0.1678* -0.1135* 0.1664* 0.0197 0.4303* -0.1006* -0.6677* 0.0465 -0.5568 -0.2162* 1  
Total pop. -0.0328 -0.02 0.2055* -0.0586 -0.0631 0.1271* 0.4706* 0.1303* 0.6551* -0.0396 0.3203* -0.0142 -0.5255* 1 
Source: own elaboration. 
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Appendix 4. Robustness tests: FE estimation of the empirical model. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Baseline estimate 
from Table 1 
Excluding Istanbul, 
Ankara and Izmir 
Placebo 
    
AKP votes 0.0126* 0.0124* 0.00105 
 (0.00675) (0.00682) (0.00699) 
CHP votes -0.0107 -0.0120* -0.00274 
 (0.00711) (0.00693) (0.00708) 
MHP votes 0.0157 0.0162 0.0115 
 (0.0119) (0.0118) (0.0111) 
Kurdish party votes 0.0120* 0.0116 0.00510 
 (0.00701) (0.00703) (0.00629) 
Electoral competition -0.00151 -0.00173 -0.00318 
 (0.00302) (0.00296) (0.00291) 
Malapportionment -0.00395 -0.0703 -0.0314 
 (0.234) (0.229) (0.265) 
Close competitor -0.000404 -0.000184 -0.000867 
 (0.00434) (0.00428) (0.00371) 
Development index 0.365* 0.370** 0.316** 
 (0.187) (0.184) (0.128) 
Per-capita GVA growth 1.800** 1.780** 0.898 
 (0.838) (0.843) (0.849) 
Manufacturing empl. 0.00480 0.00862 0.0347** 
 (0.0140) (0.0139) (0.0142) 
Education attainment -0.00839*** -0.00848*** -0.00583*** 
 (0.000872) (0.000915) (0.000744) 
Rural population 0.0730*** 0.0753*** 0.0940*** 
 (0.0228) (0.0228) (0.0346) 
Total population -2.82e-07 4.46e-07 -3.19e-07* 
 (2.18e-07) (6.36e-07) (1.80e-07) 
Constant 1.578 1.573 0.896 
 (3.015) (3.180) (3.792) 
    
Observations 567 546 567 
R-squared 0.184 0.195 0.159 
Number of id 81 78 81 
Prov FE yes yes yes 
Year FE yes yes yes 
Notes: The dependent variable is expressed in logarithms. All explanatory variables are lagged by one 
year only in models (1) and (2), while they are not in model (3).  Robust standard errors in parentheses, 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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1. Introduction 
The importance of political institutions in ensuring the efficient functioning of 
markets and consequently fostering economic performance has become central in 
much of the literature dealing with economic growth and development. A growing 
consensus in particular agrees on how one of the key prerequisites for sustained 
economic growth is the existence of inclusive institutions preventing narrow political 
groups to monopolise public resources and economic power (Acemoğlu and 
Robinson, 2012). In spite of such burgeoning interest on the politics of economic 
growth, the research specifically exploring the impact of political articulations on 
regional economic development has been significantly scarcer. Recently, the work by 
Buğra and Savaşkan (2012, 2014) on the links between politics, religion and business 
has provided preliminary evidence suggesting that in polities lacking inclusive 
political institutions and where businesses are more reliant on state intervention – that 
is, many emerging countries around the world –, governments may influence sub-
national economic performance via the privileged provision of State goods to 
constituencies with the right political affiliation, at the expenses of opponents. Yet, 
such hypothesis has not received extensive empirical attention. The existence of such 
gap in the literature is particularly puzzling considering the significant increase of 
research exploring distributive politics (Golden and Min, 2013), that is, how 
politicians selectively targets constituencies with more or less governmental monies 
and goods to reinforce their electoral advantage. While distributive politics have been 
explored on an increasing number of countries and governmental goods, almost no 
studies have so far explored their final economic implications. 
The current article aims at filling this gap by defining a political economy model of 
regional growth and testing it to Turkey’s 81 provinces over 2004-2012. Turkey’s 
case is informative because the country has traditionally suffered from social and 
political polarisation and considerable subordination of the bureaucracy to incumbent 
politicians. First of all, the results can inform the burgeoning literature on distributive 
politics by providing a preliminary assessment of whether such ‘allocative’ games’ 
have any economic consequences. The research can also contribute to the academic 
debate about the link between institutions and regional economic growth (Farole, 
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Storper, and Rodríguez-Pose, 2010) by assessing whether, and to what extent, votes 
and partisan articulations may influence subnational economic performance. Last but 
not least, if in the last fifteen years Turkey has undergone a significant number of 
institutional reforms aimed at strengthening the public governance, recent literature 
(Buğra and Savaşkan, 2014; Meyersson and Rodrik, 2014) has underlined – once 
again – the strong links between politics and economic development in the country. 
Assessing to what extent political cleavages between opponents and supporters of the 
central Government influence sub-national economies can therefore shed further light 
on the form of such links. 
Baseline results, obtained with a Fixed Effect estimator, confirm the existence of a 
reduced-form relationship between votes for the central Government and regional 
economic growth. The electoral support provided by each province to the incumbent 
party is correlated to faster rates of regional economic growth, particularly in 
provinces where the electoral race is closer. The preferential allocation of 
developmental Government goods to provinces – namely public investment and 
public investment incentives to the private sector – partly explains such relationship. 
Yet, the overall effect of electoral politics on economic growth is very modest. 
Besides, once the potential endogeneity between the dependent variable and the 
regressors is accounted for with an Instrumental Variable strategy, regional economic 
performance appears as almost entirely explained by standard socio-economic factors, 
primarily human capital endowment. Results are robust to the inclusion of standard 
variables which may drive regional economic growth, as well as to the inclusion of 
factors specifically able to control for the structural change that Turkey’s emerging 
economy is undergoing.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section two provides a review of 
the literature on the link between political representation and regional economic 
growth, offers an overview of Turkey’s political cleavages and regional economic 
performance, and sets the research hypotheses. Section three defines a political-
economy model of regional growth, and discusses the empirical variables used to 
estimate the model, the data, as well as the identification strategy. Section four 
presents, and then discusses, the results. Section five eventually draws the discussion 
to a conclusion. 
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2. Exploring the link between votes and regional economic growth 
Votes and economic growth  
The impact of political parties, elections and national political institutions on 
macroeconomic performance has been increasingly explored by scholars in the last 
twenty years (Boix, 1998; Persson and Tabellini, 2003; Rajan and Zingales, 2006; 
Sen, 2013). In parallel to such political economy literature carried out at the national 
level, a considerable amount of research has been conducted at the sub-national level. 
This second corpus of work has frequently stressed the role of local political 
coalitions and local political entrepreneurialism in shaping governance structures 
conducive to economic growth (Apaydın, 2012; Bayırbağ, 2011; Wood and Valler, 
2004; Wood, 2008). In spite of those two separate bodies of research, very little 
research has been carried out to cross cut them and specifically explore how votes and 
partisan articulations may influence local and regional economic development via 
their role in the construction of societal cleavages and the distribution of state goods.  
The existence of such gap in the literature is particularly puzzling considering the vast 
amount of literature on distributive politics, i.e. on how self-interested politicians may 
lead to heterogeneously distribute public spending and other state goods to specific 
groups at the expenses of others to gain electoral advantage (Golden and Min, 2013). 
A growing body of research linking economics and political science has indeed 
explored how public resources are frequently distributed on the basis of ‘purely 
political’ considerations (Persson, 1998). Such literature has explored the distribution 
of goods as various as regional grants and federal spending (Case, 2001; Larcinese, 
Snyder, and Testa, 2012; Tekeli and Kaplan, 2008), trade and industrial policy 
(McGillivray, 2004), infrastructure investments (Cadot et al., 2006; Castells and Solé-
Ollé, 2005; Golden and Picci, 2008; Kemmerling and Stephan, 2008), investment 
incentives schemes (Yavan, 2012), poverty reduction programmes (Diaz-Cayeros, 
Estévez, and Magaloni, 2012; Fried, 2012; Kroth, Larcinese, and Wehner, 2015), 
international aid (Briggs, 2014), and the EU cohesion policy (Bouvet and Dall’Erba, 
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2010; Kemmerling and Bodestein, 2006).
13
 Yet, in spite of a literal ‘explosion’ of 
research on distributive politics,
 
very little research has so far explored the final 
economic impacts which such preferential allocations may determine. Levitt and 
Poterba (1999) provide a seminal attempt to explore a research hypothesis similar to 
ours. They explore the link between congressional representation and state economic 
performance in the US. While they uncover a positive correlation between sub-
national economic growth and the seniority of Democratic congressmen representing 
States at the federal level, they are unable to find any causal explanation for it. Given 
the sizeable effect that electoral politics may have on the design and implementation 
of developmental policies, there is yet reason to expect that votes and partisan 
articulations may influence not only the allocative policy outputs, but also their final 
outcomes, namely economic performance.  
This may be particularly true in the emerging markets (Cadot et al., 2006), where 
public capital and state support to the business environment are likely to play a key 
role – bigger than in rich economies – in triggering the private capital accumulation 
process.
14
 Besides, in such environments lower levels of bureaucratic capacity and 
stronger informal consensus building practices (Özcan, 2000, 2006) frequently reduce 
the incentives/capacity to prevent the political use of public monies (Evans, 1995). 
Recently exploring the political economy of state-business relations in the emerging 
world, Buğra and Savaşkan (2012) put exactly forward empirical evidence suggesting 
that tense partisan relations between the subnational and the central governments may 
influence local and regional economic performance via the Government’s preferential 
treatment of its partisan supporters. The evidence collected by the two authors 
suggests that the national Government may ‘punish’ political opponents via channels 
such as: (1) the provision of particular incentives to neighbouring aligned regions so 
as to stimulate private investments’ relocations; (2) the restrainment of public 
investments for the development of key, necessary infrastructures; (3) and, last but 
                                                     
13
 In their extensive analysis of the literature Golden and Min (2013) have found more than 150 
articles on the topic. Our review of the literature even increases such count. 
14
 Scholars such as Evans (1995) and Kohli (2004) provided exhaustive theoretical frameworks and 
empirical evidence for understanding the salience of active developmental state intervention in 
emerging and late-industrialising economies. 
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not least, the mobilization of legislative and administrative mechanisms aimed at a 
favourable treatment of only aligned business groups. 
A key assumption behind such hypotheses concerns the importance of political 
cleavages as catalyst for the formation of economic ones. Since the seminal work by 
Lipset and Rokkan (1967), social scientists have extensively studies the link between 
social cleavages and party systems. According to the two authors’ theoretical 
framework, party systems reflect, to a greater or lesser degree, the social cleavage 
structure existing in a specific society. The number of cleavages is hence considered a 
key predictor of the number of parties. Furthermore, the intensity of such social 
cleavages is also assumed as a determinant of the intensity of partisan polarisation, an 
important dimension that distinguishes moderate and highly polarised party-systems.   
 
Political cleavages, state support, and economic performance in Turkey 
Turkey is described in the literature as a polity where incumbents have frequently 
provided privileged treatment to people and constituencies with the right political 
affiliation and punished opponents (Acemoğlu and Robinson, 2013b; Heper and 
Keyman, 1998). Political polarisation has been one of the most serious and persistent 
maladies of Turkish political system, with pro- and anti-government groups 
frequently opposing each other (Özbudun, 2013).
15
 In spite of periods such as the 
1990s during which fragmentation and volatility weakened the role and coherence of 
the party system, throughout Turkey’s republican history Turkish political parties 
have in general displayed a high degree of saliency in the political arena (De Leon, 
Desai, and Tuğal, 2009). Sharing similarities with other Southern European countries 
such as Italy and Greece (Lanza and Lavdas, 2000), interest politics and party politics 
have frequently showed strong links.  
                                                     
15
 The start of armed clashes between the Turkish State and the outlawed PKK (Partiya Karkeren 
Kurdistan, Kurdistan Workers’ Party) has produced another main transversal cleavage opposing 
Turkish nationalists to supporters of the Kurdish movement (Çarkoğlu and Hinich, 2006). The current 
article focuses exclusively on the first one.   
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Furthermore, in line with the experience of other late-industrialising countries around 
the world, the Turkish state has traditionally played a key role in fostering the process 
of private capital accumulation and economic development (Eraydın and Armatli-
Köroglu, 2005). The role of central government policies and state manufacturing 
firms behind the emergence of industrial districts in previously economically 
marginal areas is for example well documented (Eraydın, 2001). Bayırbaǧ (2010, 
2011)’s research on the complex rescaling interlinks between Gaziantep’s local 
economic coalitions and the central level indirectly provides evidence on the 
importance of the central state in shaping local and regional economic development 
trajectories. Qualitative evidence collected by Buğra and Savaşkan (2012) for recent 
years suggests that business groups with strong links to the government experienced 
better economic performance than ones opposed to it, thanks to preferential treatment 
in the allocation and management of public resources and other goods such as public 
tenders. Preliminary evidence collected by the two authors leads to suggest that such 
concerns may apply not only to individual business groups but also to entire 
constituencies. They in particular uncover the fear of local and regional actors about 
feeling penalized by the government for systematically voting for the main opposition 
party (Cumhuriet Halk Partisi, Republican People’s Party, CHP, as opposed to the 
Adalet ve Kalkima Partisi, Justice and Development Party, AKP) in both local and 
national elections.
16
  
Although the weight of the Turkish State’s direct intervention in the economy has 
shrunk since the 1980s (Aricanli and Rodrik, 1990), an abundant amount of literature 
has provided theoretical and empirical evidence showing how the role of the state in 
influencing the economic and business environment has not diminished. The evidence 
include qualitative and case-study investigations on the State-business relations 
(Acemoğlu and Robinson, 2013b; Buğra and Savaşkan, 2014), as well as econometric 
analyses on the impact of public capital on regional productivity ( Deliktaş, Önder, 
and Karadağ, 2008; Karadağ, Deliktaş, and Önder, 2004). Furthermore, the country 
still remains one of the most centralised public finance systems among OECD 
                                                     
16
 The other main parties since the early 2000s have been the nationalistic National Action Party 
(Milli Hareket Partisi, MHP), and the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (Barıș ve Demokrasi 
Partisi, BDP), which succeeded to the Democratic Society Party (Demokrat Toplum Partisi, DTP) 
outlawed in 2008. 
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countries (Blöchliger and Rabesona, 2009). Many of the final decisions affecting 
regional development are still largely in the hands of Turkey’s central Government, 
which may hence use such power to implement vote buying strategies.  
The map presented in Figure 1 shows how the patterns of regional economic growth 
during the last decade have been consistently heterogeneous. The group of regions 
which experienced the highest average annual growth rates of per capita GVA during 
2004-2012 include both some of the poorest NUTS2 regions such as Mardin (8 
percent per annum), Erzurum (4.5 percent per year) and Ağrı (4.3 percent per year), 
as well as middle income regions such as Manisa (4.9 percent per year), Balıkesir (4.5 
percent per year), Malatya (4.1 percent), and Kırıkkale (4.1 percent).  
Figure 1. Average AKP votes and annual growth rates of regional per-capita Gross 
Value Added (GVA) (2004-2012). 
 
Source: own elaboration 
Figure 1 also shows the average percentage of votes cast for the AKP in national 
elections between 2002, 2007 and 2011. 2002 elections are interpreted as a turning 
point in Turkish politics as they witnessed a dramatic turnover among the political 
class and the substantial rise of the newly formed AK Party, which has kept 
increasing its power thereafter. Since then, the political scene has been mostly 
dominated by such party. The distribution in Figure 1 shows the marked spatial 
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heterogeneity of the electoral support to the AKP, with average results across the 
three electoral tournaments ranging from 10 percent to more than 63 percent.  
The consolidation of Turkey’s political spectrum following 2002 has in particular 
marked the crystallisation of a pre-existing fault line, running in parallel to the 
contraposition between the pro-Islamic constituencies and the secular, Kemalist 
supporters. Compared to the European countries studied by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) 
Turkey’s social system has maintained its relatively lower number of cleavages 
(Özbudun, 2013). Such division of Turkey’s society dates back to the late Ottoman 
period and the early republican years, and is at the core of the ‘preferential treatment’ 
hypothesis being tested in the analysis. One of the most established metaphors used to 
depict such cleavage describes Turkey as a country divided between a political centre 
– constituted by the State bureaucracy, the military, and the historical urban elites – 
and a large periphery – including the lower classes and rural environments, frequently 
with more conservative and Islamic traditions (Mardin, 1973). The strongly non-
confessional State building project started by the founder of the Republic M.K. 
Atatürk, and subsequently advocated by the CHP had traditionally been one carried 
out by the centre. Since the 1980s, two socio-economic changes started rearranging 
the power balance and composition of such cleavage. First, a massive wave of 
internal migration towards the main urban areas transformed the spatial equilibrium 
between the centre and the periphery. Since centre and periphery are not spatially 
differentiated any more, authors have recently renamed the societal cleavage as one 
between “White Turks”, representing  the former group, and “Black Turks”, 
representing the less-educated, lower-class with frequently peasant roots and stronger 
links to religion (Acemoğlu and Robinson, 2013a). Second, and most important, the 
economic rise of provincial Anatolian towns – the so-called Anatolian Tigers – led by 
a new capitalist class with rural origins and which identify themselves as pious 
capitalists – or “Islamic Calvinists” (ESI, 2005) – started altering the distribution of 
economic power between the two groups. Importantly for our analysis, the AK 
Party’s political success eventually marked the electoral victory of the latters over the 
formers.  
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Research hypotheses 
Following the literature discussed in the previous sections, the main hypothesis tested 
by this article states  
Main hypothesis: Constituencies voting for the incumbent party grow faster than 
others, thanks to a preferential treatment received in the management of governmental 
public and private goods.  
In spite of hypothesis H.1, other research conducted on the impact of political and 
social factors in influencing local economic performance may suggest that partisan 
politics in general is not relevant to explain regional economic growth. According to 
Rodríguez-pose (1998)’s results, regional growth in Western Europe is largely 
accounted for by “standard” factors such as physical and human capital, innovative 
capacities, and socio-demographic regional characteristics, rather than by electoral 
politics. The alternative hypothesis thus puts socio-economic factors at the heart of 
regional economic performance. It states 
Alternative hypothesis: Electoral politics does not drive regional economic 
performance, which is instead explained by standard socio-economic factors of 
growth. 
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3. Empirical analysis 
A political-economy model of regional economic performance 
The aim of this section is to briefly describe a theoretically-driven, political-economy 
model of regional economic growth. Drawing from earlier political economy research 
(Besley et al., 2010), follows this growth model: 
ΔYi,t = β0Yi,t-1 + β1Pi,t-1 + β2P
2
i,t-1 + β3Gi,t-1 + β4Xi,t-1 + αi + nt + ɛi,t                                             (1)                                                                                       
Where:  
ΔYi,t is the rate of per-capita economic growth, expressed in logarithmic terms, of 
province i at time t and Yi,t-1  is the yearly lagged provincial per-capita GVA (gross 
value added),
17
 included to test for Solow-style convergence of per-capita income, 
with β < 0 indicating convergence. 
Pi,t-1 is the key variables of the model and is aimed at measuring the votes casted in 
each province for the incumbent governing party. In particular, we want to test 
whether β1 > 0, i.e. whether higher votes for the central government drives higher 
growth rate of provincial personal income.  
Within the literature on the link between partisan votes and distributive politics 
literature a classic debate has flourished on whether Governments target goods to 
partisan strongholds (Cox and McCubbins, 1986) or, by contrast, to swing 
constituencies (Dixit and Londregan, 1996). Recent research on Turkey’s public 
investment provides evidence in favour of the first hypothesis (Luca and Rodríguez-
Pose, 2014). The inclusion of Pi,t-1  exactly captures such relationship. Yet, even 
within core-supporters models, utility-maximising politicians may decide to reduce 
their support to core constituencies above and below a certain votes’ threshold. In 
other words, combining Cox and McCubbins (1986) Dixit and Londregan (1996)’s 
                                                     
17
 GVA may not be the best variable to measure regional economic growth, in that it does not 
capture the effect of state taxes and transfers on final income. Aware of such shortcoming, we are left 
with no other option due to data availability. Data limitation is – alas – one of the biggest problems in 
empirical research, particularly in emerging countries. Section 3.3 provides specific details on why 
GDP data at sub-national level is not available in Turkey for the last 15 years’ period.  
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models, the relationship between the amount of goods distributed and partisan 
support may be non-linear and inverse-U shaped, as found in the case of the European 
regional structural funds allocations (Bouvet and Dall’Erba, 2010). Such non-linearity 
implies that the preferential treatment tends to increase where political competition is 
higher. Anecdotal evidence supporting such argument in the Turkish context is 
offered, for example, by a Parliamentary speech delivered in 2012 by a legislator 
from the province of Kütahya. In such occasion, the Member of Parliament 
complained how the province had been “forgotten” in the distribution of State 
resources and had been left behind in terms of development (Ișık, 2012), in spite of its 
exceptionally strong electoral support given to the governing party – which exceeded 
60 percent in both 2007 and 2011 elections. Hence, P
2
i,t-1 is included to control for 
possible non-linearity in the relationship between P and ΔY. The literature also argues 
in favour of a positive link between greater local political competition and higher 
growth rates (Besley et al., 2010), driven by the positive effects of competition on the 
quality of policies implemented. In the final part of the paper we will hence test the 
robustness of our results to the replacement of P
2 
with a more traditional measure of 
provincial electoral competition, namely how close the electoral race is.  
Gi,t-1 is included to control for the heterogeneous allocation of governmental goods 
across provinces. Concretely, G accounts for total public investment and investment 
incentives to the private sector, two key policy tools adopted by the Turkish 
Government to foster regional economies. The first part of section 4 will provide 
empirical evidence to show that Government supporters receive a preferential 
treatment in the allocation of key public resources necessary for development. The 
inclusion of G in the model will then help testing whether any links between electoral 
results and economic growth is indeed driven by distributive politics. If this was true, 
adding G into the equation should lead to a decrease in the magnitude of the electoral 
variable’s coefficients, since their effect would now be picked up by the former. 
Xi,t-1, consists in a vector of socioeconomic controls which, according to the literature, 
may also play a role in influencing the dynamics of economic growth, such as private, 
public and human capital investments. While much of growth theory ignores the 
existence of productivity gaps between existing activities in the economy, in 
developing countries growth traditionally takes place through the movement of labour 
- 96 - 
 
from low-productivity to high-productivity sectors. In the last decades, Turkey has 
indeed experienced significant trends of structural economic transformation (Altuğ et 
al., 2007), with a significant shift of work-force from traditional sectors such as 
agriculture to manufacturing and, more recently, services. Such process has played a 
consistent role in the increase of total productivity. Turkey’s average productivity in 
manufacturing, for example, currently exceeds the one in agriculture almost by a 
factor of three (Rodrik, 2010). Structural change, in particular, has been responsible 
for 45percent of the labour productivity growth in Turkey between 1990 and 2005 
(Rodrik, 2010). To control for such trends, the vector Xi,t-1 will also include four key 
variables able to account for such structural socio-economic change, namely the share 
of manufacturing in the regional economy, the level of regional entrepreneurship, the 
level of rural population and the total provincial population. 
αi and nt respectively consist in province fixed- and time-effects, and ɛi,t  is the error 
term.  
 
Empirical variables 
The variables selected for the empirical estimation of equation (1) are described in the 
following paragraphs. The dependent variable is the annual growth rate of provincial 
per-capita GVA, expressed in per capita Turkish Lira at 2012 prices and in 
logarithmic terms. The selection of absolute growth rates provides a methodology 
which allows an easy and straightforward interpretation of results. Robustness tests 
will further explore whether results hold when regional growth is measured in relative 
terms to the country mean.  
A one-year lag between left- and right-hand side variables is included to account for 
the time necessary for political variables to potentially influence economic outcomes. 
This means that the length of the panel decreases from 9 to 8 years. Among the 
regressors, lagged output Yi,t-1 is followed by the model’s political variable  
Votes: the variable measures the share of votes casted for the governing AK Party in 
national elections. The decision not to focus on results from local elections is 
motivated by the fact that administrative elections are frequently based on local 
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political issues, while national elections provide a better picture of the overall partisan 
closeness of a province to the central Government. Following the conceptual 
discussion in section 2.2, the squared variable is also included to account for the non-
linear relationship we expect to find between votes and regional economic growth. 
 The third group of variables is included to control for the hypothesised preferential 
allocation of governmental goods to aligned constituencies. It includes 
Public capital investment: total amount of public fixed-capital investment to each 
province.
18
 Values are expressed in per capita Turkish Lira (TL) at 2012 prices and in 
logarithmic terms. 
Investment incentives to the private sector: total number of investment incentive 
certificates annually distributed by the State to private businesses, per 1000 
inhabitants. Values are expressed in logarithmic terms. 
Finally, the socio-economic control variables accounted for in the analysis are 
Entrepreneurship: Acemoğlu and Robinson (2013b) suggest that the beginning of the 
AKP government in 2002 may have witnessed an opening of economic opportunities 
to Anatolian entrepreneurs and would-be entrepreneurs, often with conservative and 
religious backgrounds, previously disfavoured by the strongly non-confessional 
bureaucracy. According to such hypothesis, the beginning of the AKP government 
may thus have ‘levelled the economic playing field’ by broadening the geographical 
and social basis of entrepreneurship (Acemoğlu and Robinson, 2013b). The inclusion 
of entrepreneurship into the equation should help controlling for such trends and for 
any spurious correlation between political variables and economic performance not 
related to the partisan preferential treatment hypothesis. In the absence of any other 
viable indicators, the variable is proxied by the annual variation in the total number of 
economic units per 1000 inhabitants.   
                                                     
18
 A large proportion of investments is registered as multi-provincial, so it is not possible to match 
it with any specific province. Over 2004-2012, multi-provincial projects accounted on average for 
45.67percent of the total public investment portfolio, with an annual standard deviation from the 
period’s overall mean of 5.10. In absence of any viable solution to mitigate such data flaw, we follow 
earlier pieces of literature (Celebioglu and Dall’erba, 2010; Deliktas et al., 2008; Karadag et al., 2004) 
and only concentrate on the investments which can be matched with single provinces.  
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Human capital stock: this variable is proxied by the percentage level of education in 
the labour force. While analyses conducted in more technologically-advanced 
countries customarily account for ISCED 5-6 levels, our analysis focuses on ISCED 
3-4 levels. First, the overall levels of education attainment in Turkey are still 
comparatively low. The average level of schooling for the workforce, for example, 
was in 2005 at 5.3 years, i.e. 2/3 years less than many other countries at a similar 
level of economic development (Altuğ et al., 2007). Furthermore, considering that a 
key driver of economic growth has been manufacturing in industries characterised by 
low/medium technological skills, ISCED 5-6 levels are not likely to capture the 
potential impact that human capital may play in economic development.  
Manufacturing employment share: manufacturing employment shares will capture 
one of the core sectors contributing to the transformation of Turkey’s economy. The 
importance of manufacturing in the economic development of Turkey’s regions has 
particularly increased since the 1980s, as many new industrial centres emerged in 
Anatolia. 
Rural population: this indicator is aimed at capturing the structural transformation of 
the Turkish socio-economic system is the percent of provincial population living in 
rural districts. In a country such as Turkey characterised by late development and a 
rapid, recent urbanisation, the regional developmental inequalities are likely to be 
correlated with the urban/rural divide. 
Private capital investment: gross regional investment in tangible goods is aimed at 
controlling for the role private capital accumulation may play in economic growth. 
Values are expressed in per capita Turkish Lira (TL) at 2012 prices. 
Total provincial population: last but not least, provincial population is aimed at 
controlling for potential indirect effects on economic performance. 
A final note should be devoted to social capital. A large body of regional growth 
literature has shown the role played by social capital and associability in economic 
development (cf. Iyer, Kitson, and Toh, 2005; Putnam, 1993; Woolcock, 1998). 
Unfortunately, regionalised data on measures of social capital is not available for the 
period of study. Somehow reassuringly for the research, commenters have argued that 
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the role of civil society organisations in Turkey has been traditionally modest. 
Kalaycıoğlu for example suggests: “A tolerant, trusting, active public, vigorously 
seeking greater influence over political authorities through conventional political 
participation, still seems a long-term goal in Turkish politics. […] In short, the overall 
record indicates that associability is still a relatively scarce commodity in the Turkish 
culture” (Kalaycioğlu, 2001, pp. 60, 62). While we have reasons to believe that, 
particularly in the last two decades, civic activism may have increased, we 
unfortunately have no data to control for. Interestingly, data on the total number of 
civil society organisations recorded by the Civil Society Development Centre’s 
database (www.stgm.org.tr, accessed on April, 15, 2015) as of 2015, the only 
available year, shows a significantly high correlation to provincial population: the 
pairwise correlation coefficient between number of civil society organisations and 
provincial population is above 91 percent (significant at the 0.01 confidence level).    
 
Data  
The analysis employs a panel data set covering 81 Turkish provinces over the period 
2004-2012. We will focus on changes in NUTS2 regions income, rather than 
provinces (NUTS3 level) income, thus assigning to each province the value of its 
corresponding NUTS2 region. Alas, even if NUTS2 regions do not correspond to any 
administrative tier, in 2001 the Turkish Statistical Institute ceased reporting economic 
data for provinces and started instead reporting values at NUTS2 level. In absence of 
any other viable solution, such strategy follows earlier literature. Levitt and Poterba 
(1999) points to the fact that the use of economic outcome data at an administrative 
layer higher than the political variables’ one may be good for capturing economic 
spill-overs from potentially powerful legislators that accrue to residents outside their 
strict electoral constituencies.  
Political variables are collected at the provincial level. We focus on provinces 
because they constitute the power bases of political parties, one of the most important 
tiers of political representation in Turkey (Güvenç and Kırmanoğlu, 2009), and the 
only administrative tier between municipalities (and metropolitan municipalities) and 
the central State. Electoral data for 2002, 2007 and 2011 elections was gathered from 
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the European Election Database. We annualise political variables by extending 
electoral results over each legislature’s single year. Electoral wards within 
metropolitan provinces are not taken into account and therefore national elections’ 
data is only collected for provinces.  
All the other socio-economic controls are collected at provincial level when available 
or at NUTS2 level otherwise. A detailed description of variables, their key summary 
statistics, and pairwise correlation coefficients are respectively provided in 
Appendixes 1, 2 and 3. 
 
Identification strategy 
Our baseline empirical strategy to explore the link between votes and regional 
development is to estimate equation (1) adopting a heteroscendasticity and 
autocorrelation robust estimator with province and annual fixed effects. Such strategy 
should attenuate the risk of spurious correlations between left- and right-hand side 
variables caused by unobserved characteristics – such as the local economic structure 
or the level of cohesiveness/conflicts among the local business community, as well as 
any other shocks that may affect both the electoral results and the economic 
performance.
19
  
To control for potential serial and spatial correlation, estimations adopt robust 
standard errors adjusted for clustering at the provincial level (NUTS3 level, 81 
clusters). Errors are clustered at NUTS3, rather than NUTS2 level, not only because 
we believe the former is a more important tier, but also because the latter only 
includes 26 units and such low number may not guarantee consistent results. 
While the within-estimator should help controlling for potential omitted factors, a 
second and more important cause of concern in the estimation of equation (1) is the 
endogeneity of the political variables. We consider 2002 electoral results as 
                                                     
19
 To further control against omitted variable biases we have also tried including the interaction 
between time and fixed effects. Estimates not presented in the paper but available on request show that 
results do not change.   
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exogenous. After almost a decade of rampant corruption, poor economic performance 
and infighting under coalition governments, 2002 elections are considered as a real 
turning point in Turkish politics (Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2010; Zeyneloğlu, 2006) . The 
combined share of votes for the five main parties in 1999 elections was 81 percent, 
while it dropped to a mere 24 percent in 2002 (Akarca and Başlevent, 2011). Figure 2 
shows the turnover rate of MPs after each election. The rate, which is constructed 
dividing the number of newly elected MPs by reconfirmed ones, shows how 2002 
rate has been the highest in Turkey’s democratic history.20  
Figure 2. Parliamentarians’ turnover rate (newly elected/reconfirmed MPs) at each 
election. Circled are post-1960 and post-1980 military coups, 2002 elections. 
 
Source: own elaboration. 
The literature on distributive politics underline that voters may reward or punish 
politicians on the basis of their past allocations of the budget – retrospective voting 
models – or on the basis of their promises about the future – prospective voting 
models (Larcinese et al., 2012). If the latter were true for Turkey, then also 2002 
results would suffer from endogeneity since voters’ expectations in 2002 would be 
correlated to the future preferential treatment by the central Government. In a 
politically very unstable environment where politicians frequently did not keep their 
                                                     
20
 2002 AKP electoral results may nonetheless be correlated to electoral results in the mid-1990s. 
We thank one anonymous referee for raising such important point. Robustness checks will hence test 
whether the exclusion of 2002 elections from our panel influences the empirical results.  
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pledges (as it was likely after the 1990s), we argue that the risk of endogeneity due to 
prospective voting is low.  
Yet, in the case of subsequent results endogeneity is a serious issue, since electoral 
outcomes at time t are likely to be influenced by economic performance at time t and 
time t-1. Our solution to identify the genuine causality between votes and economic 
performance is to adopt an instrumental variable approach. To this aim we design a 
shift-share instrument drawing from the seminal strategy proposed by Bartik (1991) 
and since then increasingly used to identify sources of exogenous shocks in spatial 
economics literature (e.g.: Moretti, 2010). The theory behind the instrument is that 
national vote pattern changes that are party-specific but external to an individual 
province reflect exogenous political shocks for that province. Concretely we construct 
the instrument by weighting nib, which represents the initial electoral result for each 
province i in the base year b (2002), for the national variation between time t and the 
base year b: 
 
The inclusion of the endogenous political term in quadratic form in equation (1) poses 
a further challenge. Since adding any linear variable as second instrument would lead 
to a poorly identified model, our solution is to instrument the quadratic term of the 
endogenous variable with the quadratic term of the main instrument, as suggested by 
Woodridge (2010). 
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4. Results 
The results are presented in two main steps. First, the analysis briefly provides 
evidence on the link between votes for the incumbent party and the heterogeneous 
allocation of governmental goods. Second, the investigation is extended from policy 
outputs to outcomes, to investigate whether the preferential treatment of the 
Government’s supporters influence regional economic performance. The second sub-
section presents the baseline FE results, while the third one shows the outputs 
obtained with the IV specification. The fourth sub-section provides further robustness 
tests, while the final one discusses the overall results. 
 
Votes and development policy 
Extensive evidence on the distributive politics of Turkey has already been provided 
by earlier pieces of literature. Luca and Rodríguez-Pose (2015) in particular explore 
the drivers of public investment across Turkey’s provinces for the same period 
considered in this article. While they stress how politics does not topple 
socioeconomic factors in the allocation of public investment, they show how political 
criteria have nonetheless played an important role in influencing investment 
allocations at the advantage of the government’s supporters, and at the expenses of 
opponents. Following their methodology, we estimate the link between partisan 
articulations – proxied by votes in national elections – and the geographical 
distribution of public investment and investment incentives to the private sector. The 
equation we estimate takes the following form 
Gi,t = β1Pi,t-1 + β2Xi,t-1 + αi + nt + ɛi,t                                                                                                                    (2)   
Where G is the amount of goods distributed by the central Government; P is the 
electoral support given to the main parties, as well as a measure of electoral 
competitiveness; X is the vector of socio-economic controls discussed in Section 2; α 
and n respectively consist in province fixed- and time-effects, and ɛ is the error term. 
Again, we include a one-year lag between left- and right-hand side variables. Our aim 
is to provide exploratory evidence. Table 1 shows the empirical results. Columns one 
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and two refer to public investment, while columns three and four refer to investment 
incentives to the private sector. As already stressed earlier, these are two of the key 
components behind Turkey’s regional development policy, as well as the preferential 
treatment hypothesis.   
Table 1. The link between central public infrastructure investment/investment 
incentives to the private sector and votes for the national incumbent party: robust 
Fixed Effects (FE) estimates (2004-2012). All explanatory variables are lagged by 
one year.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Public investment Investment incentives 
     
AKP votes 0.0207** 0.0123* 0.0220*** 0.0159** 
 (0.00846) (0.00721) (0.00733) (0.00670) 
CHP votes -0.0176** -0.0160** 0.00382 0.00439 
 (0.00745) (0.00725) (0.00650) (0.00658) 
MHP vottes 0.0126 0.0172 -0.0327*** -0.0314*** 
 (0.0138) (0.0137) (0.0109) (0.0104) 
Kurdish party votes 0.0150 0.0112 0.00739 0.00467 
 (0.00930) (0.00823) (0.00643) (0.00608) 
Close race 0.000209 -0.00262 0.00275 0.000854 
 (0.00326) (0.00320) (0.00293) (0.00252) 
Constant 4.314*** -5.631 -3.667*** -1.522 
 (0.397) (5.233) (0.377) (5.222) 
     
Observations 648 648 648 648 
R-squared 0.159 0.191 0.409 0.436 
Number of id 81 81 81 81 
Prov FE yes yes yes yes 
Year FE yes yes yes yes 
Controls no yes no yes 
Robust, clustered standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls include: 
Regional per-capita GVA, entrepreneurship, human capital, manufacturing employment, rurality, 
private investment and population.  
As expected, the amount of public investment and investment incentives to the 
private sector allocated to each province is positively and statistically significantly 
correlated to the electoral support for the national incumbent Government. Such 
evidence is robust against the inclusion of the socio-economic controls.   
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Robust Fixed Effects estimates 
The aim of this section is to answer the core question of the analysis and explore 
whether the effect of partisan articulations on policy choices extends to regional 
economic performance.  
Table 2. Multivariate regressions of the regional per-capita Gross Value Added 
(GVA) growth rate: robust Fixed Effects (FE) estimates (2004-2012). All explanatory 
variables are lagged by one year. (2004-2012). All explanatory variables are lagged 
by one year.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Lagged GVA -0.336*** -0.340*** -0.365*** -0.467*** 
 (0.0256) (0.0248) (0.0271) (0.0246) 
AKP 0.000810* 0.00194*** 0.00184*** 0.00107* 
 (0.000465) (0.000494) (0.000489) (0.000563) 
AKP^2  -1.26e-05* -1.30e-05* -8.22e-06 
  (7.08e-06) (6.75e-06) (6.56e-06) 
Public inv.   0.00309 0.00243 
   (0.00230) (0.00228) 
Inv. incentives   0.00753*** 0.00641** 
   (0.00284) (0.00278) 
Entrepreneurship    0.00260*** 
    (0.000677) 
Human capital    0.266*** 
    (0.0881) 
Manufacturing    0.00227*** 
    (0.000804) 
Rurality    0.00219* 
    (0.00111) 
Private inv.    0.00148*** 
    (0.000293) 
Population    3.28e-06 
    (5.67e-06) 
Constant 3.130*** 3.151*** 3.390*** 4.160*** 
 (0.229) (0.225) (0.248) (0.227) 
     
Observations 648 648 648 648 
Adjusted R
2
 0.629 0.632 0.637 0.675 
Number of id 81 81 81 81 
Province FE yes yes yes yes 
Year FE yes yes yes yes 
Robust, clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 
Table 2 presents the results. Province and year effects, as well as the lagged 
dependent variable, are included across all models. The overall fit of the models is 
good, with a ‘within’ adjusted R2 reaching 68.4 percent in the full specification.  
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In line with the main hypothesis, column one shows a positive and significant 
correlation between the percentage of support given to the governing party, the AKP, 
and the rate of per capita regional economic growth. As expected, the inclusion of the 
quadratic electoral term in column two determines a neat increase in the statistical 
significance of the correlation between the percentage of votes casted for the AKP 
and the rate of per-capita GVA annual growth rate. This finding confirms that such 
correlation is significantly bell-shaped shaped rather than linear.  
Figure 3. Fitted line of the relationship between percent of votes for the AKP and the 
annual regional per-capita GVA growth rate (2004-2012): robust fixed effects (FE) 
estimates from column two of Table 2.  
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Source: own elaboration. 
The fitted line shown in Figure 3 is based on the estimates from column two and the 
observed range of AKP values. It clearly shows how the marginal increase in GVA 
growth tend to reduce with the increase in the level of support to the central 
Government, turning negative for values above around 70 percent of votes.                                                                                     
The main research hypothesis argues that the correlation between the electoral 
variables and the regional growth rate is driven by distributive politics, i.e. the 
Government’s preferential treatment of politically aligned provinces in the allocation 
of key developmental resources. If that was true, adding public infrastructural 
investment and the amount of public investment incentives provided to the private 
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sector – two key state goods behind the preferential treatment hypothesis – into the 
equation should lead to a decrease in the magnitude of the electoral variable’s 
coefficients, since their effect would now be picked up by the newly added variables. 
Column three of Table 2 shows that this is partly the case. Among public investment 
and investment incentives to the private sector only the latter is significant. Their 
inclusion determines a reduction in the magnitude of the AKP coefficient. At the 
same time, it is necessary to acknowledge that in absolute terms such reduction is 
low. Interestingly, a bigger reduction in the AKP coefficient occurs when the control 
variables are included in column 4.
21
  
The socio-economic control variables show the expected sign, as well as a high level 
of statistical significance: entrepreneurship, human capital, the share of 
manufacturing employment, the rate of rural population,  private investment and total 
population appear all positively correlated to regional economic growth (although the 
latter is insignificant). Unexpectedly, the most relevant coefficient across the models 
is by far human capital, whose magnitude is significantly higher than all the others – 
even after taking into account differences in the variables’ units of measurement.22  
 
Instrumental Variable estimates  
The following paragraphs discuss the results obtained with the Instrumental Variable 
strategy. Table 4 shows the models’ estimates following the same order as Table 2, 
while Table 3 shows the first stage regression coefficients for the full model of 
column four. 
The relevance condition for the instruments is met: the first stage F-test of excluded 
instruments is above 10 (i.e. the customary rule-of-thumb value), while the 
instruments are strong and statistically significant predictors of the main endogenous 
                                                     
21
 Results not presented here but available on request show that the reduction in the AKP 
coefficient is in particular driven by the inclusion, among the controls, of rural population.  
22
 Further results not presented here but available on request show that the inclusion of human 
capital’s quadratic term further strengthen its link with regional economic growth: the relation between 
the two variables is hence significantly inverse-U shaped. 
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variable to be instrumented. Furthermore, all the F-tests of excluded instruments for 
each of the models shown in Table 4 are satisfactorily close to 10.
23
  
Table 3. First-stage regression of the endogenous political variable: AKP votes 
(2004-2012). Estimates are presented for both the linear (column one) and quadratic 
term (column two).  
 (1) (2) 
 AKP AKP^2 
   
GVA -2.619 -235.2 
 (6.770) (625.3) 
Public investment -0.0176 12.70 
 (0.355) (33.51) 
Investment incentives 1.240** 109.4** 
 (0.577) (44.82) 
Private investment -0.0161 -4.938 
 (0.0661) (6.612) 
Human capital -0.623 -463.7 
 (16.17) (1,537) 
Entrepreneurship 0.272** 23.90** 
 (0.106) (9.459) 
Manufacturing 0.00569 6.367 
 (0.110) (9.992) 
Rurality 0.771*** 65.81** 
 (0.274) (26.25) 
Population -0.00454*** -0.535** 
 (0.00172) (0.204) 
AKP_IV 1.547*** 347.4*** 
 (0.485) (56.25) 
AKP_IV^2 -0.0138*** -2.180*** 
 (0.00288) (0.378) 
Constant 0.152 -7,243 
 (62.55) (5,859) 
   
Observations 648 648 
Number of id 81 81 
Adjusted R
2
 0.808 0.750 
F-test 51.57 32.58 
Province FE yes yes 
Year FE yes yes 
                Robust, clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 
 
 
                                                     
23
 The F-tests here reported refer to the endogenous variable’s quadratic term.  
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Table 4. Multivariate regressions of the regional per-capita Gross Value Added 
growth rate: Instrumental Variable (IV) estimates (2004-2012). All explanatory 
variables are lagged by one year.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Lagged GVA -0.337*** -0.353*** -0.384*** -0.491*** 
 (0.0278) (0.0287) (0.0297) (0.0337) 
AKP 0.000541 0.00120* 0.00113* 0.000225 
 (0.000485) (0.000647) (0.000641) (0.000673) 
AKP^2  -2.03e-05*** -2.06e-05*** -1.28e-05** 
  (6.41e-06) (6.36e-06) (6.34e-06) 
Public inv.   0.00329 0.00241 
   (0.00205) (0.00197) 
Inv. incentives   0.0109*** 0.00880*** 
   (0.00292) (0.00279) 
Entrepreneurship    0.00281*** 
    (0.000709) 
Human capital    0.297*** 
    (0.0684) 
Manufacturing    0.00217*** 
    (0.000668) 
Rurality    0.00320*** 
    (0.00112) 
Private inv.    0.00170*** 
    (0.000445) 
Population    -1.69e-07 
    (1.07e-05) 
Constant 3.155*** 3.299*** 3.615*** 4.374*** 
 (0.257) (0.265) (0.276) (0.301) 
     
Observations 648 648 648 648 
Number of id 81 81 81 81 
First stage F 13.81 9.38 9.82 10.28 
Province FE yes yes yes yes 
Year FE yes yes yes yes 
Robust, clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 
The estimates presented in Table 4 reflect relatively closely the ones shown in Table 
2. At the same time, the political variables’ magnitude and level of statistical 
significance are now both reduced. This suggests that the Fixed Effects estimates for 
the political variables are partly influenced by endogeneity. The causal effect of 
partisan closeness to the central Government in driving faster regional economic 
performance appears with the expected sign, yet it turns significant only after the 
non-linearity is accounted for, i.e. when its quadratic term is included in the 
regression (column two of Table 4). Furthermore, the comparison between Figures 3 
and 4 clearly shows that after controlling for endogeneity, the causal effect’s 
magnitude appear even smaller, reaching its inverse-U shape’s peak at an earlier level 
of the AKP values’ distribution. For electoral result values higher more or less than 
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55 percent (i.e. less than one standard deviation from the mean), the overall net effect 
between the linear and quadratic political terms now turns even negative. Such 
finding is in line with the theoretical predictions discussed in Section 3, since the 
Government is more likely to provide stronger favouritism to constituencies where 
the electoral races are tight compared to provinces either completely lost or secured. 
Figure 4. Fitted line of the relationship between percent of votes for the AKP and the 
annual regional per-capita GVA growth rate (2004-2012): IV estimates from column 
two of Table 4.  
 
Source: own elaboration. 
Similarly to what observed with the FE estimates public investment is positively 
associated to regional economic growth but is insignificant. By contrast, the level of 
investment incentives offered by the State to the private sector is both positive and 
significant as in the FE estimates. Including public infrastructure investment and 
investment incentives to private firms – two of the channels through which the impact 
of electoral variables should influence economic performance – in model three of 
Table 4 determines a reduction in the coefficient and significance of AKP. As before, 
it is also worth noting that a similar reduction in the AKP coefficients also occurs 
when the controls are included in the full model (column four). In other terms, the 
correlation between partisan closeness to the central government and regional 
economic growth indeed seems explained, to a very small extent, by the preferential 
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allocation of public investment and incentives. Yet, another significant portion of it is 
explained by spurious factors. 
Most of the other coefficients included in models four appear with the same sign and 
statistical significance as in Table 2. Entrepreneurship, human capital, manufacturing 
employment share and private capital investment are significant drivers of economic 
growth. The only exception is provincial population, which now turns negative yet 
retains its insignificance.     
 
Robustness checks   
This last empirical section is aimed at providing some robustness checks on the 
results discussed above.  
As discussed in Section 3, our main analysis included the square of votes for the 
incumbent party to test for the effects of higher/lower political competition. A first 
test checks whether results are robust against the replacement of P
2
 with a more 
traditional measure of provincial electoral competition (Besley et al., 2010). The 
variable, named Close race, is constructed as the negative of the absolute value of the 
vote difference between the incumbent party and its main challenger in each 
province. The challenger is the second party where the AKP is the leading one or the 
first party when the AKP is not the first one. As we take the negative of the absolute 
value, we will expect the variable to show a positive value, meaning that regional 
growth is higher in provinces where the vote difference is lower. The new results, 
presented in Appendix 4, confirm the prediction and are very similar to our original 
ones. Tests not included but available on request indeed show that if Close race is 
included along with our original P
2
 variable, the latter turns highly insignificant. As a 
matter of fact, the pairwise correlation between the two variables is close to 74 
percent (significant at the 0.01 confidence level).  
Second, it is well known that in dynamic models – i.e. equations characterised by the 
inclusion of the lagged dependent variable among the regressors – FE estimates are 
potentially biased in the order of 1/T (Nickell, 1981). To rule out any potential 
concerns, this final section estimates a regression similar to Models 1 and 2 but 
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excluding their dynamic components, i.e. including the dependent variable in levels 
instead of first difference while excluding the lagged convergence term from the 
regressors. The new equation takes the following form:  
Yi,t = β1Pi,t-1 + β2P
2
i,t-1 + β3Gi,t-1 + β4Xi,t-1 + αi + nt + ɛi,t                                                                    (3)   
Appendix 5 shows the results obtained estimating equation (3). The results are overall 
consistent to the ones from the dynamic model specifications. The socioeconomic 
controls are mostly uninfluenced from the different specification. Across the FE 
estimates, the key electoral variables of the model behave similarly as before. Their 
statistical significance is nonetheless further reduced: after the inclusion of the full 
list of controls, neither AKP, nor its squared term, are significant at a standard 
confidence level. The political variable and its square term show the expected sign 
across the IV estimates, yet they are insignificant. Interestingly the square term turns 
significant after the inclusion of the controls, but only at the 10 percent level. 
Considering the dramatic dynamism of Turkey’s regional economies during the 
period of study we believe that the estimates obtained from the dynamic Models 1 
and 2 are likely to be more reliable. At the same time, however, the fact that the main 
hypothesis failed to pass the robustness test further weakens the evidence supporting 
the picture of Turkey as an economy where partisan factionalism plays a big role in 
regional economic performance.  
While we considered the 2002 electoral results as exogenous, they may be correlated 
to previous elections held in the 1990s, in the sense that politicians elected in the mid-
1990s from ‘old’ parties may have switched to the newly founded AKP (while 
skipping the 1999 legislature). To address such potential concern, a third robustness 
test excludes the 2002 electoral results from the analysis, hence restricting the panel 
to the period 2007/2012, for which our instrument allows – by construction – to 
identify a source of political variation which is exogenous to provinces. Results are 
presented in Appendix 6. Interestingly, results are overall very similar to the ones 
from the full panel. All the coefficients show the expected signs, and the shift from 
the FE to the IV estimator marks as expected a reduction in the explanatory power of 
the endogenous political variables. 
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A final test aims at checking the robustness of results against the exclusion of 
Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir, Turkey’s three biggest cities and economic hubs. The 
results, presented in Appendix 7, show that coefficients are virtually identical to the 
ones of the full specification.
24
   
 
Discussion 
Overall, the results suggest the existence of a positive, inverted-U shaped relationship 
between the provincial votes for the central Government and the rate of per capita 
GVA growth. They also provide preliminary evidence that such relationship seems – 
at least partly – driven by the heterogeneous distribution of State goods across 
provinces, as put forward in the theoretical section. At the same time, however, the 
magnitude of such influence is small, not robust in our third specification, and in any 
case considerably less relevant than the one of the other socio-economic controls. 
Once the potential endogeneity between votes and regional growth is controlled for, 
the causal effect of the Government’s preferential treatment to electorally aligned 
constituencies in driving faster regional economic performance is even smaller. Such 
result is relevant as it shows that, while there are still modest signs of the preferential 
treatment hypothesis, much of the correlation between votes and regional growth in 
the baseline specification is actually driven by reverse causality. In other words, the 
correlation we uncover in the baseline specification is likely to be driven by the 
electoral support given by fast-growing provinces to the central Government party – a 
finding which confirms earlier research on the role of positive economic performance 
in reducing electoral volatility (Akarca and Tansel, 2006) – and only partially by 
faster growth rates triggered by the Government’s preferential treatment of politically 
aligned constituencies.  
The results’ implications are threefold. The first concerns the academic and policy 
debate about distributive politics. While the amount of research asking whether and 
                                                     
24
 Further tests not presented in the article but available on request show that results are equally 
stable if we further exclude the other second-tier economic centres of Turkey, namely Adana, Antalya, 
Kocaeli and Bursa. 
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how political actors use their control over government resources to strengthen their 
electoral advantage has experienced a literal ‘explosion’ in recent years (Golden and 
Min, 2013), almost no studies had so far explored how distributive and ‘allocative 
games’ may influence not only policy outputs, but also their final economic 
outcomes. If earlier studies uncovered clear signs of strategic manipulation over the 
allocation of Turkey’s public investment (Luca and Rodríguez-Pose, 2014), the good 
news emerging from the current research is that the final impact of votes – via 
distributive politics – on economic performance is significantly small, and in any case 
much less relevant than the other socio-economic controls. Such finding is potentially 
relevant to other countries with high political polarisation and high levels of 
electorally-motivated distribution of public goods, and where there are hence 
concerns that cities and regions opposing the incumbent governments may suffer in 
long-term economic performance. Confirming earlier attempts to measure the impact 
of electoral factors on regional development (Rodríguez-pose, 1998), our results are 
reassuring since they suggest that regional economic growth is largely explained by 
structural socioeconomic factors, and only very marginally by electoral idiosyncratic 
determinants.   
Second, the most relevant predictor of Turkey’s regional per-capita GVA growth is 
interestingly human capital, whose effect is significantly higher than all other 
variables. Confirming preliminary findings put forward by Filiztekin (2009), such 
result is relevant in that it contributes to overcoming the lack of knowledge stressed 
in the literature about the role played by education and human capital in Turkey’s 
economic performance (Altuğ et al., 2007). Such results carry relevant implications 
not only for the academic research but also for policy. Although recent public 
expenditure on education has increased, Turkey still ranks at the bottom of the OECD 
members’ list both in terms of education attainment as well as public education 
expenditure (Bardak and Majcher-Teleon, 2011). Under this light, our results suggest 
that an increase in the public education expenditure would bring not only social 
(Dinçer, Kaushal, and Grossman, 2014) but also significant economic benefits. The 
importance of increasing public investment in education is even higher considering 
that Turkey has not yet achieved full literacy, and education attainments still lags 
behind many comparator countries. For example, in 2009 the rates of population aged 
15-64 with Lower secondary (ISCED 0-2), Upper secondary (ISCED 3-4) and 
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Tertiary (ISCED 5-6) education were respectively 70.8/19.2/10.0 in Turkey while 
27.6/53.2/19.2 in Bulgaria, 39.8/40.2/20.0 in Greece and 31.5/46.4/22.1 in the EU-27 
average (ibid.).  
Last but not least, the results speak to the debate on the extent to which Turkey is 
progressing towards the achievement of more democratic and inclusive institutions. 
Throughout its republican history Turkey has traditionally suffered from fragmented 
politics and factionalism. Following the economic crisis of 2001, as well as the start 
of Accession Negotiations to the EU, the country started a series of public reforms 
inspired by good governance principles and democratic accountability. The policy 
path followed by Erdoğan’s AK Party succeeding its electoral victory in 2002 has 
been largely depicted by international media as a commitment to such 
democratisation process. Yet, the concrete extent of such process is debated. While 
criticising Erdoğan’s recent autocratic stance, Acemoğlu (2014) shows optimism 
about Turkey’s long-term democratic prospects. In the economic realm, Acemoğlu 
and Robinson (2013b) go further by hypothesising that the beginning of the AKP 
government in 2002 may have witnessed an opening of economic opportunities to 
Anatolian entrepreneurs with conservative and religious backgrounds, thus 
broadening the geographical and social basis of entrepreneurship (Acemoğlu and 
Robinson, 2013b) and providing new scope for Turkey’s economic growth. Although 
in a preliminary way – given the scope for misspecification in a simple political 
economic regional growth model –, our findings may indeed support Acemoğlu and 
Robinson (2013b)’s claims. Unfortunately the available data does not allow us to 
carry out the analysis for the most recent years, during which tensions between the 
supporters and the opponents of the government have escalated and the autocratic and 
confrontational tone of former Prime Minister and current President Erdoğan have 
increased dramatically. If drawing strong conclusions from our limited evidence is 
probably incorrect, it is at least fair to say that our results provide a picture of 
Turkey’s economy during the 2000s where partisan factionalism had modest effects 
and did not topple standard drivers of regional growth.  
While the analysis provides a relatively positive picture about the impact of political 
cleavages on Turkey’s economy, such picture should not however be confounded 
with optimistic narratives about Turkey’s overall institutional dynamics. First, 
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quantitative analyses carried out at regional level can capture aggregate territorial 
effects but falls short in uncovering informal channels through which state-economy 
relations may manifest. As underlined by Piattoni (2001), interest politics should not 
be seen in monolithic terms but, rather, as a ladder that climbs upward according to 
the level at which particular interests are aggregated: at the lowest possible level, 
determining clientelism and cronyism networks pivoting around individuals; and at 
higher levels determining, among others, pork-barrelling practices based on 
constituencies and local communities, and consociationism based on religious or 
ethnic groups. Our analysis only captures the last two. An alternative hypothesis is 
that the effects of the government’s preferential treatment may have influenced 
individual people and business groups, rather than entire territories. For example, 
what may really dependent on political favouritism may not be the allocation of 
monies across provinces but, rather, the award of favours to specific, individual 
business groups. Buğra and Savaşkan (2014) and Özcan and Gündüz (2015) provide 
for example evidence in this direction. Second, some commenters have recently 
argued that optimistic narratives about Turkish socioeconomic change fail to uncover 
a de-facto institutional deterioration (Meyersson and Rodrik, 2014). In other words, a 
possibility is that positive performance in the economic realm has been coupled with 
a deterioration of political and democratic liberties. Under such light positive 
economic performance may indeed explain why the constant increase in Erdoğan’s 
autocratic stance has not led to a decrease in his electoral success. Yet, the strongly 
confrontational and autocratic stance adopted by Erdoğan in recent years (Arbatlı, 
2014; Meyersson and Rodrik, 2014) may mark a lost opportunity to capitalize any 
positive societal achievements in the long term.  
Two further caveats are in point. First, the analysis has focused its attention on party 
politics, grounding such decision in the significant amount of research stressing the 
role of parties in capturing the key Turkish political cleavages likely to influence the 
economic environment. Political parties in Turkey have traditionally stood “out as the 
penultimate political institution of populist patronage” (Kalaycioğlu, 2001, p. 63). 
Yet, we cannot rule out the possibility that there may be other political dimensions as 
much as relevant as partisan articulations. Buğra (1998) and Buğra and Savaşkan 
(2014) have for example pointed to the role of business associations as key societal 
fault-line markers. While they acknowledge how “the impact of these two types of 
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actors [parties and business organizations] on the economic environment is not 
exercised through separate channels, but appears the outcome of strategies that 
mutually support each other” (Buğra and Savaşkan, 2014, p. 31), further quantitative 
research on business associations would ideally complement our analysis on 
partisanship.
25
 Last but not least, our theoretical model and empirical strategy explore 
the link between votes and regional economic growth under a single-party 
government, so we don’t have evidence to assess what results could be expected 
under a coalition government. Drawing from the distributive politics literature, our 
speculation is that the link between votes, allocation of state goods and regional 
growth would be more complex. Analysing the distribution of Turkey’s investment 
incentives during the 1990s – a period marked by coalitions among very 
heterogeneous political parties – Kemahlioğlu (2008) for example shows that 
allocative patterns were not aimed at favouring core constituencies, but rather at 
punishing coalition partners with the goal of preventing them from claiming credit of 
the benefits allocated. We would hence expect that such complexity may be mirrored 
in the final link between votes and regional economic growth.     
 
                                                     
25
 One key, empirical issue preventing from carrying out such an analysis is – alas – the lack of 
extensive data on business associations.  
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5. Conclusion 
The analysis of institutions in ensuring the efficient functioning of markets and in 
consequently fostering economic development has become a key topic in the 
literature on economic growth and development (cf. Rodríguez-Pose, 2013). In spite 
of such burgeoning interest, the research specifically exploring the impact of political 
institutions on regional economic development has been significantly scarcer. In 
particular, almost no studies have so far explored how votes and partisan cleavages 
may impact on local and regional economic development. To bridge such gap the 
article tested whether, in countries where governments’ disproportionate power to 
influence the bureaucracy is coupled with strong political polarisation, the economic 
performance of regions and constituencies politically close to the incumbent 
governments may benefit from a preferential treatment in the management of state 
resources, and may thus experience faster economic growth. The analysis first 
assessed the link between votes for the incumbent national party and the amount of 
public developmental resources channelled to provinces, uncovering a clear pattern of 
preferential distribution of resources to core constituencies. Second, it defined a 
political economy model of regional growth and tested it to Turkey’s 81 provinces 
over 2004-2012. The empirical strategy is first based on a Fixed Effect estimator. To 
rule out the potential risk of reverse causality and omitted variable bias, we then 
adopt a shift-share Instrumental Variable strategy inspired by the work of Bartik 
(1991).  
The results of the analysis lead to both good news and bad news. The bad news is the 
fact that pork-barrelling and the partisan closeness to the central Government seem 
effectively to influence sub-national economic growth. Compared for example to the 
case of France studied by Cadot et al. (2006), who did not found any effect of pork-
barrelling on the final economic performance of French regions, our results partly 
confirm the concerns put forward in Turkey by Buğra and Savaşkan (2012) and 
Heper and Keyman (2006). The good news emerging from the research is that the 
impact of votes on regional economic performance is significantly small and in any 
case considerably less relevant than the one of other more ‘standard’ socio-economic 
drivers of growth. Furthermore, after controlling for the potential reverse causality 
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between dependent and explanatory variables, the causal effect of electoral politics on 
regional economic performance appear even smaller. In other words, the correlation 
we uncover in the baseline specification between votes for the Governing party and 
regional growth is likely to be driven by the electoral support given by fast-growing 
provinces to the central Government, and only partially by the Government’s 
preferential treatment of politically aligned constituencies. Considering the concerns 
of cities and provinces not voting for the national incumbent party of being penalised 
in long-term economic opportunities, results are reassuring.  
While the analysis provides a relatively positive picture about the impact of political 
cleavages on Turkey’s economy, such picture should not be confounded with 
optimistic narratives about the country’s overall institutional dynamics. Commenters 
have increasingly documented the autocratic and authoritarian stance adopted by 
Turkey’s former Prime Minister and current President Erdoğan in recent years 
(Arbatlı, 2014; Meyersson and Rodrik, 2014). Under such light, the positive 
economic performance experienced in many provinces may indeed explain why the 
constant increase in Erdoğan’s autocratic stance has not led to a decrease in his 
electoral success. In line with the pre-AKP period (Akarca and Tansel, 2006), results 
seem to confirm the importance of economic growth as one of the factors explaining 
the constant electoral success of the AKP since 2002. Yet, in the long term, the 
strongly confrontational and autocratic stance adopted by the former Prime 
Minister/new President in recent years may mark a lost opportunity to capitalize any 
positive societal achievements from the first years in power. Interestingly, the 
research also uncovered that across the socioeconomic variables human capital – 
measured as percentage of the workforce with upper secondary education – appears 
as the most relevant predictor of per-capita Gross Value Added growth. Although 
recent public expenditure on education has increased, Turkey still lags behind and 
ranks at the bottom of the OECD members’ list both in terms of education attainment 
as well as public education expenditure (Bardak and Majcher-Teleon, 2011). A 
stronger focus on human capital accumulation as a strategy for regional development 
may hence bring not only social but also significant economic benefits. Besides, 
given the role of the central state in providing education at the sub-national level, this 
is perhaps one further area of enquiry into the political economy of development in 
Turkey and elsewhere. 
- 120 - 
 
Literature references 
Acemoğlu, D. (2014). The Failed Autocrat. Foreign Affairs, May 22, 2–5. 
Acemoğlu, D., and Robinson, J. A. (2013a). Black Turks, White Turks. In Why Nations Fail Blog, 
20 February. Accessed on 01/01/2014. 
Acemoğlu, D., and Robinson, J. A. (2013b). The political economy of Turkey. In Why Nations 
Fail Blog. 27 February. Accessed on 01/01/2014. 
Akarca, a. T., and Başlevent, C. (2011). Persistence in regional voting patterns in Turkey during a 
period of major political realignment. European Urban and Regional Studies, 18(2), 184–
202.  
Akarca, A., and Tansel, A. (2006). Economic performance and political outcomes: An analysis of 
the Turkish parliamentary and local election results between 1950 and 2004. Public Choice, 
129(1), 77–105. 
Altuğ, S., Filiztekin, A., and Pamuk, S. (2007). The Sources of Long-term Economic Growth for 
Turkey, 1880-2005 (CEPR Discussion Paper Series No. 6463). London: Centre for 
Economic Policy Research.  
Apaydın, F. (2012). Partisan Preferences and Skill Formation Policies: New Evidence from 
Turkey and Argentina. World Development, 40(8), 1522–1533.  
Arbatlı, E. (2014). Turkey’s new path: The rise of electoral authoritarianism. Centre for Policy 
and Research of Turkey (Research Turkey), III(12), 76–92. 
Aricanli, T., and Rodrik, D. (1990). An overview of Turkey’s experience with economic 
liberalization and structural adjustment. World Development, 18(10), 1343–1350.  
Bardak, U., and Majcher-Teleon, A. (2011). Flexicurity analysis of the labour market in Turkey. 
Turin: European Training Foundation. 
Bartik, T. J. (1991). Who benefits from state and local economic development policies? 
Kalamazoo, Michigan: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. 
Bayırbağ, M. K. (2010). Local Entrepreneurialism and State Rescaling in Turkey. Urban Studies, 
47(2), 363–385. 
Bayırbağ, M. K. (2011). Pro-Business Local Governance and (Local) Business Associations: The 
Case of Gaziantep. Business and Politics, 13(4). 
Besley, T., Persson, T., and Sturm, D. M. (2010). Political Competition , Policy and Growth : 
Theory and Evidence from the US. Review of Economic Studies, 77, 1329–1352.  
Blöchliger, H., and Rabesona, J. (2009). The fiscal autonomy of sub-central governments: An 
update (OECD Network on Fiscal Relations Across Levels of Government Working Paper 
No. 2009/09). Paris: OECD. 
Boix, C. (1998). Political parties, growth, and equality. Conservative and social democratic 
strategies in the world economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
- 121 - 
 
Bouvet, F., and Dall’Erba, S. (2010). European Regional Structural Funds: How Large is the 
Influence of Politics on the Allocation Process? JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 
48(3), 501–528. 
Briggs, R. C. (2014). Aiding and Abetting: Project Aid and Ethnic Politics in Kenya. World 
Development, 64, 194–205.  
Buğra, A. (1998). Class, culture and state: an analysis of interest representation by two Turkish 
business associations. International Journal of Middle East Studies, 30, 521–539. 
Buğra, A., and Savaşkan, O. (2012). Politics and class : The Turkish business environment in the 
neoliberal age. New Perspectives on Turkey, 46(46), 27–63. 
Buğra, A., and Savaşkan, O. (2014). New capitalism in Turkey. The relationship between politics, 
religion and business. Celtenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
Cadot, O., Röller, L.-H., and Stephan, A. (2006). Contribution to productivity or pork barrel? The 
two faces of infrastructure investment. Journal of Public Economics, 90(6-7), 1133–1153. 
Çarkoğlu, A., and Hinich, M. J. (2006). A spatial analysis of Turkish party preferences. Electoral 
Studies, 25(2), 369–392. 
Case, A. (2001). Election goals and income redistribution: Recent evidence from Albania. 
European Economic Review, 45(3), 405–423. 
Castells, A., and Solé-Ollé, A. (2005). The regional allocation of infrastructure investment: The 
role of equity, efficiency and political factors. European Economic Review, 49(5), 1165–
1205. 
Celebioglu, F., and Dall’erba, S. (2010). Spatial disparities across the regions of Turkey: an 
exploratory spatial data analysis. The Annals of Regional Science, 45(2), 379–400.  
Cox, G. W., and McCubbins, M. D. (1986). Electoral politics as a redistributive game. Journal of 
Politics, 48(2), 370–89. 
Crescenzi, R. (2009). Undermining the Principle of Concentration? European Union Regional 
Policy and the Socio-economic Disadvantage of European Regions. Regional Studies, 43(1), 
111–133. 
De Leon, C., Desai, M., and Tuğal, C. (2009). Political articulation: parties and the constitution of 
cleavages in the United States, India, and Turkey. Sociological Theory, 27(3), 193–219. 
Deliktaş, E., Önder, a. Ö., and Karadağ, M. (2008). The spillover effects of public capital on the 
Turkish private manufacturing industries in the geographical regions. The Annals of 
Regional Science, 43(2), 365–378. 
Diaz-Cayeros, A., Estévez, F., and Magaloni, B. (2012). Strategies of vote buying: Poverty, 
democracy and social transfers in Mexico. Unpublished Manuscript, Department of 
Political Science, Stanford University. 
Dinçer, M. A., Kaushal, N., and Grossman, M. (2014). Women’s Education: Harbinger of 
Another Spring? Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Turkey. World Development, 64, 
243–258.  
- 122 - 
 
Dixit, A., and Londregan, J. (1996). The determinants of success of special interests in 
redistributive politics. Journal of Politics, 58(4), 1132–55. 
Eraydın, A. (2000). Regional policies at the crossroad: new strategies in the long challenge for 
cohesion. In Regional/rural development conference: a critical evaluation of the European 
Turkish experiences, 27th-28th November, Ankara. 
Eraydın, A. (2001). The role of central government policies and the new forms of local 
governance in the emergence of industrial districts. In M. Taylor and D. Felsenstein (Eds.), 
Promoting local growth: Process, Practice and Policy. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Eraydın, A., and Armatli-Köroglu, B. (2005). Innovation, networking and the new industrial 
clusters: the characteristics of networks and local innovation capabilities in the Turkish 
industrial clusters. Entrepreneurship and Regional Development, 17(4), 237–266. 
ESI. (2005). Islamic Calvinists. Change and conservatism in Central Anatolia. Berlin - Brussels - 
Istanbul: European Stability Initiative. 
Evans, P. B. (1995). Embedded autonomy: States and industrial transformation. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
Farole, T., Storper, M., and Rodríguez-Pose, A. (2010). Human geography and the institutions 
that underlie economic growth. Progress in Human Geography, 35(1), 58–80. 
Filiztekin, A. (2009). Regional unemployment in Turkey. Papers in Regional Science, 88(4), 
863–878. 
Fried, B. J. (2012). Distributive Politics and Conditional Cash Transfers: The Case of Brazil’s 
Bolsa Família. World Development, 40(5), 1042–1053.  
Golden, M. A., and Picci, L. (2008). Pork-Barrel Politics in Postwar Italy, 1953–94. American 
Journal of Political Science, 52(2), 268–289. 
Golden, M., and Min, B. (2013). Distributive Politics Around the World. Annual Review of 
Political Science, 16(12), 1–27. 
Güvenç, M., and Kırmanoğlu, H. (2009). Electoral atlas of Turkey 1950-2009. Continuities and 
Change in Turkey’s politics. Istanbul: Bilgi University Press. 
Heper, M., and Keyman, F. (1998). Double-faced state: political patronage and the consolidation 
of democracy in Turkey. Middle Eastern Studies, 34(4), 259–277. 
Ișık, A. (2012). Kütahya Milletvekili Alim Işık’ın, Kütahya İline Yapılan Kamu Yatırımlarına 
İlişkin Gündem Dışı. Parliamentary Reports of the Republic of Turkey, LXI Government, 
Legislative year: 2, Session: 65.  
Işık, O., and Pınarcıoğlu, M. M. (2010). Back to the Year When It All Started: Local 
Determinants of Party Preferences in 2002 Turkish Elections. METU Journal of Faculty of 
Architecture, 27(1), 161–183. 
Iyer, S., Kitson, M., and Toh, B. (2005). Social capital, economic growth and regional 
development. Regional Studies, 39(8), 1015–1040.  
- 123 - 
 
Kalaycioğlu, E. (2001). Turkish Democracy: Patronage versus Governance. Turkish Studies, 2(1), 
54–70.  
Karadağ, M., Deliktaş, E., and Önder, A. (2004). The effects of public capital on private sector 
performance in Turkish regional manufacturing industries 1. European Planning Studies, 
12(8), 1145–1156. 
Kemahlioğlu, O. (2008). Particularistic distribution of investment subsidies under coalition 
governments: The case of Turkey. Comparative Politics, 40(2), 189–207. 
Kemmerling, A., and Bodestein, T. (2006). Partisan Politics in Regional Redistribution: Do 
Parties Affect the Distribution of EU Structural Funds across Regions? European Union 
Politics, 7(3), 373–392. 
Kemmerling, A., and Stephan, A. (2008). The politico-economic determinants and productivity 
effects of regional transport investment in Europe. EIB Papers, 13(2), 36–60. 
Kroth, V., Larcinese, V., and Wehner, J. (2015). A Better Life For All? Democratization and 
Electrification in Post-Apartheid South Africa. Unpublished Manuscript. London School of 
Economics and Political Science. 
Lanza, O., and Lavdas, K. (2000). The disentanglement of interest politics: Business associability, 
the parties and policy in Italy and Greece. European Journal of Political Research, 37, 203–
235. 
Larcinese, V., Snyder, J. M., and Testa, C. (2012). Testing Models of Distributive Politics using 
Exit Polls to Measure Voters’ Preferences and Partisanship. British Journal of Political 
Science, 43(4), 845-875. 
Levitt, S. D., and Poterba, J. M. (1999). Congressional distributive politics and state economic 
performance. Public Choice, 99, 185–216. 
Lipset, S. M., and Rokkan, S. (1967). Cleavage structures, party systems, and voter alignments: 
An introduction. In S. M. Lipset and S. Rokkan (Eds.), Party systems and voter alignments: 
Cross-national perspectives (pp. 1–64). New York: Free Press. 
Luca, D., and Rodríguez-Pose, A. (2015). Distributive Politics and Regional Development: 
Assessing the Territorial Distribution of Turkey’s Public Investment. The Journal of 
Development Studies, 1–23. doi:10.1080/00220388.2015.1028536 
Mardin, S. (1973). Center-periphery relations: A key to Turkish politics? Daedalus, 102(1), 169–
190. 
McGillivray, F. (2004). Privileging industry: the comparative politics of trade and industrial 
policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Meyersson, E., and Rodrik, D. (2014). Erdoğan’s Coup. The true state of Turkish democracy. 
Foreign Affairs, May 26, 8–11. 
Moretti, E. (2010). Local Multipliers. American Economic Review: Papers and Procedings, 
100(2), 373–377.  
Nickell, S. (1981). Biases in dynamic models with fixed effects. Econometrica, 49(6), 1417–1426. 
- 124 - 
 
Özbudun, E. (2013). Party politics and social cleavages in Turkey. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publisher. 
Özcan, G. B. (2000). Local economic development, decentralisation and consensus building in 
Turkey. Progress in Planning, 54(4), 199–278. 
Özcan, G. B. (2006). A critical analysis of decentralisation and local economic development: the 
Turkish case. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 24(1), 117–138. 
Özcan, G. B., and Gündüz, U. (2015). Political connectedness and business performance: 
evidence from Turkish industry rankings. Business and Politics. 17(1), 41-73. 
Persson, T. (1998). Economic policy and special interest politics. The Economic Journal, 
108(March), 310–327. 
Persson, T., and Tabellini, G. (2003). The economic effects of constitutions. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press. 
Piattoni, S. (Ed.). (2001). Clientelism, interests, and democratic representation. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Putnam, R. D. (1993). Making democracy work. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Rajan, R. G., and Zingales, L. (2006). The persistence of underdevelopment: Institutions, human 
capital or constituencies (CEPR Discussion Paper Series No. 5867). London: Centre for 
Economic Policy Research. 
Rodríguez-pose, A. (1998). Dynamics of regional growth in Europe: social and political factors. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Rodríguez-Pose, A. (2013). Do Institutions Matter for Regional Development? Regional Studies, 
47(7), 1034–1047.  
Rodrik, D. (2010). Structural Transformation and Economic Development. Ankara. 
Sen, K. (2013). The Political Dynamics of Economic Growth. World Development, 47, 71–86.  
Tekeli, R., and Kaplan, M. (2008). Determinants of the distribution of the central-government 
budgetary grants in Turkey. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 26(5), 
954–967. 
Wood, A. (2008). The politics of local and regional development. In K. R. Cox, M. Low, and J. 
Robinson (Eds.), The SAGE Handbook of Political Geography. London, Thousand Oaks, 
New Delhi, Singapore: Sage Publications. 
Wood, A., and Valler, D. (2004). Governing Local and Regional Economies. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Woodridge, J. M. (2010). Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data (2nd editio.). 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Woolcock, M. (1998). Social capital and economic development: Toward a theoretical synthesis 
and policy framework. Theory and Society, 27(2), 151–208.  
Yavan, N. (2012). Türkiye ’ de Yatırım Teşviklerinin Bölgesel Belirleyicileri: Mekânsal ve 
İstatistiksel Bir Analiz. Cografi Bilimler Dergisi, 10(1), 9–37. 
Zeyneloğlu, S. (2006). Istanbul’un secim cografyasi: 1999-2002. Toplum ve Bilim, 107, 87–116. 
- 125 - 
 
Appendixes 
Appendix 1. Variables: review of main hypotheses and their operationalization.  
Variable Description Unit  Source 
Gross Value 
Added 
Per capita gross value added (GVA) at 
2012 prices.  
Ln, TL at 
2012 prices TURKSTAT Regional Database 
AKP 
Percentage of votes to the central 
governing party (AKP) in national 
elections (2002, 2007, 2011) 
Percent 
points European Election Database  
Close race 
Negative absolute value of the vote 
difference between the incumbent party 
and its main challenger in each province 
Percent 
points Own calculation 
Public 
investment 
Per-capita fixed capital investments in 
transport and infrastructural networks 
allocated to each province 
Ln, TL at 
2012 prices 
Own calculation on data from the 
Ministry of Development 
Investment 
incentives  
Number of investment incentive 
certificates annually awarded to private 
firms per 1000 inhabitants Ln count 
Own calculation on data from the 
Ministry of Economy 
Entrepreneurship 
Net annual variation in regional economic 
units per 1000 inhabitants Count 
Own calculation on data from 
TURKSTAT Regional Database 
Human capital 
Percentage of economically active 
population (Labour force) aged 15 years 
old and over with upper secondary 
education (ISCED 3-4) 
Percent 
points TURKSTAT Regional Database 
Manufacturing  
Percentage of workforce aged 15 years 
and over employed in manufacturing 
(NACE Rev. 1) 
Percent 
points TURKSTAT Regional Database 
Rurality 
Percentage of population living in rural 
district within each province 
Percent 
points TURKSTAT Regional Database 
Private 
investment 
Annual variation in per-capita total 
private investment in tangible goods 
1000 TL at 
2012 prices 
Own calculations on data from 
TURKSTAT Regional Database 
Population Total provincial population 1000 people 
TURKSTAT Regional Database, 
OECD 
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Appendix 2. Summary statistics. 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
GVA growth 0.04 0.05 -0.10 0.16 
GVA 9.36 0.39 8.55 10.14 
AKP 45.04 14.81 6.50 84.82 
Close race -25.40 15.16 -70.4 -0.10 
Public investment  3.03 1.42 0.00 9.21 
Investment incentives -3.17 0.63 -6.91 -1.70 
Entrepreneurship 1.01 2.56 -6.28 6.87 
Human capital 0.20 0.04 0.10 0.31 
Manufacturing 20.96 9.44 4.70 46.30 
Rurality 37.85 13.68 1.01 70.08 
Private investment 728.11 3006.66 -20214.25 17152.98 
Population 891.44 1497.70 65.13 13624.24 
 
Appendix 3. Pairwise correlations among variables. 
 GVA  
growth 
GVA AKP Close 
race 
Public 
Inv. 
Inv. 
Inc. 
Entrepr. Human 
capital 
Manuf. Rurality Private 
Inv. 
Pop. 
GVA 
growth 
1 
(0.000) 
           
GVA -0.093* 
(0.017) 
1 
(0.000) 
          
AKP -0.078* 
(0.047) 
0.071 
(0.054) 
1 
(0.000) 
         
Close race -0.001 
(0.991) 
0.120* 
(0.001) 
-0.596* 
(0.000) 
1 
(0.000) 
        
Public inv. 0.016 
(0.678) 
0.101* 
(0.006) 
0.205* 
(0.000) 
-0.098* 
(0.003) 
1 
(0.000) 
       
Inv. Inc. 0.221* 
(0.000) 
0.437* 
(0.000) 
0.248* 
(0.000) 
0.002 
(0.951) 
0.156* 
(0.000) 
1 
(0.000) 
      
Entrepr. 0.280* 
(0.000) 
-0.009 
(0.816) 
-0.103* 
(0.009) 
0.057 
(0.146) 
-0.015 
(0.701) 
0.019 
(0.625) 
1 
(0.000) 
     
Human cap. 0.034 
(0.389) 
0.599* 
(0.000) 
-0.051 
(0.173) 
0.033 
(0.375) 
0.117* 
(0.002) 
0.143* 
(0.000) 
0.022 
(0.577) 
1 
(0.000) 
    
Manuf. -0.044 
(0.295) 
0.659* 
(0.000) 
0.026 
(0.507) 
0.056 
(0.158) 
0.0191 
(0.628) 
0.303* 
(0.000) 
-0.050 
(0.207) 
0.521** 
(0.000) 
1 
(0.000) 
   
Rurality 0.047 
(0.269) 
-0.437* 
(0.000) 
-0.137* 
(0.000) 
0.031 
(0.378) 
-0.230* 
(0.000) 
-0.272* 
(0.000) 
0.032 
(0.414) 
-0.448* 
(0.000) 
-0.555* 
(0.000) 
1 
(0.000) 
  
Private inv. 0.256* 
(0.000) 
0.101* 
(0.005) 
-0.037 
(0.352) 
0.047 
(0.234) 
-0.036 
(0.363) 
0.124* 
(0.002) 
0.233* 
(0.000) 
0.032 
(0.413) 
0.118* 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.916) 
1 
(0.000) 
 
Population -0.039 
(0.314) 
0.293* 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
(0.956) 
0.120* 
(0.000) 
0.080* 
(0.006) 
0.082* 
(0.011) 
0.032 
(0.423) 
0.231* 
(0.000) 
0.324* 
(0.000) 
-0.526* 
(0.000) 
-0.059 
(0.136) 
1 
(0.000) 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05. 
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Appendix 4. Multivariate regressions of the per capita Gross Value Added growth 
rate: FE and IV estimates adopting an alternative measure of electoral competition 
(2004-2012). All explanatory variables are lagged by one year.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 FE IV 
         
Lagged GVA -0.336*** -0.343*** -0.366*** -0.469*** -0.337*** -0.344*** -0.370*** -0.480*** 
 (0.0256) (0.0247) (0.0269) (0.0244) (0.0278) (0.0277) (0.0286) (0.0330) 
AKP 0.000810* 0.00105*** 0.000918*** 0.000502 0.000541 0.000399 0.000324 -0.000247 
 (0.000465) (0.000328) (0.000324) (0.000322) (0.000485) (0.000432) (0.000433) (0.000456) 
Close race  0.000421*** 0.000411*** 0.000282**  0.000281* 0.000287* 0.000111 
  (0.000148) (0.000140) (0.000129)  (0.000167) (0.000165) (0.000169) 
Public inv.   0.00318 0.00247   0.00329* 0.00238 
   (0.00233) (0.00227)   (0.00199) (0.00193) 
Inv. Inc.   0.00709** 0.00614**   0.00834*** 0.00723*** 
   (0.00282) (0.00277)   (0.00282) (0.00272) 
Entrepr.    0.00256***    0.00272*** 
    (0.000686)    (0.000697) 
Human cap.    0.269***    0.278*** 
    (0.0870)    (0.0667) 
Manuf.    0.00226***    0.00228*** 
    (0.000792)    (0.000652) 
Rurality    0.00226**    0.00314*** 
    (0.00108)    (0.00112) 
Private inv.    0.00145***    0.00158*** 
    (0.000293)    (0.000437) 
Population    4.09e-06    2.95e-06 
    (5.63e-06)    (1.04e-05) 
Constant 3.130*** 3.198*** 3.426*** 4.183*** 3.155*** 3.229*** 3.485*** 4.273*** 
 (0.229) (0.224) (0.246) (0.226) (0.257) (0.256) (0.266) (0.294) 
         
Observations 648 648 648 648 648 648 648 648 
Number of id 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 
Adjusted R
2
 0.629 0.634 0.639 0.676 // // // // 
First stage F // // // // 13.81 16.62 17.29 18.10 
Prov FE Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year FE Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Robust, clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 
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Appendix 5. Multivariate regressions of the per capita Gross Value Added growth 
rate: FE and IV estimates including the dependent variable in levels instead of first 
difference (2004-2012). All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 FE IV 
         
AKP 0.000514 0.00247** 0.00214** 0.000520 -5.77e-05 0.00129 0.00107 -0.000818 
 (0.000937) (0.00114) (0.00106) (0.000935) (0.000689) (0.000954) (0.000907) (0.000829) 
AKP^2  -2.18e-05 -2.18e-05 -7.38e-06  -4.09e-05*** -3.85e-05*** -1.35e-05* 
  (1.52e-05) (1.36e-05) (1.07e-05)  (9.42e-06) (8.95e-06) (7.86e-06) 
Public inv.   0.0102*** 0.00476*   0.0101*** 0.00456* 
   (0.00311) (0.00267)   (0.00287) (0.00243) 
Inv. Inc.   0.0203*** 0.0115***   0.0258*** 0.0148*** 
   (0.00450) (0.00403)   (0.00401) (0.00343) 
Entrepr.    0.00278***    0.00310*** 
    (0.000866)    (0.000879) 
Human cap.    0.469***    0.502*** 
    (0.0969)    (0.0830) 
Manuf.    0.00726***    0.00678*** 
    (0.00127)    (0.000737) 
Rurality    0.00424**    0.00569*** 
    (0.00197)    (0.00138) 
Private inv.    0.00142***    0.00176*** 
    (0.000425)    (0.000552) 
Population    2.37e-06    -2.72e-06 
    (9.04e-06)    (1.33e-05) 
Constant 9.238*** 9.201*** 9.236*** 8.858*** 9.257*** 9.266*** 9.314*** 8.870*** 
 (0.0302) (0.0245) (0.0334) (0.0756) (0.0235) (0.0239) (0.0319) (0.0562) 
         
Observations 648 648 648 648 648 648 648 648 
Number of id 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 
Adjusted R
2
 0.747 0.750 0.769 0.837 // // // // 
First stage F // // // // 15.13 13.24 13.74 13.92 
Prov FE Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year FE Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Robust, clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 
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Appendix 6. Multivariate regressions of regional per capita Gross Value Added 
growth rate: FE and IV estimates limiting the panel to the period 2007-2012. All 
explanatory variables are lagged by one year. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 FE IV 
         
Lagged GVA -0.412*** -0.412*** -0.434*** -0.498*** -0.411*** -0.415*** -0.443*** -0.510*** 
 (0.0357) (0.0364) (0.0405) (0.0396) (0.0345) (0.0349) (0.0365) (0.0399) 
AKP 0.000685 0.00344*** 0.00336*** 0.00218*** 0.00138* 0.00253*** 0.00248*** 0.000920 
 (0.000661) (0.000659) (0.000691) (0.000722) (0.000749) (0.000948) (0.000945) (0.000990) 
AKP^2  -3.07e-05*** -3.07e-05*** -2.16e-05**  -3.91e-05*** -3.94e-05*** -2.69e-05*** 
  (9.24e-06) (9.25e-06) (9.08e-06)  (9.17e-06) (9.14e-06) (9.35e-06) 
Public inv.   0.00159 0.00162   0.00185 0.00205 
   (0.00229) (0.00238)   (0.00228) (0.00225) 
Inv. Inc.   0.00634* 0.00489   0.00830** 0.00667** 
   (0.00343) (0.00343)   (0.00328) (0.00321) 
Entrepr.    0.00297***    0.00353*** 
    (0.000856)    (0.000866) 
Human cap.    0.211**    0.256*** 
    (0.103)    (0.0933) 
Manuf.    0.00155**    0.00122 
    (0.000748)    (0.000827) 
Rurality    0.00449***    0.00548*** 
    (0.00168)    (0.00174) 
Private inv.    0.000840***    0.00105** 
    (0.000313)    (0.000481) 
Population    -1.83e-05*    -2.77e-05 
    (1.04e-05)    (1.98e-05) 
Constant 3.849*** 3.802*** 4.020*** 4.389*** 3.815*** 3.869*** 4.149*** 4.523*** 
 (0.326) (0.344) (0.384) (0.382) (0.322) (0.326) (0.343) (0.358) 
         
Observations 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 
Number of id 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 
Adjusted R
2
 0.658 0.672 0.674 0.698 // // // // 
First stage F // // // // 16.66 12.09 12.02 12.03 
Prov FE Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year FE Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Robust, clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 
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Appendix 7. Multivariate regressions of regional per capita Gross Value Added 
growth rate: FE and IV estimates excluding Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. All 
explanatory variables are lagged by one year. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 FE IV 
         
Lagged GVA -0.336*** -0.341*** -0.365*** -0.466*** -0.338*** -0.354*** -0.384*** -0.488*** 
 (0.0260) (0.0255) (0.0275) (0.0245) (0.0284) (0.0293) (0.0302) (0.0342) 
AKP 0.000785* 0.00195*** 0.00185*** 0.00111* 0.000560 0.00123* 0.00115* 0.000296 
 (0.000460) (0.000494) (0.000491) (0.000579) (0.000489) (0.000658) (0.000652) (0.000710) 
AKP^2  -1.30e-05* -1.33e-05* -8.71e-06  -2.02e-05*** -2.04e-05*** -1.32e-05* 
  (6.99e-06) (6.68e-06) (6.68e-06)  (6.49e-06) (6.45e-06) (6.71e-06) 
Public inv.   0.00343 0.00273   0.00360* 0.00267 
   (0.00239) (0.00238)   (0.00212) (0.00203) 
Inv. Inc.   0.00757** 0.00664**   0.0107*** 0.00893*** 
   (0.00290) (0.00277)   (0.00296) (0.00283) 
Entrepr.    0.00289***    0.00310*** 
    (0.000673)    (0.000735) 
Human cap.    0.264***    0.294*** 
    (0.0878)    (0.0692) 
Manuf.    0.00225**    0.00214*** 
    (0.000858)    (0.000690) 
Rurality    0.00206*    0.00303*** 
    (0.00115)    (0.00115) 
Private inv.    0.00150***    0.00171*** 
    (0.000305)    (0.000451) 
Population    -3.73e-06    -7.41e-06 
    (2.68e-05)    (2.60e-05) 
Constant 3.127*** 3.154*** 3.383*** 4.146*** 3.150*** 3.305*** 3.601*** 4.349*** 
 (0.233) (0.231) (0.250) (0.226) (0.262) (0.269) (0.279) (0.306) 
         
Observations 624 624 624 624 624 624 624 624 
Number of id 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 
Adjusted R
2
 0.629 0.633 0.640 0.682 // // // // 
First stage F // // // // 13.93 9.62 9.94 10.40 
Prov FE Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year FE Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Robust, clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 
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Do bureaucracies enhance or constraint development policy 
effectiveness? Evidence from Turkey’s central management of public 
investment 
Davide Luca 
Abstract 
While Turkey’s use of public monies has been frequently marred by populism, 
clientelism, and short-term electoral rewarding, recent research suggests that the 
allocation of public investment across Turkish provinces during the last decade has 
been more responsive to socioeconomic needs than electoral politics. The current 
paper aims to understand this empirical puzzle by: (1) exploring the extent to which 
the management of Turkey’s public investment is effectively focused on publicly-
oriented goals, as opposed to being used as a tool for particularistic redistribution and 
electoral rewarding; (2) explaining whether the institutional characteristics of the 
economic bureaucracy condition the attainment of publicly-oriented goals. The 
analysis draws on in-depth elite interviews. Results suggest that the existence of a 
capable and authoritative organisation directing the project cycle – the Ministry of 
Development, former State Planning Organisation – has positively contributed to the 
technical management of investments. Empirical evidence also indicates how the 
organisation is insufficiently insulated vis-à-vis the government, and hence its ability 
to implement ‘sound’ policies is contingent on the political context. Such results 
confirm the literature on developmental states, which suggests how a key 
precondition for sound policies is bureaucratic autonomy. Nevertheless, the analysis 
also uncovers significant resistance from the bureaucrats against measures which 
would increase bureaucratic efficiency and transparency. Overall, findings suggest 
that, to enhance policy-effectiveness, bureaucracies must be not only capable and 
autonomous, but also accountable.   
 
Key words: Bureaucracies; state effectiveness; public goods; autonomy; 
accountability; Turkey.  
JEL Classification: H11; H83; O21; O53; R58.  
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1. Introduction 
Like in many other countries around the world, the use of public monies in Turkey 
has been frequently distorted by populism, clientelism, and policies driven by short-
term electoral interests rather than long-term developmental goals (cf. Heper and 
Keyman, 1998; Kalaycioğlu, 2001). Recent research on the allocation of Turkish 
public investment during the last decade has yet uncovered a picture in which the 
geographical distribution of public goods responds more to socioeconomic need than 
distributive politics considerations (Luca and Rodríguez-Pose, 2015). The current 
paper aims to understand such empirical puzzle by: (1) exploring in more depth 
whether Turkey’s public investment project cycle is currently managed effectively. 
We define policy effectiveness as the ability to formulate and pursue objectives 
coherently with their policy mandate, regardless of the preferences of other actors in 
their environment (Echeverri-Gent, 1992); (2) explaining what is the role played by 
the Ministry of Development – the organisation in charge of investment allocation 
and overall coordination – in ensuring that investment decisions remain focused on 
publicly-oriented goals, as opposed to purely becoming a tool for particularistic 
redistribution and rewarding electoral support (Biddle, Milor, 1995).
 26
  
The research goal is inspired by the literature on state effectiveness which, after 
almost a century since Max Weber (1921)’s seminal work on bureaucracies, still 
discusses how, and when, public sector organisations can contribute to effectively 
provide the critical public goods necessary for development. On the one hand, the 
literature on the developmental state (Amsden, 1989; Evans, 1995; Evans et al., 2014; 
Rauch and Evans, 1999; Wade, 1990) has pointed out how capable and insulated 
bureaucracies are important preconditions for the sound management of development, 
particularly in contexts where the political class is prone to short-term, populist 
decision-making and clientelistic redistributive goals. On the other hand, however, 
the public choice literature (Huber and Shipan, 2001; Huber, Shipan, and Pfahler, 
2001; Niskanen, 1971, 2001) has stressed the inherent self-interested nature of 
                                                     
26
 In the real world, the distinction between the two ideal types may be blurred, in the sense that 
policies might be aimed at electoral rewarding and yet address social objectives. Like any ideal-type, 
the depiction of the two policy objectives as completely dichotomous is hence a heuristic device.   
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bureaucratic agents, and hence emphasised the importance of mechanisms aimed at 
ensuring oversight over bureaucrats to avoid the latter’s potential predatory and rent-
seeking behaviours.   
This contribution draws on elite, semi-structured interviews among Turkey’s 
economic bureaucracy, as well as on the analysis of national and international policy 
documents. To the best of our knowledge, the analysis is the first attempt to critically 
explore the micro-foundations of the Turkish public investment project cycle. The 
article first contributes to the literature on distributive politics (cf. Golden and Min, 
2013) by complementing Luca and Rodríguez-Pose's (2015) analysis on the territorial 
distribution of public investment and providing novel insights on how dynamics of 
tactical redistribution in contemporary Turkey are concretely shaped. Second, and 
most importantly, the article also contributes to the debate on how to achieve and 
foster state capacity in emerging and middle-income countries similar to Turkey. It 
does so by identifying the specific institutional characteristics which 
promoted/inhibited the effective management of the investment project cycle in the 
Turkish case.  
Results suggest that the institutional characteristics of the Ministry of Development – 
comparatively more capable and authoritative than most other bureaucratic agencies 
in the country – have positively contributed to a technical management of investment 
projects. Results also show, however, how the organisation is insufficiently insulated 
vis-à-vis the government, and hence the effective management of funds is strongly 
dependent on the political elite’s ‘will to deliver’. Luca and Rodríguez-Pose's (2015) 
results showing limited pork-barrelling allocations must hence be interpreted as 
contingent to the government willingness to follow the ‘good governance’ reforms 
implemented after the 2001 economic crisis and also triggered by the EU accession 
negotiations (Luca, 2011; Özdemir-Tsarouhas, 2013). In comparison, in periods such 
as the 1990s, when the political system was in a state of flux (Sayarı, 2002), the 
bureaucracy was unable to shield from pressure and deliver. Such results confirm the 
literature on developmental states, which emphasizes the existence of strong and 
autonomous bureaucracies as a key precondition for sound policies. At the same time, 
however, the analysis also uncovers significant resistance from groups within the 
organisation against the implementation of reforms aimed at increasing bureaucratic 
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efficiency and transparency. Overall, in line with very recent international research on 
state effectiveness (cf. Azulai et al., 2014), findings hence suggest that, to foster 
policy-effectiveness, bureaucracies must be not only capable, insulated, and aware of 
societal needs, but also accountable.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: section two provides a review of 
the literature, and draws from it the main research hypotheses. Section three offers an 
overview of Turkey’s state and policy effectiveness tradition, while section four 
discusses the methodology. Section five presents the empirical findings. Section six 
eventually leads the discussion to a conclusion.  
   
- 136 - 
 
2. The role of bureaucracies in fostering state effectiveness: 
literature review and research hypotheses 
The presence of a well-functioning public sector able to deliver effective policies is a 
key precondition to foster economic growth and social transformation (Azulai et al., 
2014).
27
 Effectiveness depends on the existence of a technical project cycle, that is 
mechanisms allowing to translate visions and goals into well-informed, disciplined, 
and accountable decisions (Milio, 2007; World Bank, 1997). Yet, while there is 
universal agreement on the importance of technical capacity, debate still exists on 
which institutional conditions are necessary to ensure that such technical management 
measures are concretely implemented and followed. Too frequently, the effective 
geographical allocation and management of key public services and goods fails 
because of distorted bureaucratic and political incentives (Diaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and 
Magaloni, 2012). These concerns are particularly relevant in the developing world 
where, because of weaker societal institutions, the provision of public goods is more 
likely to be distorted around redistributive goals and clientelistic networks aimed at 
pleasing partisan supporters in the short-term (Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni, and 
Weingast, 2007; Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2012; Knutsen, 2013), rather than serving long-
term development goals. Drawing from the case of Turkey, Kalayıcıoğlu has 
underlined how 
“[it] is an irony to note that the practice of popular government [electoral democracy, A./N.] and 
good governance seem to be inversely related […] Hence, in effect, democracy is equated with 
populism practiced through clientelistic networks, which often requires the bending of rules and 
laws to distribute benefits […] Promotion of patronage undermines law enforcement and erodes 
                                                     
27
 Empirically, we interpret effectiveness as the extent to which the allocation of public investment 
remains focused on the publicly oriented goals of increasing the overall national welfare and/or 
reducing the inter-regional disparities in people’s income and capabilities, as opposed to becoming a 
tool used for short-term, purely strategic purposes (Biddle, Milor, 1995). Given the scope of the paper, 
we do not discuss in depth whether there exist – or not – a trade-off between favouring overall national 
efficiency and reducing inter-regional imbalances, an issue at the centre of much disagreement among 
the regional science literature (Farole, Rodríguez-Pose, and Storper, 2011; Martin, 2008; Osberg, 
1995; World Bank, 2009). Our choice is motivated by the fact that, although grounded in different 
policy preferences, both objectives are not driven by short-term strategic rationales but by long-term 
policy objectives. 
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the rule of law in the country. Hence a dilemma emerges: democracy is maintained at the 
expenses of the rule of law” (Kalaycioğlu, 2001, p. 66, 67, 63).  
In the cases of Thailand and Indonesia, after the shift to democracy politicians used 
their control of the legislature and the prime minister’s office, as well as pork-
barrelling spending in the countryside, to build their own patron-client networks 
(Rock, 2009). Exploring the experience of Thailand, Rock argues that politicians “did 
so by carrying out a frontal and corrupt assault on the state so they could reward their 
supporters and build their coffers for the next election” (ibid., p. 941). Electoral 
politics is inherently particularistic, in the sense that the exchange of votes and other 
types of political support in favour of public decisions with divisible benefits spans 
virtually across all political systems (Piattoni, 2001). Yet, in ‘weak democracies’ such 
particularistic behaviours may end up in ‘tragic underdevelopment equilibria’ where 
voters contribute maintaining in power political coalitions whose actions are 
detrimental for the overall societal development (Blaydes, 2010; Diaz-Cayeros et al., 
2007).  
The literature tradition rooted in economic sociology and international development 
has hence stressed how capable bureaucracies insulated from politicians may be 
beneficial for effective policy-making. The existence of such bureaucracies may keep 
the state and its developmental policies at bay from interest groups, as well as from 
politicians’ short-term objectives. The literature on the developmental state provides 
one of the strongest positions of how ‘Weberian’ state structures may be a 
prerequisite for ensuring effective policymaking aimed at fostering economic growth 
in emerging economies (Amsden, 1989; Evans et al., 2014; Moon and Prasad, 1994; 
Rauch and Evans, 1999; Wade, 1990). The comparative ‘developmental advantage’ 
of rational, technocratic structures lies in their intrinsic strength in designing and 
carrying out policies which are politically difficult but critically important (Eisner, 
1993). If the bureaucracy is strong and have enough autonomy to resist political 
pressure and interferences by rent-seeking actors, it will be more able to promote 
development and formulate policies in the public interest.  
Drawing from such literature our first hypothesis is that, conditional on the existence 
of technical capacity, policy effectiveness is positively related to the extent to which 
the economic bureaucracy enjoys insulation from external actors.  
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Rauch and Evans (1999) in particular suggest how insulation depends on some key 
‘Weberian features’, namely meritocratic recruitment, salary competitiveness with 
respect to other civil services and the private sector, internal promotion and career 
stability. They also provide cross-country empirical evidence showing how the link 
between differential government performance and economic growth across the world 
is significantly correlated to the existence of bureaucracies with the features described 
above. Analysing the relationship between political appointees within the 
bureaucracy and management performance, Lewis (2007) shows that US federal 
programmes administered by politically appointed bureau chiefs received 
systematically lower evaluation scores than programmes run by chiefs from the civil 
service. Rasul and Rogger (2013) further demonstrate that public sector project 
completion rates in Nigeria are positively correlated with bureaucrats’ autonomy.  
Overall, Evans (1995) argues that developmental states are those where a strong 
bureaucracy is embedded enough in society to ensure that the state elite is aware of 
and responsive to societal needs, but at the same time independent enough to be 
protected against interferences from special interest groups and politicians. While 
Evans (1995)’s theory provides important insights into the relations between 
bureaucracies and their external, social environment, his argument still leaves open 
questions on the specific extent to which bureaucratic agencies’ should be insulated 
from democratic politics.
 28
  
The literature stemming from the public choice tradition has indeed put the 
mechanisms to control the bureaucracy at the core of its interest. Stressing the 
inherent self-interested nature of bureaucratic agents, such research points to the role 
played by mechanisms aimed at ensuring control over bureaucrats as a key factor to 
avoid their possible predatory and rent-seeking behaviours (Chang, de Figueiredo, 
Weingast, and Weingast, 2001; Huber and Shipan, 2001; Niskanen, 2001). As Downs 
(1967) and Niskanen (1971)’s seminal works on bureaucracy go, in the absence of 
                                                     
28
 Interestingly, while most of the literature has taken a positive view of developmental states, 
Kohli (2004) rightly stresses how a country such as South Korea – one of the most discussed examples 
of effective developmental states – has been characterized by cohesive politics, i.e. “by centralised and 
purposive authority structures that often penetrate deep into the society” (p. 10) to the extent that it 
shared characteristics with fascist states of interwar Europe and Japan. 
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control self-interested and rational bureaucrats will try to maximize their own utility 
and hence act in defiance of the public interest. Bureaucratic performance is hence 
explained following a principal-agent model, according to which a principal (the 
legislator) acts as an outside monitor and can reduce inefficiencies and improve 
delivery of services by controlling the opportunistic behaviours of his bureaucratic 
agent (Huber et al., 2001; Niskanen, 2001).  
Successive scholars have further developed such argument to account for more 
complex conditions and considered the possibility that there may be multiple 
principals (Olsen, 2015). The literature explores cases where the room of action of the 
bureaucracy may be shaped not only by legislators but also by interest groups (e.g. 
(Banks and Weingast, 1992; Bendor and Moe, 1985; Waller and Walsh, 1996) and by 
individual influential veto players (e.g. Moraski and Shipan, 1999). The overall 
argument is however clear: bureaucrats are modelled as interested in “some 
combination of bigger budgets, more slack, achieving policy goals, and avoiding 
oversight” (Bendor and Moe, 1985, p. 757). In the absence of control by politicians, 
bureaucracies will hence work against the interest of society, as “the very expertise 
that bureaucrats and other actors enjoy, along with their structural role in policy 
processes, provides them with opportunities to work against the interest of politicians 
and their supporters” (Huber and Shipan, 2001, p. 2).  
The second hypothesis hence suggests that monitoring measures and mechanisms to 
ensure bureaucrats’ accountability positively influence policy effectiveness.  
To conclude, a tension between apparently contradictory hypotheses still informs the 
literature on the link between bureaucracies and state effectiveness (Hopkin and 
Rodríguez-pose, 2007; Hopkin, 2002). The article’s remainder will explore the extent 
to which these different hypotheses help explain the case of public investment 
management in Turkey.  
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3. State and policy effectiveness traditions in Turkey 
Similarly to other late industrializing countries, the development of the Turkish 
economy as well as its private sector in the twentieth century was marked by the 
crucial role played by the state (Buğra and Savaşkan, 2014). For more than nine 
decades Turkey’s developmental state has been the symbol of nation building (Kezer, 
2009; Secor, 2007) and has mobilized resources for social and economic change. 
Within the scope of economic nationalism, the state undertook enormous efforts and 
massive projects for the development of infrastructures. Particularly during the two 
decades of one-party ruling (1923-1945), the state was dominated by a strong 
consensus among three key groups: intellectuals, the army, and civil servants. After 
the first military coup in 1960, the military set in place measures aimed at reasserting 
the state power over the political populist drift and the erosion of bureaucrats’ 
independence occurred during the first years of multiparty system (1945-1960). The 
1963 saw the foundation of the State Planning Organisation (Devlet Pılanlama 
Teşkilatı, SPO hereafter), transformed in 2011 into the Ministry of Development, an 
organization in charge of managing, supervising, and overall coordinating at the 
central level the country’s public development policies (Eraydın, 2000). Since then, 
the SPO has been in charge of preparing multiannual development plans highlighting 
the priorities and strategies of all Ministries and other public agencies. Plans are then 
implemented through annual programmes and annual investment programmes, 
respectively detailing out annual policy priorities and public investment budgetary 
allocations.  
The state’s commitment to developmentalism is written in the Supreme Law. Article 
166 of the 1982 Constitution explicitly calls for public policies to tackle 
developmental imbalances via a ‘speedy, balanced, and harmonious development of 
industry and agriculture throughout the country’(TGNA, 1982). Figure 1 compares 
the shares of public gross fixed capital investment as a percentage of GDP in Turkey 
and in the EU27. Along with the shift from a state-oriented to a more market-oriented 
development model, the public investment share has more than halved during the last 
25 years. Yet, it is still significantly higher than in the EU countries. 
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Figure 1. Shares of public gross fixed capital investment in Turkey and in the EU27, 
1985-2010.   
 
Source: own elaboration on data from Turkey’s Ministry of Development, Eurostat. 
In spite of the Turkish state’s commitment to a developmental agenda, a significant 
amount of scholars has nonetheless pointed to the existence of a frequent gap between 
goals and concrete implementation (Gezici and Hewings, 2004) across many policy 
areas. Particularly since the transition to a multi-party democracy in 1945, i.e. after 
the two initial decades of republican history marked by a one-party regime, the 
process of Turkish modernisation became increasingly mired in strategies of political 
populism, clientelism, and patronage. Research conducted by sociologists and 
political scientists has extensively documented the pervasive influence of clientelism 
and patronage networks over the use of state goods (Güneş-Ayata, 1994a, 1994b; 
Heper and Keyman, 1998; Sayarı, 1977). As stressed by Barkey (1990), the big loser 
in this process was the state, which was progressively deprived of its ability to 
produce coherent policies. Almost three decades ago Heper explained this process by 
arguing that: 
 “[D]evelopments prompted the political parties to capture the state by their co-ideologists. Also, 
particularly from 1973 on, what Kalaycıoğlu calls ‘amoral partyism’ increased by leaps and 
bounds. From 1973 to 1980 Turkey was governed by coalition governments. As this writer has 
pointed out elsewhere, the coalition members were each heavily engaged in unrestrained 
patronage and nepotism […]. Each ministry was brought under the complete jurisdiction of a 
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political party as if each ministry had been ‘appropriated’ by a particular political party” (Heper, 
1985, pp. 114, 115). 
Kalayıcıoğlu (2001) indeed argues that the popular image of democracy in Turkey 
has been tilted toward an understanding of the democratic regime as a mechanism for 
the people to gain greater access to the resources of the State. According to the 
scholar such access is granted by political parties, and elections provide the nexus of 
exchange between the electorate and the political authorities. The weakening of 
public institutions vis-à-vis the political realm – the government in particular – 
reached its peak in the 1980s and 1990s. As a reflection of the changing balance of 
powers between the bureaucracy and the executive (Heper, 1989, 1990), the 
significance and quality of Development Plans decreased significantly. Evidence 
about the pervasiveness of politics into state functioning includes not only the central 
level but also the subnational ones. Tekeli (1993) has stressed how, following the 
military coup of 1980, the governors who took control of Istanbul Metropolitan 
Municipalities abolished the City Planning Office as one of their first actions, as a 
move to prevent the municipal assembly having constraints on profiting from land 
rents.  
The unsustainability of the 1980s and 1990s’ populist and clientelistic drifts reached 
its limits with the burst of the 2001 economic crisis, which forced the politicians and 
the public at large to reconsider the ongoing trajectory (Bakir, 2009; Önis, 2003; 
Uğur and Yankaya, 2008). The devastating impacts of the crisis triggered a complete 
political change in the 2002 elections, and the adoption of many landmark public 
administration reforms. Such reforms were pushed through a small group of top 
bureaucrats who, with the support of the World Bank, the IMF, and the EU, had been 
trying to advocate for change since 1995 (Börzel and van Hüllen, 2014; Özdemir-
Tsarouhas, 2013). As a former top manager from the Treasury recollects: 
“The mentality of the bureaucracy in the 2000s was very much shaped by the economic crises. 
This created a synergy between the SPO, the Treasury and the Ministry of Finance. [Bureaucrats] 
managed to come together and create a letter of intent. Bureaucracy championed change. […] 
Erdoğan found the reforms proposals in a golden tray.”
29
 
                                                     
29
 Interview number 1.  
- 143 - 
 
The Law number 5018 on Public Financial Management and Control approved in 
2003, in particular, drastically restructured the functioning of the entire public finance 
management, replacing the system in operation since 1927 (Özdemir-Tsarouhas, 
2013). The new law incorporates the principles of fiscal transparency and 
bureaucratic accountability, as well as strengthens pre- and post-spending control 
mechanisms for fiscal authorities at all levels.
30
  
While the reforms reshaped the Turkish public financial management’s legislative 
framework, not enough is known about the extent to which these novelties have been 
translated into concrete changes. Analysing the changing relationship between 
politics, business associations, and religion, Buğra and Savaşkan (2014) have 
indirectly provided a cogent discussion of the politicisation of the state in recent 
years. They in particular show how after the Erdoğan’s led Justice and Welfare Party 
(Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) came into power in 2002, the country’s 
clientelistic networks have increasingly pivoted around the newly formed political 
organisation.  
A recent econometric analysis carried out by Luca and Rodríguez-Pose (2015) on the 
allocation of public investment across the provinces of Turkey during 2005-2012 
nonetheless unveils a picture in which the allocation of investment does respond to 
short-term criteria, but where the magnitude of electorally-driven strategic allocations 
is relatively low in comparison to the role played by socioeconomic drivers of 
investment. In their analysis, even after controlling for distributive politics, 
socioeconomic disadvantage measures remain more relevant predictors of investment. 
In the light of the significant amount of literature traditionally stressing the 
pervasiveness of clientelism, patronage, and politicians’ influence over a wider array 
of Turkey’s state functions, are the (relatively) positive results about public 
investment allocation a proof of an effective investment management? Besides, can 
effectiveness patterns be explained by specific institutional characteristics of the 
bureaucracy in charge of investment management? To our best knowledge, almost no 
studies have explored such topic. Interestingly, this literature gap is not only confined 
                                                     
30
 As it will become important during the discussion of the empirical results, it is worth stressing 
that the reforms received resistance among numerous quartiers in the bureaucracy (Ozdemir 
Tsarouhas, 2013). 
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to the case of Turkey. As Bertelli and Grose (2009) stress, the literature exploring 
how politicians strategically use public resources has generally been legislature 
centric, in the sense that although it recognizes that allocations are made in the 
byways of bureaucracies, it has mostly focused its attention on the role of 
governments and parliamentarians, and much less on the specific role played by 
bureaucratic agencies. Biddle and Milor (1995) have seminally analysed the role of 
the SPO in determining the effectiveness of investment incentives to the private 
sector. Apart from their seminal contribution, yet, no research has ever explored the 
link between the organisation and the effectiveness of public investment.  
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4. Methodology 
The methodology is based on qualitative techniques. The fieldwork was conducted 
between October and December 2014 in Turkey’s central economic bureaucracy. The 
research findings draw from elite, in-depth semi-structured interviews.
31
 The 
interviewees’ were selected integrating purposive and chain sampling techniques. 
First, officers occupying positions relevant for the project cycle were contacted. Each 
of them was then asked to provide further contacts. A snowball selection of potential 
interviewees was hence nested into the initial purposive sampling. The final sample 
includes 32 interviewees, of which 18 civil servants from the Ministry of 
Development, and 14 individuals from other organisations, namely six civil servants 
from the Ministry of Finance, three key public policy scholars from Bilgi University, 
Boğazici University, and Koç University, two experts from the Delegation of the EU 
to Turkey, one retired manager from the Undersecretary of Treasury, one public 
finance expert and director from Turkey’s Economic Policy Research Foundation 
(Türkiye Ekonomi Politikaları Araştırma Vakfı, TEPAV) with previous experience at 
the Undersecretary of Treasury and the World Bank, and one expert from the 
Ministry of Transport’s General Directorate for Highways (Karayolları Genel 
Müdürlüğü, KGM).   
In the selection of interviewees, the Ministry of Development was targeted 
preferentially because the organisation holds the main responsibilities for the 
coordination of public investment and regional policies. Since the 1980s, along with 
significant transformations in its economy (Çokgezen, 2000) and the shift toward an 
export-oriented growth model (Tokatlı and Eldener, 2002), the country has taken 
progressive steps towards an incipient decentralisation.
32
 In spite of such changes, 
public investment is still planned, allocated and monitored at the central level by the 
                                                     
31
 Four of the interviews were conducted during a pilot research phase between October 2012 and 
September 2013.   
32
 The opening of accession negotiations to the EU, in the early 2000s, in particular, coincided with 
– and partly triggered – a series of reforms in the country’s development strategies (Dedeoğlu, 2010; 
Luca, 2011). Reforms included the creation of development agencies (Lagendijk, Kayasu, and Yaşar, 
2009), semi-public entities in charge of regional development initiatives at the NUTS II level, as well 
as the decentralization of some powers to Provinces, Metropolitan Municipalities and Municipalities 
(Özcan and Turunç, 2008). 
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Ministry of Development. Local administrations can invest autonomously from 
Ankara. Yet, around 90% of their investment is still covered by the central investment 
budget. While public investment projects are proposed and operationally managed by 
line Ministries, the definition of annual priorities and guidelines, and the project 
selection and monitoring are still prerogative of the Ministry of Development. We 
hence focused our main attention on the latter organization on the ground that it is 
exactly the place where policies are developed.  
The inclusion of interviewees from external organisations was foreseen to 
customarily cross-validate the correctness of information. The EU Delegation to 
Turkey, TEPAV, and the key scholars were selected because of their authoritative and 
independent view on the state bureaucracy. The Ministry of Finance and the 
Undersecretary of Treasury should be a further source of critical information, 
particularly considering the traditional power and coordination problems (Nicholson-
Crotty, 2005) they experienced with the Ministry of Development.
33
 Interviews lasted 
on average between 60 and 90 minutes, and were carried out in English and Turkish. 
Figure 2. The composition of the interviewees’ sample (percentages, clockwise). 
56%
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Ministry of Development
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General Directorate for Highways
Undersecretary of Treasury
Interview findings were also coupled with secondary document collection, which 
added considerably to the factual understanding of the public investment 
                                                     
33
 In line with the key role played by the Ministry of Development in the project cycle, Section 5 
will mostly present and discuss quotes from the organisation’s personnel. The quotes presented are the 
ones which were confirmed most frequently – directly and indirectly – by the ‘interviewees’ control 
group’ and by external sources. 
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management, and served to cross-check the findings from the Ministry of 
Development. Particular attention was paid to three institutional sources: the annual 
reports prepared by the European Commission to monitor Turkey’s progress towards 
accession to the EU, the annual Economic Surveys on Turkey prepared by the OECD, 
and the Five-Year Development Plans and the Annual Investment Programmes 
prepared by the Ministry of Development. 
Two analytical caveats must be taken into account. First, it is important to bear in 
mind that the analysis does not claim to conclusively map Turkey’s public investment 
policy process. The complete understanding of policymaking would require an 
extensive exploration of not only the bureaucratic organisation (the agent), but also 
the politicians (the principal) and the overall public financial framework. Improving 
state effectiveness indeed requires not only an effective bureaucracy able to design 
and implement development-friendly policies, but also political willingness as well as 
fiscal capacity to promote them. Given the very limited amount of research on the 
topic, such a broad subject would nonetheless be out of the scope of the current 
research. More modestly, the article’s aim is to provide novel empirical evidence on 
the concrete functioning of the public investment project cycle during the last decade, 
and then link the observed strengths and weaknesses to the institutional 
characteristics of the Ministry of Development. Relatedly, the analysis does not 
explore how governance links between the central state and sub-national levels 
(potentially) shape the project cycle. Although sub-national tiers of government do 
not play a major role in Turkey’s public investment project cycle, further research in 
that area could perhaps provide insightful results, particularly considering how the 
lack of coordination between central and sub-national decision units has been 
discussed as a problem in the literature (cf. Karadağ, Deliktaş, and Önder, 2004).  
A second caveat relates to the interviews. The ability to receive reliable and honest 
answers may be potentially limited by the author’s status as an outsider. This may be 
particularly relevant in a social context such as Turkey, where interpersonal trust 
plays a role bigger than formal ties in shaping insider/outsider dynamics. 
Interviewees were hence accessed after having secured the support of trusted 
individuals who could ‘warrant’ the interviewer’s trustworthiness. Previous work 
experience in the country and the use of Turkish in communication further helped 
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‘breaking into the bureaucratic black box’. Considering both the bureaucratic ranking 
of some of the interviewees and sensitivity of the questions being asked, interviews 
were not recorded.
34
 Last but not least, interviewees were guaranteed anonymity in 
order to encourage ‘free speech’. Overall, these precautions increased respondents’ 
eagerness to talk and discuss personal and institutional conflicts more freely. 
Interviewees were also asked to provide information on their most-followed media 
outlets. Such information was then used to ‘control’ for respondents’ heterogeneous 
political views – which may influence answers about the bureaucracy/politics 
relationship.  
 
                                                     
34
 Such decision was taken after running some pilot interviews, where respondents did not accept to 
be recorded. Since 2013, and following a massive corruption scandal involving Turkey’s former Prime 
Minister and other members of the Cabinet, the Government has significantly increased pressure on 
civil servants and worked to purge thousands of suspected political enemies from the judiciary and the 
police (Meyersson and Rodrik, 2014). We hence decided not to record any of the final interviewees to 
avoid potential influences on some of the responses. 
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5. Empirical analysis 
The public investment project cycle 
Following the approval of Law 5018/2003, the public investment project cycle is 
formally based on the three pillars of strategic planning, performance-based 
budgeting, and monitoring and evaluation of results. The Ministry of Development’s 
key project cycle responsibilities include the preparation of the annual project 
guidelines, the screening and approval of projects, as well as their overall 
coordination and monitoring and evaluation. By contrast, the empirical 
implementation of investment projects is carried out by line Ministries.   
The selection of annual projects is based on a three-step process. The Ministry of 
Development first issues a circular directed to other state agencies and line ministries 
stating each year’s specific objectives. Such circular should mirror the strategic 
priorities set in the Five-year and Medium-term Plans. The latter, which cover three 
years and is annually prepared on a rolling basis, was one of the key innovations 
introduced by the new law. It was foreseen to overcome the traditional lack of 
coordination between multiannual plans and annual investment decisions. At least in 
theory, medium-term plans should now guide the selection of investment projects to 
ensure a more strategic use of public monies. Second, bureaucratic agencies and 
public institutions submit their programme proposals to the Ministry of Finance and 
the Ministry of Development, in charge of ensuring that projects comply with fiscal 
and planning documents respectively. A phase of negotiation then occurs between 
other line ministries and the Ministry of Development’s experts, before the latter 
agency finalises the investment programme. As the following quotes suggest the 
procedure is, at least in theory, very technical:   
“Experts look at project proposals and negotiate with their counterparts. Then a meeting is 
organised at the Ministry of Development. It’s a technical level meeting, sector by sector. These 
meetings last from August to September. In the whole Ministry, there may be more than 100 
meetings. From line ministries there is staff attending not only from Strategy Departments, but 
also operational people. The final phase is the approval. Experts at the Ministry of Development 
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put forward the proposals which they believe need approval. […] Such list of proposals then goes 
to the Director General. Only big issues are brought to upper levels e.g. controversial projects.”
35
 
“Of course politicians propose projects, but we can try to convince them that hospitals are not 
needed where there are already four. We are strongly working at reducing inequalities in hospital 
provision across Turkey. Of course there are demands for useless hospitals, but we can frequently 
manage to reject unnecessary projects. E.g. two years ago we came together with the Ministry of 
Health. We defined priorities areas, allocating each of the 29 health regions of Turkey to one of 
four ‘urgency groups’. Frequently our Minister and our General Managers have backed up our 
positions.”
36
 
Programmes are subsequently approved by the High Planning Council (Yüksek 
Pılanlama Kuruluşu, HPC hereafter). The annual investments’ draft programme 
eventually needs to be ratified by the Parliament. The investment project cycle is 
developed in a way to limit the direct influence of legislators (Wehner, 2010). As a 
matter of fact, Members of Parliament are unable to see the projects’ detailed figures. 
In other words, before the final publication of annual investment programmes, 
parliamentarians can only express their views on the budget (and the related 
investment programme) as a whole since the detailed project allocation is not 
disclosed. Because of such mechanism, changes introduced by the Parliament have 
often been minor (Özdemir-Tsarouhas, 2013), hence limiting the influence of 
individual legislators in seeking pork-barrelling allocations. The system is based on 
the idea that legislators can monitor the bureaucracy’s past performance (i.e. 
assessing previous years’ plans), and yet are prevented from influencing forthcoming 
programmes.  
Overall, the new system has modernised the investment cycle in line with 
international standards (OECD, 2004b). Nevertheless, empirical evidence also 
suggests that the project cycle continues – at least in part – to be marred by two main 
types of flaws. 
First, the system has traditionally suffered from inadequate targeting and a lack of 
focus on the most relevant priorities. In spite of the reforms, the link between annual 
                                                     
35
 Interview number 21. 
36
 Interview number 26. 
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investment programmes and multiannual plans continues to be weak. As a matter of 
fact, after just a few years since their first appearance in 2006, Medium-term 
Programmes have started to be published weeks after projects had already been 
proposed by public agencies and selected by the Ministry of Development. The 
consequence is that strategic planning continues to be inadequate, with projects still 
being proposed and discussed without clear overall strategies. The following excerpt 
from a former top-manager from the Treasury explains this issue: 
“A problem is that there are too many plans/documents. There are the Five Year Development 
Plans, the Medium Term Programmes, the Annual Programmes and Investment Programmes, and 
each Ministry has its own plan. All these documents were created to ensure a good coordination 
and good strategic planning, but they are too many now and are not respected.”
37
 
Second, weak monitoring and ex-ante feasibility controls leads to inefficient projects. 
As the Eight Development Plan suggested, “even completed promptly, they [projects, 
A./N.] may not yield the anticipated benefits due to the insufficiencies in feasibility 
projects. […] Insufficiencies in monitoring as well as evaluation both restrain timely 
determination and elimination of breakdowns and curtail coordination among 
projects” (State Planning Organisation, 2001, p. 226/227). This flaw is caused both 
by the insufficient procedures to carry out effective ex-ante controls by the Ministry 
of Development, and by the poor quality of feasibility studies submitted by public 
institutions to the Ministry. The following quote by a senior manager with more than 
two decades of experience in the organisation explains the second problem: 
“According to the Law 5018, you have to have a feasibility study analysing technical and 
financial feasibility, social impacts, etc. What is concretely the quality of those studies is another 
thing. I can show you one. This, I can read it in 15 minutes, and it does not say anything. Yet, if 
you tell the Ministry of Transport that a study is wrong, they have always answers [to put the 
project forward].”
38
   
The weaknesses in the availability of effective mechanisms to ex-ante evaluate 
projects at the selection phase is mirrored by an almost complete lack of on-going and 
ex-post monitoring and evaluation of approved projects. Numerous interviewees 
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 Interview number 1. 
38
 Interview number 17. 
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acknowledged such shortcomings as significant constraints on the agency’s 
performance. Indeed, a Ministry of Development manager with 15 years of 
experience explains:   
“I think this is the weakest part of our project cycle. Sometimes we ask for realisations, we also 
carry out some site visits. We do some monitoring but we are not good in evaluation. There is no 
formal evaluation. If we did, it would have a big influence on project effectiveness. So now we 
continue making the same mistakes.”
39
  
To conclude, the analysis provides an overall picture of the investment project cycle 
in line with Luca and Rodríguez-Pose's (2015) relatively positive findings. The good 
governance reforms implemented in the early 2000s appear as a first explanatory 
variable behind the limited amount of distributive politics uncovered by the two 
authors. Such reforms have strengthened both the country’s fiscal situation and the 
investment project cycle. At the same time, the latter still shows important flaws. The 
following two sections will discuss how the levels of policy effectiveness observed 
can be explained by the role and characteristics of the Ministry of Development.    
 
Bureaucratic capacity, autonomy, and policy effectiveness 
Unlike other developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America which achieved 
independence from colonial rule with relatively low state capacity, coming into 
existence in 1923 the Republic of Turkey inherited a strong state tradition from the 
Ottoman Empire (Heper, 1985). At the same time, the weak independence of state 
institutions from the ruling elite has been one enduring characteristic of the Turkish 
state. Within this tradition, the SPO was statutorily designed by the military rulers as 
an organisation comparatively stronger and better insulated than most other Turkish 
public agencies. A senior manager with almost three decades of experience in the 
agency explains: 
“Our position was unique within the public administration. Why? It was considered that the 
institution had to think freely and had to find solutions for the future of the country. So they don’t 
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 Interview number 21. 
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have to be directed by plagiarized people [people not independent from special and short-term 
interest groups, A./N.].”
40
 
As Özbudun and Ulusan (1980) stress, the military junta was rather sympathetic to 
the concept of planning and the idea of an independent organism aimed not merely at 
the physical growth of the nation, but also at a peaceful transformation of the existing 
systems. Since the 1980s, along with the shift from an import-substitution to an 
export-oriented model of growth and the progressive trend of decentralization 
occurred in Turkey (Özcan and Turunç, 2008), the overall state’s active role in 
development started declining. Yet, the SPO overall managed to maintain its elitist 
character and, with it, levels of technical capacity comparatively higher than many 
other state institutions. The public employees’ insufficient skills level has 
traditionally been a problem for the effective provision of public services in Turkey 
(State Planning Organisation, 2006). The peculiar place occupied by the Ministry of 
Development within the broad public sector can be hence grasped comparing the 
organisation’s human resources with other public agencies.  
Table 1. Distribution of personnel across different Ministries according to 
educational status in 2014 (percentage). 
Institution Educational attainments 
  
Elementary 
school 
Secondary 
school 
Associate 
degree 
Undergrad. 
degree 
Graduate 
degree 
PhD 
Ministry of Development 1.5 6.5 8.8 51.5 28.5 3.2 
Treasury 1.7 11.6 8.3 53.7 22.7 2.2 
Ministry of Economy 3.0 12.0 8.0 56.0 21* 
Ministry of Finance 3.5 14.5 10.7 68.1 3.1 0.1 
Ministry of Labour and 
Social Security 2.4 10.6 8.1 73.4 5.7 0.8 
*data include both Graduate and higher qualifications. Source: Ministry of Development, Ministry 
of Finance, Treasury, Ministry of Labour and Social Security. 
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 Interview number 2. 
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Table 1 compares the educational attainments of civil servants in the Ministry of 
Development to four other state organisations. If compared to the 1980s and 1990s 
(Biddle and Milor, 1995), the gap in educational attainments between the Ministry of 
Development and rest of the economic bureaucracy has currently decreased. 
Nevertheless, the table still shows noteworthy differences. The Ministry of 
Development fares in particular better than its counterparts in the highest levels of 
educational attainments, with almost 32% of its staff possessing a graduate degree or 
a higher diploma, as opposed to less than 25% in the Treasury, 21% in the Ministry of 
Economy, and only 6.5% in the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, and 3.2% in 
the Ministry of Finance. 
Interestingly, the Ministry of Development has also traditionally given emphasis to 
the ‘socialization’ of new recruits to its ‘institutional norms’ by pairing junior experts 
to senior staff for long periods, as well as by supporting logistically and financially 
members of staff in the achievement of graduate degrees in top foreign universities 
(frequently in the US). The following excerpt by one head of department with more 
than 20 years of service confirms how ‘socialisation’ into the organisational structure 
is considered as a key characteristic of the Ministry: 
“I think that highly trained personnel are more prone to resist against political pressure from 
above. […] I think that compared to the initial selection, more important is the training of 
personnel. Here new people are well trained. Each new assistant expert is assigned to an expert. In 
other ministries, there may be 10 new people for each expert. So they don’t learn the institutional 
culture.”
41
  
Traditionally, the Ministry has also benefitted from a relatively objective and 
meritocratic system of recruitment, which guaranteed the selection of competent 
applicants, as well as from salaries significantly higher than other line institutions. As 
will be discussed later, the organisation has not been immune from nepotism and the 
preferential hiring of candidates based on political views, particularly since the 1980s. 
At the same time, however, most interviewees agreed on how the agency has 
managed not to fully undermine the quality of new recruits. The following quote by a 
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senior planning expert with more than 10 years of experience in the Ministry provides 
an example: 
“For promotions in top management of course there is political interference. [As for lower 
positions], if there are two applicants for a position, they may prefer the [politically] closest one. 
But if there is just one applicant, they generally will give the job to him.”
42
 
When asked why the formal recruitment system has allowed keep nepotism (torpillik) 
relatively at bay in the Ministry, one head of department with more than 10 years of 
experience answered: 
“The [entry] examination is done by people from here. We work on candidates, and then give a 
list and the Minister selects among our list. […] Of course pressure on this kind of thing is always 
there. But […] we are the ones frying in the pan eventually. I will be the one to work until 9 in the 
evening. So it is in our interest to hire the best people.”
43
 
The quote confirms the importance of ‘internal control’ as a mechanism for the 
reproduction of ‘institutional quality’, in line with Rauch (1995)’s theoretical 
framework. Marrying the Weberian state hypothesis to a principal-agent model, he 
argues that, in a bureaucracy overall effective in fulfilling its mission, each manager 
will have incentives to act as a principal and select and supervise his/her staff  (i.e. 
agents) to ensure that they carry out their tasks. Relatedly, the literature suggests how 
two other mechanisms are important for ensuring an agency effective working. The 
first one concerns whether career advancements are based on merit, rather than on 
other non-performance related factors. The second mechanism refers to the emphasis 
given to internal advancement over the selection of external candidates. While it 
could be argued that the selection of external candidates may potentially bring new 
talents into the organisation – and hence acts as an efficiency-enhancer mechanism –, 
Evans (1995) and Rauch (1995) extensively argue how, in settings where political 
pressure on appointments is high, civil service protection mechanisms are more likely 
to be efficiency-enhancing. The following quote by a young head of department with 
10 years of experience at the organization supports their hypothesis:  
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“The Ministry of Development is not the Ministry of Agriculture, or the one of Interior. The latter 
is the most political place on earth. There if you do something the top people don’t like, you are 
hanged. We are not a Weberian bureaucracy either. Yet, what we have is we still get promoted 
from within. […] Appointments are most of the time objective up to the level of Director General. 
Then they have to be supporters of the party. But even then they must have some capacity. In a 
normal Ministry, if you want to get appointed you go to the Minister, or to MPs. […] The culture 
here normally doesn’t work like that.”
44
 
Indeed, out of the current 15 top managers of the Ministry (Minister, Vice-Minister, 
Undersecretaries and General Directors), only two do not have spent their entire 
professional life within the organisation before being appointed to their current 
position.  
Overall, the evidence seems to suggest that the existence of a capable institution with 
purposive authority in charge of investment management has positively contributed to 
ensuring that investment decisions remain focused on publicly-oriented goals. At the 
same time, and in spite of institutional characteristics comparatively stronger than the 
rest of Turkey’s bureaucracy, the analysis also suggests that concrete mechanisms 
through which the Ministry of Development operates have not been immune from 
flaws. The remainder of this section will explore how the organisation has in 
particular suffered from insufficient autonomy from the executive in carrying out its 
activities.  
Since the bureaucratic elite played a key role in the modernization of the country, by 
its own virtue high-level bureaucrats traditionally formed a distinct group united by a 
sense of shared identity (Biddle and Milor, 1995) and frequently perceived 
themselves as the main formulator of the Turkish state’s long-term interests (Heper, 
1985). At the same time, however, such powers and elitist attitude spread the seeds 
for their own demise, bringing the top bureaucracy into a long-term conflict with the 
political elite. During the 1980s, in particular, non-legal political pressure on 
personnel started to creep into the SPO via the recruitment of new staff through a 
separate process to bypass the formal examination. A senior finance expert from 
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TEPAV with former experience at the Undersecretary of Treasury and the World 
Bank points out: 
“In Turkey, this has always been a problem, especially in the 1980s and 1990s. So bureaucracy 
tried to safeguard itself [by trying to retain as much as independence as possible]. The 
Undersecretary of Treasury is an example.”
45
  
Similarly to many other countries (cf. for example the Italian case described by 
Golden, 2003), Turkish politicians have indeed frequently used the expansion of the 
state as an opportunity to engage with patronage recruitment. Aside from its 
budgetary effects, the expansion of personnel has had implications on the 
organisation’s implementation capacity (World Bank, 1997). Numerous interviewees 
stressed such problem, arguing that the excessive increase in the number of new 
personnel hired has – particularly in recent years – jeopardized the agency’s capacity 
of ‘socialising’ new recruits. As a head of department with almost 30 years of service 
explains:  
“In the past our salary regime was higher than other institutions. So we were selected as the cream 
of the available personnel. […] There are still residuals of that culture. But in the last 10 years we 
hired too many people, so it is difficult to transmit these values to new people. […] Why were 
people hired? That is political!”
46
 
Besides, while there are mechanisms to ensure a relative insulation from the 
legislative, the organisation is not independent from the Government. This should be 
no surprise considering that the SPO was statutorily designed as an advisory 
organisation attached to the Prime Ministry. Institutional changes in the project cycle 
have nonetheless altered, throughout the decades, the scope of the bureaucrats’ ability 
to make their voice heard by the Cabinet. As many interviewees suggest, a main locus 
where technical decisions are overruled is the High Planning Council. While initially 
composed of the Prime Minister, 4 Ministers, and 4 top managers from the SPO, 
following the Decree Law no. 223/1984 and Law no. 304/1987 bureaucrats have been 
removed from the Council. Since then, the Government has had full power to modify 
investment plans prepared by the bureaucracy. The Eight Development Plan indeed 
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points out to this phenomenon as one of the structural problems of the public 
investment management, stating how “additional allocation practices within the 
program year mar program discipline and sectorial balances” (State Planning 
Organisation, 2001, p. 227). The following excerpt provides a concrete example: 
“As experts, our basic document in the selection of projects is the annual development 
programme. […] If you read page 236 of the 2014 programme, you understand that we should not 
invest at all in motorways but invest in other means of transport. But in the last years there have 
been 70 trillion TL investments in motorways. We allocate 4 trillion at the beginning of the year, 
and at the end they have become 9. [So how does it happen?] At the High Planning Council. If a 
project is above 100 million TL we send the project to it. We send reports saying that projects are 
good/bad, giving technical opinions. […] Yet, so far, I cannot remember even one case when they 
rejected a project after our evaluation. At the end, unless you get politicians away from populist 
approaches, all the ideas about effective planning rest on paper.”
47
 
The main channel of ‘control’ of the principal (the political agents) over the agent 
(the bureaucrats)’s policy decisions is hence not the Parliament and its sectorial 
committees (cf. Weingast and Moran, 1983) but, rather, the Prime Minister and the 
Cabinet (cf. Moe and Wilson, 1994). The top bureaucrats’ stronger role into the HPC 
was initially foreseen by the Military interim government which established the SPO 
in the 1960s. According to the literature on democratic accountability discussed 
earlier on, the substitution of top-bureaucrats with elected Ministers may mark a 
positive transition towards a more accountable and democratic system. At the same 
time, however, in a setting where politicians have frequently embraced inefficient and 
unsustainable policies purely aimed at garnering votes, the changing balance of 
power between bureaucrats and politicians within the Council has had implications 
for the sound management of public funds.  
Indeed, over the years a number of economically dubious investment projects have 
been burdening the public investment portfolio. As Gönenç, Leibfritz, and Yilmaz 
(2005) suggest these projects were often launched in response to central and local 
political pressures. Examples include the launching of irrigation projects with 
particularly long completion, and the construction of transport infrastructures with 
                                                     
47
 Interview number 25. 
- 159 - 
 
limited use. This drifts worsened in periods such as the 1990s, when the political 
system was more unstable and political leaders engaged more deeply in short-term 
electorally-motivated allocations. Figure 3 confirms such trend. It shows the average 
number of projects included each year in the annual investment programme between 
1992 and 2014, as well as the average completion time of projects (for the years 
available). The number of projects included into each year’s programme peaked in 
the mid-1990s, to start decreasing only in the early 2000s.   
Figure 3. Number of total investment projects included in each annual programme 
(left axis), and average completion rate of projects (right axis) (1992-2014). 
 
Source: own elaboration on data from Turkey’s Ministry of Development. 
Following the late 1990s and early 2000s political and economic crisis, the State 
Planning Organisation was assigned in 2001 the task to identify the least efficient 
projects and prepare an investment rationalisation programme. Such programme 
proposed to freeze those projects with the lowest prospects of completion, and 
concentrate the limited resources on priority areas. Under the loom of new crises, and 
willing to comply with the EU accession negotiations, the government followed these 
recommendations (OECD, 2004). Evidence hence suggests that Luca and Rodríguez-
Pose (2015)’s positive results for the period 2005-2012 are driven by the Ministry of 
Development’s capacity, but also contingent on Erdoǧan and his government’s 
willingness to implement and follow the post-2001 ‘good governance’ reforms 
- 160 - 
 
developed by the bureaucracy in concert with the World Bank, the IMF, and the EU. 
The following quote by one of the bureaucrats involved in the rationalisation of the 
project cycle supports this claim:   
“Fiscal control gave us opportunities during the management of this government. […] Of course 
[in the past the system] was not working because of political interferences. Actually I think [the 
system] worked in the 1960s, in the 1970s, and in a way still the 1980s because of the preferences 
of Özal’s government. But in the 1980s it started to decline and of course went down in the 1990s. 
There was a chance in the 2000s. Actually it was going pretty well until 2008…”
48
 
Pressure to pass investment projects primarily motivated to garner votes derives not 
only from external actors, but also from part of the top-management within the 
organisation. The fact that politicians increasingly managed to influence bureaucratic 
recruitment and promotion patterns in turn increased the sensitivity of top bureaucrats 
to signals emanating from the political class (Biddle and Milor, 1997). The following 
quote by a young planning expert explains this phenomenon: 
“We are different than other ministries, but it happens that we feel the pressure, that we are said 
‘this is a key project, if we don’t accept it that will be an issue’. If we write very negative and 
strong assessment reports we would put politicians in a difficult corner, so this leads us to write 
reports in a more nuanced and softer way. [Who tell you?] It’s top managers. They may tell that 
‘this is a key project. I know it’s not economically feasible but it’s “socially” viable.’ […] There 
is closeness (samimiyet) between top bureaucrats at the SPO and people in the political sphere.”
49
  
Along with the strong power of the Government to influence investment decisions 
irrespective of the technical project cycle, a final factor undermining the technical 
management relates to inadequate staffing within the Ministry of Development. 
Pointing to the road network projects within the transport sector, which for example 
in 2013 accounted for more than three billion Turkish Lira worth of projects, one 
junior manager explains:  
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“Formally there is no space for political pressure. The procedure is formally very technical. Do 
you ask me if it concretely works? Check how many people work on each sector: on road projects 
there are only three people working. This implicitly politicizes the process.”
50
 
To conclude, the analysis suggests that although still in a better position than other 
institutions, the Ministry has not been immune from flaws, particularly related to 
insufficient autonomy vis-à-vis the government. Overall, results confirm Biddle and 
Milor (1995), who argued that it is less the absence of bureaucratic capacity than the 
lack of bureaucratic insulation to undermine Turkey’s development policies 
effectiveness. 
 
Bureaucratic accountability and policy effectiveness 
The final research hypothesis suggests that while bureaucratic autonomy may reduce 
politicians’ attempts to drive the policy process towards inefficient, clientelistic and 
populist outcomes, effective devices to monitor bureaucrats’ actions are nonetheless 
expected to be an important component to reduce moral hazard among civil servants 
(Page, 2010).  Interestingly, empirical results suggest that the very limited existence 
of mechanisms to ensure accountability – another significant flaw in Turkey’s 
investment project cycle – is determined not only by factors external to the Ministry 
of Development but also by resistance to change originating within the organisation.  
In spite of the legal novelties introduced by the Law 5018/2003, only an extremely 
limited amount of personnel is currently in charge of monitoring and evaluation tasks. 
One of the interviewees from the Ministry of Development in particular suggests 
how, concretely, probably only 5 members of staff (i.e. around 0.06% of the 
organisation’s total employees) are concretely devoted to the real monitoring and 
evaluation of projects.
51
 As a former top manager from the Treasury explains:  
“The founding of the SPO was done to streamline investments and check efficiency. Yet, 
monitoring and evaluation had always largely ignored. In the 1980s and 1990s, in particular, 
project efficiency was low. […] The 2003 laws on public expenditure were an effort to rationalize 
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public spending. Yet, nobody knows exactly the outcomes of projects. Bureaucratic offices (e.g. 
units, directorates) publish activity reports, but these don’t link to performance indicators.”
52
 
Trying to explain the reason why the organisation never gave significant priority to 
monitoring and evaluation, in spite of the awareness of its utility to increase 
effectiveness, Biddle and Milor (1995) reported the opinion of a staff member that 
collecting data on performance would be like ‘playing Russian roulette’. Most 
interviewees provided similar arguments. Interestingly, one senior manager suggests 
how the top management’s focus on the monitoring of performance has decreased 
along the years, rather than increasing: 
“The first big change in the SPO was done in 1994. At that time the Coordination Department was 
closed. […] Our main rule in that department was to follow-up the implementation, make 
necessary revisions and coordination, and monitor the realization and make necessary reporting. 
[…] We were monitoring all projects’ realisations; we were issuing public investment expenditure 
reports each quarter. Now we don’t do that! At that time we were. […] By closing that 
department, those functions were cancelled.”
53
  
Similarly, numerous experts acknowledged that monitoring and evaluation has never 
become a priority for the top management. The same senior manager provides a 
concrete example:  
“We started a new project. It was initially accepted by the top management, it was about ex-post 
evaluation of selected projects. But later the top management said that it was not our priority at 
the moment.”
54
  
Overall, both the interviews’ findings and the policy documents (in particular the 
Eight Development Plan) suggest that monitoring and evaluation procedures have 
been applied unsystematically and lack overall coherence. The analysis also points 
out how the substantial lack of mechanisms aimed at ensuring both internal and 
external accountability has constrained the bureaucracy’s commitment to achieve 
better performance. One of the few staff members working on intermediate and ex-
post monitoring of projects recounts: 
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“All the people in our department are trying to do their best with all their efforts. But there is no 
standard. There are no shared rules on how to deal with numbers. The SPO historically did not 
have capacity [on this area]. But there has been no interest too. […] Those who are brave, they get 
discouraged. We don’t take the initiative, we are discouraged. [For example] we conducted a 
monitoring and evaluation project with the World Bank in 2007-8. It was aimed at introducing 
monitoring and evaluation in annual programmes. There was commitment with the World Bank. 
Our top level signed a commitment with them. We wanted people from sectorial departments. But 
sectorial managers did not even attend our meetings regularly because they were too busy.”
55
  
The flaws in the mechanisms aimed at ensuring the agency’s external accountability 
are even more striking. In annual investment programmes, projects are recorded with 
no common classification criteria, so any external in-depth analysis on single 
investments projects is very difficult. Besides, project codes between the national 
budget prepared by the Ministry of Finance and the investment programme prepared 
by the Ministry of Development don’t coincide (Yavuz, 2014). As the latter author 
suggests, this is not a casual flaw, but rather a planned expedient to avoid the 
Parliament and the Court of Accounts’ auditing controls. In other words, the 
bureaucratic and political elites have effectively colluded. Interestingly, such 
collusion between top bureaucrats and the government resembles recent evidence put 
forward by Page (2010). Exploring which mechanisms for securing public 
accountability do bureaucrats pay particular attention to when developing public 
policies, he concludes that bureaucrats take significant efforts to make sure their 
political leaders approve their actions. In other words, in contrast to conventional 
rational choice and principal-agent frameworks, which stress the potential for conflict 
between bureaucrats and politicians, his findings suggest that the incentives for 
bureaucrats can work entirely in the same direction as the ones for politicians. Indeed, 
as one of the interviewees from the Ministry of Development recollects:  
“From a political point of view, this was done to avoid the audit function of the parliament. Both 
the audit system used in Turkey and the control of the Court of Accounts (Sayıştay) work on the 
budget, not on the investment programmes. So the system was created to avoid control. And from 
a bureaucratic point of view, the lack of standards was beneficial to give more comfort to the top 
managers. So there was connivance between the top bureaucrats and politicians.”
56
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While further research on this area is needed, it is possible to speculate that one of the 
reasons why the parliament never pushed for reforms aimed at correcting this flaw 
might be related to the functioning of political parties. Similarly to the case of Mexico 
explored by Langston (2001), in Turkey party leaders have traditionally had strong 
influence over party members. Following the new constitution approved after the 
1980s military coup, parties’ candidate lists are compiled by leaders, while a national 
electoral threshold of 10% prevents dissidents from separating from their party to 
form a new one. The strong-executive/weak-parliament has therefore been a peculiar 
characteristic of Turkey’s political system (Öniş and Webb, 1992). The system 
induced strong discipline from party members, who had an incentive to align with the 
party leadership, and then reduced dissent among legislators against the actions taken 
by the Government, and the Prime Minister in particular.  
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6. Conclusion 
Drawing on elite, semi-structured interviews among Turkey’s economic bureaucracy, 
as well as on the analysis of national and international policy documents, the research 
has aimed to answer the following related questions: (1) is Turkey’s public 
investment project cycle currently managed effectively, as recent research by Luca 
and Rodríguez-Pose (2015) on the territorial distribution of investment would imply? 
(2) What is the role played by the Ministry of Development – the organisation in 
charge of planning and directing the project cycle, formerly State Planning 
Organisation – in ensuring that investment decisions remain focused on publicly-
oriented goals, as opposed to purely becoming a tool for particularistic redistribution 
and electoral rewarding? These research questions are motivated by the literature 
which, after almost a century since Max Weber's (1921) seminal work on 
bureaucracies, still discusses how, and when, public sector organisations can 
contribute to effectively providing the critical public goods necessary for 
development. On the one hand, the literature on the developmental state (Amsden, 
1989; Evans, 1995; Evans et al., 2014; Rauch and Evans, 1999; Wade, 1990) has 
suggested how capable and insulated bureaucracies are important effectiveness 
enhancers, particularly in contexts where the political class is oriented to short-term, 
populist decision making and clientelistic redistributive goals. On the other hand, 
however, the public choice literature (Huber et al., 2001; Niskanen, 2001) has 
stressed the inherently self-interested nature of bureaucratic agents, and hence pointed 
to mechanisms aimed at ensuring oversight over bureaucrats as an important factor to 
avoid the latter’s potential predatory and rent-seeking behaviours. 
In line with the developmental state literature, results suggest that the Ministry of 
Development’s nature, comparatively more capable and authoritative than many other 
Turkish public organisations, has positively contributed to the sound, technical 
management of public investment. Results also show how the organisation and the 
project cycle are relatively well insulated from individual legislators, but not 
autonomous vis-à-vis the government, and hence the effective management of funds 
is strongly dependent on the political elite’s ‘will to deliver’. Luca and Rodríguez-
Pose's (2015) results on the limited scope of pork-barrelling allocations in 
- 166 - 
 
contemporary Turkey might hence be contingent to the stable political environment 
of the 2000s and the fiscal reforms implemented following the 2001 economic crisis. 
In comparison, in periods such the 1990s, when the political system was ‘in a state of 
flux’ (Sayarı, 2002), the bureaucracy was unable to shield from executives’ pressure 
and deliver. At the same time, however, in line with the democratic accountability 
literature, the analysis also uncovers significant resistance from the bureaucracy 
against the implementation of reforms which would increase the organisation’s 
efficiency and transparency.  
The analysis’ implications for theory and policy are threefold. First, it contributes to 
the literature on distributive politics (cf. Golden and Min, 2013) by providing novel 
insights on how tactical redistribution dynamics in contemporary Turkey occur. 
Empirical evidence indicates that distributive politics allocations are, in the Turkish 
case, mostly determined by the Prime Minister and the executive, rather than the 
legislative. As most interviewees point out, the main locus where technical decisions 
are overruled is the High Planning Council, a body composed of the Prime Minister 
and eight other members of the Cabinet. Interestingly, in line with Page (2010) the 
analysis also uncovers the over-sensitivity of part of the top bureaucrats to signals 
emanating from the political class. It is hence not only members of the executive, but 
also top-bureaucrats to drive investment decisions towards electoral rewarding. In 
other words, in contrast to conventional rational choice and principal-agent 
frameworks which stress the potential for conflict between bureaucrats and 
politicians, our findings seem to suggest that the incentives for bureaucrats can 
sometimes work in the same direction as the ones for politicians.     
Second, results contribute to the debate on how effective public organisations should 
be designed and managed. Findings suggest that effective bureaucracies need to strike 
a balance between the two opposing dimensions of bureaucratic autonomy and 
accountability. As Azulai et al. (2014, p. 8) argue, good institutions “need to solve the 
conflict of interest between bureaucrats and politicians on one side and citizens on the 
other by providing mechanisms for political accountability, guaranteeing that 
society’s interests prevail over bureaucrats’ and politicians’ interests”. If the balance 
between these two dimensions is tipped too far in favour of either of them, 
bureaucracies will face the risk of either becoming too powerful and seek rents (as 
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seminally foreseen by Niskanen, 1971), or to become too weak to oppose the use of 
public goods by politicians (Steelman, 2001) for purely-strategic goals. Results also 
suggest how one of the real challenges of (regional) development policies is not only 
to figure out technical solutions but also to sort out the political process so that 
incentives to achieve effectiveness arise among politicians and bureaucrats. Such 
goals can be achieved by reforms aimed at de-politicising the civil service, separating 
the political sphere from the administrative tasks, and instil new management 
practices within the public administration (Milio, 2010). Such recommendations can 
also partly apply to local and regional development analyses, where there is a lively 
debate on how to reform inefficient institutional settings at the subnational level (cf. 
Milio, 2007; Rodríguez-Pose, 2013). 
Last but not least, while most countries around the world have progressively moved 
towards an incipient decentralization (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2003), results from 
contemporary Turkey confirm earlier research (Özcan, 2000, 2006) on the risks of 
horizontal and vertical decentralization measures carried out in absence of a strong 
and competent state administration. This is not to argue against decentralization. 
Many researchers, both in Turkey and elsewhere, have indeed shown the risks linked 
to overly relying on the central state and the lack of grass-root local participation in 
local and regional development programmes (Boulding and Wampler, 2010; Heper, 
1992; Jaramillo and Wright, 2015), or the risks of wrong policy choices caused by a 
central planner lacking information about local needs (Bayraktar, 2007; Dulupçu, 
2005; Eder and Çarkoğlu, 2005; Eraydın, Köroğlu, Özturk, and Yaşar, 2008). The 
analysis hence does not argue the case for a traditional ‘top-down’ developmental 
state. Yet, results are a reminder of how a capable, shielded from political power, and 
accountable bureaucracy is a prerequisite to limit the problems which frequently 
cause ‘democratic failures’ (Besley, 2006) around the world. As suggested by Heper 
(1992) long ago, Turkey needs reforms aimed at increasing democratic participation 
in the policy process and taxpayers’ monitoring over public spending. Reforms which 
reduce the powers of the old top bureaucracy from institutions such as the (former) 
State Planning Organisation, to increase the control by the ruling government will not 
otherwise lead to stronger institutions, but simply produce different – and in some 
ways more pernicious (Meyersson and Rodrik, 2014) – ineffective and unsustainable 
structures.   
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Abstract 
After its initial unexpected electoral victory in 2002, the Justice and Development 
Party (AKP), led by former Prime Minister and current President of the Republic 
Erdoğan, has constantly increased its hegemonic power over Turkey’s state, politics, 
and society, turning progressively more authoritarian. While commenters have 
already assessed the social and political consequences of Erdoğan’s increasing 
authoritarianism, little research has been conducted to assess the transformations 
occurred during the period in the management of public resources. The paper draws 
from the analysis of public transport investment between 2004 and 2012. Filling a 
gap in the literature on distributive politics, it explores whether, and why, the use of 
public goods to strategically punish/reward provinces for electoral reasons has 
changed along with the upsurge of authoritarian power by Erdoğan and his party. The 
empirical analysis provides evidence of how the government’s political hegemony is 
unexpectedly correlated to a reduction in the use of public investment for territorial 
pork-barrelling. Such reduction was nonetheless driven only partly by a virtuous 
increase in policy effectiveness. Political influence over investment decisions seems 
to have comparatively shifted from pork-barrelling to the selection of projects driven 
by populist rationales and whose logics run above partisan politics. 
 
Key words: Public investment; authoritarianism; pork-barrel politics; regional policy; 
state effectiveness; Turkey.  
JEL codes: H11; H41; O18; O21; O53. 
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1. Introduction 
After its unexpected electoral victory in 2002, the Justice and Development Party 
(Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) has constantly retained its electoral hegemony and 
increased its powers over Turkey’s state, politics, and society. Following the party’s 
first years in office, during which the country underwent significant democratisation 
reforms, the Turkish political and institutional environment has started to backlash. 
Particularly after 2008 the government, led by former Prime Minister and current 
President of the Republic R.T. Erdoğan, started to change direction in policy, and 
progressively moved towards a more authoritarian style. As a result, commentators 
have recently argued that Turkey increasingly resembles a ‘quasi-electoral 
authoritarian’ regime (cf. Arbatlı, 2014). While a conspicuous amount of studies has 
explored the societal and political consequences of the country’s increasingly 
authoritarian stance (inter alia: Acemoğlu, 2014; Arbatlı, 2014; Meyersson and 
Rodrik, 2014; Müftüler-Baç, Keyman, 2012), little research has been conducted to 
assess the transformations occurred in the management of Turkey’s public resources. 
The paper draws from the analysis of public transport investment between 2004 and 
2012, and aims to answer the following interrelated questions: (1) is the constant 
upsurge of power by Erdoğan and his party correlated to a change in the way public 
investment is allocated to provinces for tactical redistribution? (2) If yes, what 
potential dynamics may explain such result?  
The research goal is informed by the literature on distributive politics – that is, on 
how self-interested politicians may distribute public spending to specific cities and 
regions to gain electoral advantage. In spite of a significant increase in the number of 
studies conducted on this topic (cf. Golden and Min, 2013), the literature still 
provides unclear expectations on whether shifts from highly competitive electoral 
environments towards one-party electoral hegemony may lead to higher – o lower – 
levels of pork-barrelling. On the one hand, the literature on public good provision 
under dictatorship and democracy (Deacon, 2009; Kroth, Larcinese, and Wehner, 
2015; Lake and Baum, 2001) suggests that nondemocratic rule is often accompanied 
by lower public good provision and quality. The reason behind such intuition is that 
when many supporters demand rewards for their votes, the costs of personal or 
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narrowly-targeted benefits which are required to retain their loyalty may increase. 
Instead “whether leaders are civic-minded or not, those who rely on a broad-based 
coalition emphasize the production of goods that benefit everyone in society” (Bueno 
de Mesquita et al., 2003, p. 37). By contrast, increases in authoritarianism may 
determine an upsurge in the provision of private goods “such as corruption, pork, 
patronage, cronyism, nepotism” (Bueno De Mesquita et al., 2002, p. 559, our 
emphasis). Empirical evidence in support of such hypothesis is, for example, 
provided by Burgess, Miguel, Jedwab, and Morjaria (2014), who show how in the 
case of Kenya transitions in/out of democracy have constrained/exacerbated pork-
barrelling based on ethnic favoritism.
57
 Similarly, Diaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and 
Magaloni (2012) argue that the Mexican Institutional Revolutionary Party’s loss of 
majority control in the late 1990s led to a reduction in the discretionary targeting of 
public resources to municipalities. On the other hand, however, other scholars have 
raised alternative, contrasting arguments (Lizzeri and Persico, 2005). Golden and Min 
(2013, p. 123), for instance, point out that there is “reason to suspect that distributive 
politics is quantitative more important in democratic than authoritarian regimes” 
because, in the former, office-seeking politicians are more responsive to voters.   
The research features a two-step mixed-methodology. It draws on the triangulation of 
econometric analysis, which exploit a panel data on the allocation of public 
transportation investment to Turkey’s 81 provinces over 2004-2012, with elite, semi-
structured interviews carried out among the country’s economic bureaucracy. Amid 
the different types of public investment carried out by the Turkish central state, the 
analysis specifically focuses on transport infrastructure because of the role the sector 
played in AKP’s distributive politics. As it aims to study pork-barrelling, it hence 
follows a ‘selection of  the extreme case’ (Gerring, 2007; Seawright and Gerring, 
2008) where such dynamics are most evident. In line with the paper’s research aim, 
the purpose of such type of selection technique is not to disprove an extant fully-
                                                     
57
 It is important to stress that, in spite of the increasingly unchecked powers of the incumbent 
government, the systematic repression on media outlets not aligned with the ruling party, and the 
increasingly pervasive control of state institutions (Meyersson and Rodrik, 2014), the comparison 
between contemporary Turkey and fully authoritarian regimes is not entirely correct. Turkey still 
enjoys free elections and other attributes characteristic of democratic regimes (Acemoğlu, 2014). Such 
comparison is hence done for heuristic reasons. 
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fledged theory but, rather, to provide new exploratory findings about a specific topic 
for which theory is scarce or unclear. Empirical results suggest that, contrary to the 
majority of expectations, the increase in the government power is correlated to a 
reduction in the use of investment to reward supporting constituencies and punish 
political foes’ ones. Such decline in pork-barrelling has nonetheless been driven only 
partly by a virtuous increase in policy effectiveness. Instead, political influence over 
investment decisions seems to have comparatively shifted from pork-barrelling to the 
selection of projects driven by populist rationales and whose logics run above 
partisan politics.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: section two provides a review of 
the theoretical literature, draws from it the research hypotheses, and briefly discusses 
Turkey’s institutional environment. Section three covers the research design, 
discussing the empirical econometric model and the data, as well as the selection of 
interviewees. Section four presents the results. Section five eventually leads the 
discussion to a conclusion.    
 
- 180 - 
 
 
1. Electoral hegemony and pork-barrelling  
In the last two decades, a growing number of studies has explored how public monies 
are distributed on the basis of not only economic rationales, but also of electoral 
politics considerations. There is now an extensive empirical body of research on how 
politicians may pass pork-barrelling legislation, that is, distribute public spending to 
specific cities and regions to gain electoral advantage (Golden and Min, 2013). 
Recent developments in this literature have started exploring why such form of 
strategic targeting is more intense in some settings than in others. Numerous 
contributions have linked the variations in distributive patterns and pork-barrelling 
levels to countries’ institutional systems (Persson and Tabellini, 2003; Rogowski and 
Kayser, 2002). Drawing from the theoretical model proposed by Lizzeri and Persico 
(2001), Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti, and Rostagno (2002) for example exploit cross-
country differences to specifically maintain that the balance between programmatic 
versus pork-barrel redistribution is influenced by the electoral rule. They argue that 
single-member district, majoritarian electoral systems are more prone to pork-
barrelling than proportional-representation ones. Different electoral systems provide 
different incentives to politicians, which may hence respond by providing different 
quantities/types of public goods. In spite of the increasing attention to the link 
between institutional conditions and distributive patterns, the literature still provides 
contrasting expectations on whether highly competitive electoral environments may 
be characterized by higher – o lower – levels of discretionary strategic allocations of 
public goods compared to institutional settings with one-party hegemonic political 
power.   
On the one hand, the literature on the delivery of public goods under different 
political regimes suggests that nondemocratic rule is often accompanied by lower 
public good provision and quality (inter alia: Deacon, 2009; Kroth, Larcinese, and 
Wehner, 2015; Lake and Baum, 2001). As Deacon (2009, p. 242) suggests “in a 
dictatorship, a rational government will spend the public budget mainly on transfers 
targeted to influential groups. Spending on a non-exclusive public good is unwise 
[…]. By contrast in a democracy, direct transfers are relatively unattractive. Spending 
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in public goods makes sense here.” Bueno De Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and 
Smith (2002, 2003) provide a more finely calibrated taxonomy of regimes based on 
two key institutional characteristics, namely the sizes of the selectorate and the 
winning coalition. Loosely, the first can be thought of as the enfranchised people with 
the right to cast their vote, while the latter as the number of votes which, according to 
the electoral rule, leaders need to remain in office. Overall, their predictions are 
similar to Deacon's (2009) ones. They suggest that private goods – “such as 
corruption, pork, patronage, cronyism, nepotism” (Bueno De Mesquita et al., 2002, p. 
559, our emphasis) – become less attractive to provide compared to public goods – 
“such as the protection of property rights, the rule of law, transparency, protection of 
human rights, national security” (ibid.) – along with the increase in size of the 
winning coalition. In their words, all else being equal, “with many supporters 
demanding rewards, the costs of personal benefits required to keep their loyalty are 
just too high. Instead, whether leaders are civic-minded or not, those who rely on a 
broad-based coalition emphasize the production of goods that benefit everyone in 
their society” (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, p. 37).   
It must be underlined that most contributions in this literature generally tend to focus 
more on the overall quantity of public goods provided, rather than on their territorial 
distribution. Nevertheless, drawing from this body of work one could conjecture that 
increases in authoritarianism may lead to a higher use of public investment for 
strategic reasons. In her analysis of distributive politics in Mubarak’s Egypt, Blaydes 
(2010) for example points out how the authoritarian regime significantly rewarded 
supporters of the ruling National Democracy Party and punished opponents in the 
delivery of basic public goods such as access to water and sewage. Similarly, Diaz-
Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni (2012) show that the Institutional Revolutionary 
Party (PRI) extensively used for decades clientelism and pork-barrelling as strategies 
to retain its hegemonic power over Mexico’s political opponents. Furthermore, they 
argue that the PRI’s loss of majority control after the watershed elections of 2000 led 
to increasing societal pressure over the central government and the president and, 
eventually, to a reduction in the discretionary targeting of public resources to 
municipalities. Last but not least, Burgess et al. (2014) provide evidence of how the 
preferential allocation of transport infrastructure projects to Kenyan districts sharing 
the same ethnic group of the president was significantly reduced/exacerbated under 
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the transitions into/out of democracy. Drawing from the literature, the main 
hypothesis is the following  
Main hypothesis: shifts from more democratic to more authoritarian institutional 
settings, which are accompanied by more discretionary powers of the government, are 
associated with an increase in pork-barrelling allocations.  
On the other hand, however, Truex (2014) contends that the association between 
democracy and better provision of public goods is empirically extremely fragile. 
Accoding to him, the idea of a ‘democratic advantage’ is simply too weak to be 
believed. Similarly, Magaloni and Kricheli stress how authoritarian leaders have to 
calculatedly distribute resources so as to maximize their survival prospects, for 
example broadening their appeal “by making policy concessions in a direction 
favoured by potential opponents” (2010, p. 126). There is therefore reason to 
alternatively surmise how distributive politics and pork-barrelling may be quantitative 
more important in democratic than authoritarian regimes (Golden and Min, 2013), 
and in settings with a large number of competing parties than in ones with low 
electoral competition (Lizzeri and Persico, 2005). As Lizzeri and Persico (2005, p. 
1319) argue, the theoretical rationale is that “when there are many competing parties, 
the electoral base of each party tends to be smaller. To cater to their narrow support 
base, politicians will find it expedient to promise pork-barrel policies with narrow 
appeal rather than policies which benefit the supporters of the winning politician, but 
will not maximize aggregate welfare”. In other words, as the support base of each 
political party becomes a smaller fraction of the total electorate, the potential gain 
from targeting only a subset of the electorate increases, and hence the incentives for 
politicians to engage in pork-barrelling increase (ibid.). Drawing from such intuition, 
the alternative hypothesis states 
Alternative hypothesis: shifts from more democratic to more authoritarian 
institutional settings are correlated not to an upsurge but, rather, to a reduction in the 
strategic use of public investment for pork-barrelling.   
To conclude, the literature still provides contrasting expectations on whether the 
increase in incumbent parties’ hegemonic powers vis-à-vis electoral opponents may 
be characterized by an increase – o a decrease – in the use of public good allocations 
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to strategically reward supporting constituencies and punish opponents’ ones. The 
remainder of the paper will explore the extent to which these different hypotheses 
help explain the case of public investment allocations in contemporary Turkey.   
 
The recent transformation of Turkey’s institutional environment 
Turkey has frequently been described as a polity where incumbents provide 
privileged treatment to people and constituencies with the ‘right’ political affiliation 
and punish opponents (Acemoğlu and Robinson, 2013; Heper and Keyman, 1998; 
Heper, 1985; Kemahlioğlu, 2008).58 Buğra and Savaşkan (2014) indirectly offer a 
cogent discussion of the politicisation of the state in recent years. They show how 
after the AKP came into power in 2002, the country’s clientelistic networks have 
increasingly pivoted around the newly formed political organisation.
59
 Similarly, 
Özcan and Gündüz (2015) provide preliminary evidence of how the incumbent party 
in power since 2002 has pervasively favoured business groups close to the 
government in the award of tenders and in the construction of projects. Last but not 
least, Luca and Rodríguez-Pose (2015) explore the extent to which the allocation of 
public investment across the provinces of Turkey during 2004-2012 responded to 
‘socioeconomic drivers’, as opposed to ‘electorally-driven, strategic rationales’. 
While all these studies offer new insights into the political economy of Turkey 
following the arrival of the AK Party into power, their empirical design does not 
allow grasping possible diachronic changes in distributive politics patterns occurred 
along with the AKP’s increase of political and societal powers.   
                                                     
58
 In its current form, Turkey is a closed-list proportional-representation electoral system 
democracy. The D’Hondt formula and a national threshold of 10 percent are used to translate votes 
into parliamentary seats (Sayari and Esmer, 2002; Sayari, 2002). In spite of periods such as the 1990s 
during which fragmentation and volatility weakened the role and coherence of the party system, 
Turkish political parties have in general displayed a high degree of saliency in Turkey’s political arena 
(De Leon, Desai, and Tuğal, 2009). Parties are important ‘gatekeepers’ for the people to gain greater 
access to the resources of the State and hence act as key determinants of the country’s distributive 
politics (Kalayıcıoğlu, 2001).  
59
 Their empirical evidence seems in particular to suggest how the institutional change occurred in 
very recent years affected the areas where politicisation occurs, as well as the mechanisms used by 
political forces to influence the configuration of business interests – with particularistic behaviours 
now involving less a branch of the Law but rather its modification. 
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During the first years in power, the AK Party’s performance was assessed favourably 
by many commenters, with the country going through a virtuous cycle of landmark 
economic and political reforms (Öniş, 2004) – also triggered by the start of the EU 
Accession Negotiations in 2005 (Luca, 2011; Özdemir-Tsarouhas, 2013; Uğur and 
Yankaya, 2008). Yet, after a few years in office, Erdoğan and his government started 
to change direction in policy, moving towards an increasingly authoritarian style.
60
 
While some commenters suggests that Turkey’s democracy is still on track 
(Acemoğlu, 2014),61 other voices have provided far more pessimistic interpretations, 
arguing that optimistic narratives fail to identify widespread de facto institutional 
deterioration (Meyersson and Rodrik, 2014). First of all, while elections are still 
considered free in the country, the political system increasingly resembles an uneven 
playing field for the opposition parties. Besides, particularly since 2008 a series of 
landmark political trials started to frontally attack military officers, the former 
Kemalist elite, Kurdish politicians and other social activists. As Meyersson (2014) 
evidences, in spite of a relatively stable number of terrorist attacks between 2002 and 
2011, the number of people imprisoned under terrorist charges has increased 
dramatically throughout the period.  
In parallel, during the same years freedom of expression experienced a draconian 
backlash. Figure 1 depicts the evolution of Reporters Without Borders’ Turkish 
international ranking, as well as the Freedom House’s Freedom of the Press Index, 
since the AKP’s arrival into power. As the graph shows, 2008 and 2009 represent the 
main watershed years. According to the former ranking, the country has fallen from 
99
th
 in 2002 to 149
th
 in 2015 in the world while, in 2013, Turkey had more journalists 
imprisoned than any other country in the world, ahead of countries such as Iran and 
China (Reporters Without Borders, 2013). The government crackdown of the Gezi 
Park protest in June of the same year similarly exemplifies a notorious example of 
large-scale attacks against activists and demonstrators. 
                                                     
60
 While mixed signals emanating from the EU are frequently invoked to explain the AKP’s change, 
Ugur and Yankaya (2008) argue that such shift was caused by two main political calculations by the 
party leadership: first, the decision to cater more for the demands of its conservative core support base; 
second, concerns that support for EU membership would alienate the more nationalist base. Besides, 
the policy innovation in the field of democratisation reforms and EU membership had secured the AK 
Party with significant legitimacy to rule against threat from potential veto players (Dağı, 2006). 
61
 The electoral results of 7
 
June 2015 can be interpreted as a sign in this direction (Scott, 2015). 
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Figure 1. Press freedom in Turkey, 2002-2015 (Reporters Without Borders’s Turkish 
ranking in the world, Freedom House’s Freedom of the Press Index). 
 
Source: own elaboration on data from Reporters Without Borders, Freedom House. 
Figure 2 presents Turkey’s index of judicial independence prepared by the World 
Economic Forum, as well as the country’s world ranking, for the available period 
2007-2015. Judicial independence is a key component of constraints on government 
powers. Again, the graph points to 2008 as the year after which the Turkish 
institutional environment started deteriorating. Last but not least, in the wake of the 
corruption scandal erupted in 2013, the Government drafted a series of laws aiming to 
bring structural changes to the appointment of judges and prosecutors, and give far-
reaching powers to the National Intelligence Agency (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı, MIT) 
(Kiziltan and Yildirim, 2014). Arbatlı (2014) indeed argues that contemporary 
Turkey is increasingly shifting towards ‘electoral authoritarianism’.  
 
Figure 2. Judicial independence in Turkey, 2007-2015 (Judicial Independence Index, 
Turkey’s ranking in the world). 
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Source: own elaboration on data from World Economic Forum.  
In spite of such debate on the social and political changes occurred along with the 
evolution of Turkey’s political scenario, no research has yet explored how the use of 
public investment as a tool to reward electoral supporters and punish opponents has 
evolved during the same period. 
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2. Research design 
Econometric analysis: model and variables 
The analysis aims to test whether the constant increase in the AKP government’s 
hegemonic political powers has led to an increase in the strategic distribution of 
public infrastructure investment to rewards partisan supporters and punish opponents. 
The analysis tests this hypothesis through the estimation of the following empirical 
model: 
Gi,t = β1Pj,i,t-1 + β2Dt-1 + β3D*Pj,i,,t-1 + β4Xi,t-1 + αi + nt + ɛi,t ,                                                         (1) 
where (j, i and t respectively denote parties, provinces and years): Gi,t is the total 
amount of per capita fixed-capital investment in transportation infrastructure projects 
allocated to each province by the state;
62
 Pj,i,t-1 represents a vector of electoral 
variables; Dt-1 is a dummy equal to one for each year after 2008, that is, the period 
after which the former Prime Minister and current President of the Republic Erdoğan 
turned increasingly authoritarian, starting his frontal attack to the independence of 
many state institutions; D*Pj,i,t-1 is an interaction betwee such dummy and the 
electoral variables; Xi,t-1 is a vector of socioeconomic control which should also 
influence the allocation of public investment; αi and nt are respectively province and 
year fixed-effects, and ɛi,t is the error term.
63
 A one-year lag between left- and right-
hand side variables is included to account for the investment project cycle as well as 
the time necessary for tactical concerns to potentially influence redistributive 
outcomes. This set-up is somehow similar to a Difference-in-Difference equation, 
with the interaction term D*P being the ‘treatment variable’, the years until 2008 the 
‘pre-treatment’ period, and the years from 2009 onward the ‘post-treatment period’. 
                                                     
62
 While local administration can invest independently, the central state controls almost 90% of all 
public investments. 
63
 Investments projects are very likely to stretch over many years so allocations, as well, may be 
correlated over time. While this fact may support the inclusion of the dependent variable’s lagged 
value Yi,t-1 among the regressors, we reject such choice because of the bias that affects FE estimators 
of dynamic models in the order of 1/T, that is, a level too high for our short time span. Tests available 
on request show that the inclusion of lagged investments into regressions indeed confirms how current 
allocations are correlated to previous years’ ones, but do not alter the political variables’ results.  
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Ceteris paribus, a positive estimate of β3 for the incumbent party would hence mean 
that provinces with a higher vote share for it have been advantaged more after 2008 
than before it in the allocation of investment. By contrast, a positive β3 coefficient for 
an opposition party would suggest that the ‘punishment’ of opponents’ strongholds by 
the AKP government has reduced. The dependent and the explanatory variables, 
summarised in Appendix 1, are described in the following paragraphs.  
Public investment. The variable consists in the amount of per-capita public 
investment in transportation and communication infrastructure projects. Values are 
expressed in 1000 Turkish Lira (TL) at 2012 prices and in logarithmic terms in order 
to control for non-linear relations.
64
 Along with the economic development of the 
country, incumbent politicians have focused on different public goods to 
preferentially punish/reward political supporters. During the 1990s, for example, 
bringing electricity, village roads and high schools was a common strategy to 
punish/reward voters. We hence focus on transport investment because of the role the 
sector played in AKP’s more recent distributive politics. In other words, as we aim to 
study the evolution of pork-barrelling, we select the ‘extreme case’ where such 
dynamics are likely to be most evident. In line with our research aim, the purpose of 
such type of selection technique is not to disprove an extant fully-fledged theory but, 
rather, to provide new exploratory findings about a specific topic for which theory is 
scarce or unclear. Among the different techniques discussed in the literature, Gerring 
(2007), as well as Seawright and Gerring (2008), indeed discuss the selection of 
extreme cases as useful to probe for new – but as yet unspecified – 
explanations/hypotheses.  
Party vote shares. Party vote shares at national elections are the first, most immediate 
variables able to capture the political clout of provinces. We account for the AK 
                                                     
64
 A significant proportion of investments is registered as part of multi-provincial projects, so it is 
not possible to match it with any specific province. Typical multi-provincial projects are the 
construction of roads linking more than one province, or the national wholesale purchase of equipment 
and machineries. Our analysis only concentrates on the investments which can be attributed to a single 
province. Data limitation is – alas – one of the biggest problems in empirical research, particularly in 
emerging countries. Aware that the data may potentially be imprecise and in absence of any other 
viable solution, we follow the same approach as earlier researchers who have worked on public 
investments in Turkey (Deliktaṣ et al. 2008; Karadağ et al., 2004; Celebioğlu and Dall’erba, 2010). 
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Party, the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriet Halk Partisi, CHP), the National 
Action Party (Milli Hareket Partisi, MHP), and the Kurdish Party.
65
 During the 
period of analysis these four main parties overall received nearly 80% of total votes.  
Electoral competition. Such variable is constructed as the negative of the absolute 
value of the vote difference between the incumbent party and its main challenger in 
each province. The challenger is the second party where the AKP has garnered the 
greatest number of votes or an opposition party, when this is not the case. As we take 
the negative of the absolute value, we will expect the variable to show a positive sign, 
meaning that provinces where the vote difference is lower receive comparatively 
more funds. 
Contextual development level. Due to changes in early 2000s in data collection by 
Turkstat, provincial data on GDP for the whole period of analysis does not exist. We 
then try to control for the contextual socioeconomic disadvantage by including the 
Provincial Development Index. It consists in a composite indicator developed by the 
Ministry of Development through principal component analysis. It takes into account 
economic (statistics on manufacturing, constructions, agriculture, value added, 
investments and finance) and, to a lesser extent, social factors (demographic structure, 
employment, education, health and various developmental parameters). While we are 
aware that the index may not fully be a proxy for contextual wealth, there is no viable 
alternative.  
Manufacturing employment. We concentrate on the per cent of employment in 
manufacturing on total employment because of the central role that industrialisation 
has played in the structural transformation of Turkey’s economy in recent years.  
Education attainments. We control for the percentage of students in higher education 
(vocational training and university) on total population, as a proxy for the level of 
education in each province.  
                                                     
65 Under the allegation of supporting the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the main Kurdish parties 
have been repeatedly banned over the years. We therefore consider, at each election, the party in place 
at that moment. Since running as independent candidates and then agglomerating into a single group 
after elections has been a strategy to circumvent the seat allocation minimum national thresholds, we 
jointly consider Kurdish and independent votes.  
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Rural population. In a country such as Turkey characterised by late development and 
a rapid, recent urbanisation, the regional developmental inequalities are likely to be 
correlated with the urban/rural divide, which we proxy by the per cent of population 
living in rural areas. 
Population. While the other socioeconomic regressors, as well as the dependent 
variable, are normalized per-capita, population is still included in the equation as it is 
customarily considered an important driver of investment allocations.  
 
Data 
The analysis employs a panel data set covering 81 Turkish provinces over the period 
2004-2012. Because of the one-year lag between left- and right-hand side variables, 
the length of the panel decreases from 9 to 8 years. Basic data on national public 
investments per province was derived from the Ministry of Development (former 
State Planning Organisation). Electoral data for the 2002, 2007, and 2011 elections 
was gathered from the European Election Database, as well as from Turkey’s 
Electoral High Committee. We annualised political variables by extending electoral 
results over each legislature. Electoral wards within metropolitan provinces are not 
taken into account and therefore national elections’ data are collected for provinces, 
which constitute the power bases of political parties and one of the most important 
units of political representation (Güvenç and Kırmanoğlu, 2009). Population 
information was obtained merging 2005-2009 OECD figures with Turkstat regional 
database’s 2007-2011 figures. Other socioeconomic data where obtained from 
Turkstat’s regional database and interpolated in case of missing years.  
A review of data sources, summary statistics for each variable and pairwise 
correlation coefficients are provided in Appendices 1, 2 and 3. Appendix 4, instead, 
presents the distribution of the average amount of fixed-capital investment until and 
after 2008. 
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Qualitative analysis: selection of interviewees 
The final part of the analysis draws on qualitative research methods. In doing so, we 
follow Lieberman's (2005, p. 440) guidelines for the use of in-depth analysis “to 
answer those questions left open by the LNA [large-N analysis, that is, quantitative 
analysis, A./N.] – either because there were insufficient data to assess statistical 
relationships or because the nature of causal order could not be confidently inferred.” 
Concretely, the analysis is based on elite, semi-structured interviews carried out 
between October and December 2014 in Turkey’s central economic bureaucracy.66 
The interviewees were selected integrating purposive and chain sampling techniques. 
First, officers occupying positions relevant for the project cycle were contacted. Each 
of them was then asked to provide further contacts. A snowball selection of potential 
interviewees was hence nested into the initial purposive sampling. The final sample 
includes 32 interviewees, of which 18 civil servants from the Ministry of 
Development, and 14 individuals from other organisations, namely six civil servants 
from the Ministry of Finance, three key public policy scholars from Bilgi University, 
Boğazici University, and Koç University, two experts from the Delegation of the EU 
to Turkey, one retired manager from the Undersecretary of Treasury, one public 
finance expert from Turkey’s Economic Policy Research Foundation (Türkiye 
Ekonomi Politikaları Araştırma Vakfı, TEPAV) with previous experience at the 
Undersecretary of Treasury and the World Bank, and one expert from the Ministry of 
Transport’s General Directorate for Highways (Karayolları Genel Müdürlüğü, 
KGM).  
In the selection of interviewees, the Ministry of Development was targeted 
preferentially because the organisation holds the main responsibilities for the 
allocation and coordination of public investment. We hence focused our main 
attention on the latter organization on the ground that it is exactly the place where 
policies are developed. The inclusion of interviewees from external organisations was 
foreseen to customarily cross-validate the correctness of information. Figure 3 and 
                                                     
66
 Four of the interviews were conducted during a pilot research phase between October 2012 and 
September 2013.   
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Appendix 5 respectively provide the institutional breakdown and a detailed list of the 
interviewees’ sample.  
Figure 3. The composition of the interviewees’ sample (percentages, clockwise).   
 
To increased respondents’ eagerness to talk and discuss personal and institutional 
conflicts more freely, interviewees were accessed only after having secured the 
support of trusted individuals who could ‘warrant’ the interviewer’s trustworthiness. 
Interviews lasted on average between 60 and 90 minutes. Previous work experience 
in the country and the use of Turkish in communication further helped ‘breaking into 
the bureaucratic black box’. Considering the sensitivity of the questions being asked, 
interviews were not recorded. Interviewees were also guaranteed anonymity in order 
to encourage ‘free speech’. Finally, interviewees were asked to provide information 
on their most-followed media outlets. Such information was then used to ‘control’ for 
respondents’ heterogeneous political views – which may influence answers about the 
bureaucracy/politics relationship.
67
 
 
 
                                                     
67
 Similarly to many other countries around the world, different Turkish media outlets are 
associated with different political views.  
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3. Empirical analysis 
Econometric estimation and results 
Our identification strategy adopts a fixed-effect (FE) heteroscedasticity- and 
autocorrelation-robust estimator with province and year fixed effects. Such estimator 
has the advantage of controlling for all the possible omitted variables that are 
idiosyncratic to provinces as well as for cross-sectional common shocks. Considering 
that plans for time t are prepared in advance and the approved by the winter of time t-
1, we include a one-year lag between dependent and explanatory variables, which will 
also help minimize the endogeneity between right- and left-side variables. To control 
for potential serial and spatial correlation, we estimate robust standard errors adjusted 
for clustering at the provincial level (81 clusters). As a robustness check, we follow 
Angrist and Pischke (2009)’s suggestion and add province-specific time trends to the 
list of controls. The inclusion of province-specific time trends, that is, coefficients 
obtained multiplying the province fixed-effects by year-specific intercepts, allows 
‘treatment’ and ‘control’ provinces to follow different trends over time. Besides, it 
will also help minimize the potential risk of omitted variable bias. For example, we 
do not have data to control for previous public investment stock, and hence would be 
otherwise unable to rule out the hypothesis that higher/lower investment flows during 
the ‘post-treatment’ period may be influenced by the amount of investments already 
channeled before 2009.     
Table 1 presents the results. Columns one and two show the baseline estimates for the 
electoral variables, respectively excluding and including socioeconomic controls. 
Columns three to seven report the results obtained adding the dummy for the post-
2008 period, as well as its interaction with each individual electoral variable. Column 
eight presents the interactions together. Finally, column nine adds the province-
specific time trend to the latter model, allowing to further control for potential 
omitted variables.       
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Table 1. Multivariate regressions of the provincial per-capita public investment 
in transport and communication infrastructures: robust Fixed Effects estimates 
(2004-2012).  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
AKP votes 0.0495** 0.0334* 0.0327* 0.0334* 0.0340* 0.0195 0.0336* 0.0153 0.0156 
 (0.0194) (0.0176) (0.0181) (0.0176) (0.0179) (0.0195) (0.0176) (0.0201) (0.0199) 
CHP votes -0.0362** -0.0417*** -0.0439*** -0.0374 -0.0480*** -0.0422*** -0.0414** -0.0763*** -0.0749*** 
 (0.0158) (0.0150) (0.0163) (0.0234) (0.0150) (0.0147) (0.0162) (0.0261) (0.0263) 
MHP votes 0.0276 0.0361 0.0345 0.0366 0.0940** 0.0508* 0.0365 0.0858** 0.0860** 
 (0.0315) (0.0286) (0.0296) (0.0289) (0.0429) (0.0294) (0.0302) (0.0425) (0.0425) 
Kurdish votes 0.0120 0.00266 0.00116 0.00311 0.00116 -0.0164 0.00271 -0.0247 -0.0237 
 (0.0199) (0.0188) (0.0198) (0.0189) (0.0196) (0.0215) (0.0186) (0.0244) (0.0239) 
El. Comp. 0.00814 0.00304 0.00189 0.00314 0.00147 -0.00382 0.00344 -0.00450 -0.00431 
 (0.00853) (0.00848) (0.00839) (0.00847) (0.00873) (0.00836) (0.0108) (0.0114) (0.0113) 
Post-2008   1.283 1.087** 1.474*** 0.768 0.998* 0 0 
   (0.846) (0.515) (0.513) (0.474) (0.566) (0) (0) 
Post#AKP   -0.00464     0.0236 0.0222 
   (0.00979)     (0.0178) (0.0173) 
Post#CHP    -0.00442    0.0440* 0.0416* 
    (0.0135)    (0.0227) (0.0217) 
Post#MHP     -0.0536***   -0.0221 -0.0225 
     (0.0202)   (0.0249) (0.0246) 
Post#Kurd      0.0244**  0.0381** 0.0370** 
      (0.00976)  (0.0157) (0.0150) 
Post#El. Comp.       -0.000691 0.00196 0.00156 
       (0.00863) (0.0134) (0.0132) 
Constant 1.261 -5.261** -5.090** -5.294** -4.935* -3.176 -5.275** -2.368 -2.406 
 (0.903) (2.457) (2.475) (2.487) (2.535) (2.514) (2.490) (2.806) (2.781) 
          
Observations 648 648 648 648 648 648 648 648 648 
R-squared 0.083 0.113 0.114 0.113 0.134 0.134 0.113 0.149 0.149 
Number of id 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 
Prov FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Controls  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Prov*year FE         yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls include: 
provincial development index, manufacturing employment, education attainments, rural 
population, and population. 
As expected, column one shows how the central allocation of transport investment 
across the provinces of Turkey across the period 2004-2012 is indeed correlated to 
the electoral results. In line with earlier research (Luca and Rodríguez-Pose, 2015) 
and theoretical predictions for a close-list, proportional multi-member electoral 
system (McGillivray, 2004), coefficients in particular support the core-voter 
hypothesis, according to which strategic allocations are done to cement support 
among core partisan voters. The findings are robust against the inclusion of 
socioeconomic controls (column two). Holding other variables constant, and 
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transforming the dependent variable’s coefficient in linear terms, column two shows 
that a one percent increase in the votes for the AK Party is correlated to an average 
increase of nearly 3.4 percent in the amount of per-capita investment. Conversely, a 
one percent increase in the votes for the main opposition party, the CHP, is correlated 
to an average reduction of more than 4.2 percent.  
Moving from the first two columns to the rest of the table, results show significant 
differences in the distributive politics patterns for the pre- and post-2008 sub-periods. 
Columns eight and nine are our preferred specifications, in that they allow controlling 
for each political variable’s interaction with the post-2008 dummy. While the linear 
political terms maintain the same signs as in the first models, their significance and 
magnitude change significantly. The coefficient for votes for the AKP remains 
positive, but turns insignificant. The coefficient for the interacted term is similarly 
positive, yet highly insignificant. Moving to the main opposition party, the CHP, 
results show a very unexpected and interesting result: after controlling for the two 
different periods, coefficients indicate how the unfavourable allocation of investment 
to CHP provincial strongholds has been markedly higher during the AK Party’s first 
years in office than during the period 2009-2012. Results show a similar picture for 
the case of provinces with strong support for the pro-Kurdish party. While the 
coefficient for the latter’s linear term is insignificant in all models, its interaction with 
the post-2008 dummy is positive and strongly significant. This finding is particularly 
interesting considering how, during the 1980s and 1990s, mostly Kurdish-inhabited 
areas were persistently disadvantaged in the allocation of public investment 
(Danielson and Keles, 1985). As many interviewees pointed out, the increase in the 
allocations to Kurdish-inhabited provinces has followed the attempt carried out by 
AKP government to solve the longstanding problem of Kurdish separatism and 
underdevelopment. Under this light, the result can also be read as a confirmation of 
Magaloni and Kricheli (2010), who stress how authoritarian leaders have to 
calculatedly distribute resources so as to maximize their survival prospects, for 
example by broadening their appeal to potential opponents.  
To conclude, the empirical evidence seems to lean towards the alternative hypothesis, 
according to which the increase in the social and political powers of the government 
is associated with a reduction – and not an increase – in the strategic use of public 
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investment to reward supporters and punish opponents. Results tend to support 
Golden and Min's (2013) as well as Lizzeri and Persico's (2005) intuitions of how 
pork-barrelling and special-interest policies may be particularly responsive to 
democratic electoral competition. In other words, the quantitative empirical findings 
seem to suggest how a more authoritarian AK Party has felt less of a need to reward 
its core constituencies, and freer to transfer funds to other areas of the country. 
Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir – Turkey’s three main cities and economic hubs – have 
been significant recipients of overall transport infrastructure investment flows in 
recent years. Considering the different political orientation of these cities – with Izmir 
traditionally being a CHP stronghold, and Istanbul and Ankara more frequently 
showing a higher support for the AKP – Appendix 6 checks the robustness of the 
estimates against their exclusion. The results show that coefficients are virtually 
identical to the ones of the full specification, indicating that potential differences in 
the allocation of funds to the big Turkish cities does not seem to make a difference 
for the link between politics and the distribution of funds. While grounded in an 
ample body of work, our empirical results may yet potentially suffer from 
endogeneity caused by reverse causality, since higher/lower investments by the 
central government at election t may increase/decrease the votes given to the 
governing party at subsequent polls (Larcinese, Snyder, and Testa, 2012). Unable to 
find robust instrumental variables to identify exogenous sources of variation in 
electoral outcomes, the following section follows Lieberman's (2005) principles and 
aims to complement the econometric results with in-depth qualitative evidence.  
 
Potential explanatory mechanisms: qualitative findings 
Overall, the quantitative evidence suggests that the AKP government has not been 
immune from rewarding its core constituencies with more investment. At the same 
time, the degree of rewards, as well as the extent to which electoral opponents’ 
constituencies have been punished, seem to have decreased as the incumbent 
government has become more authoritarian. Detailed accounts elucidating the first 
finding have been provided by earlier research (cf. Luca, 2015; Luca and Rodríguez-
Pose, 2015). Yet, how can the second result be explained? 
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A first hypothesis which needs attention is that the econometric results may be 
influenced, and biased, by potential ‘Keynesian attempts’ to boost macroeconomic 
demand following the 2008/9 economic recession. Throughout the implementation of 
the Ninth Multiannual Development Plan, the government indeed decided to give 
more weight to investment in transport infrastructures than initially foreseen. The fact 
was acknowledged in the Ministry of Development's (2014) Tenth National 
Development Plan. While it is hence true that the country experienced an increase in 
investment in transport projects, a significant amount of literature has nonetheless 
shown how the allocation of extraordinary ‘Keynesian’ programmes, such as the US 
‘New Deal’, has been frequently biased towards political rewarding (inter alia: 
Wright, 1974). Besides, the inclusion of province-specific time trends helps 
controlling for such potential source of bias. In other words, while it may be true that 
the reallocation of funds towards transport projects may have partly been a reaction to 
the downturn, the crisis alone is not enough to explain the distributive politics 
patterns which emerge from the econometric results.  
Findings from the interviews point instead to a different direction. While the majority 
of the interviewees expressed concerns about the excessive powers that the 
government has recently adopted, most of them nonetheless acknowledged how the 
strong government has streamlined policy decisions. The two following excerpts, 
respectively by a retired manager from the Undersecretary of Treasury and a manager 
from the Ministry of Development, provide an example:   
“Before Erdoğan, with coalition governments [that is, before 2002, A./N.], each party would try to 
influence the ministry they controlled, so coordination was more problematic. Now Erdoğan has 
much more power in investment decisions. So at the decision level problems are lower.”
68
  
“In coalition times, there was an unsigned agreement among coalition members not to ask things. 
Now, with a single-party government, pressure is higher. [In the past] we would go to our general 
director and say that a project is not necessary. And the issue would stop there. But now the 
matter comes directly to our Minister. In some sense this pressure works as a facilitator. We have 
for example reduced the difference between the best and worst regions.”
69
 
                                                     
68
 Interview number 1. 
69
 Interview number 26. 
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Indeed, data by the World Bank on the evolution of governance indicators, presented 
in Figure 4, shows how, while political voice decreased in recent years, the level of 
government effectiveness has followed an opposite, upward trend. In other words, the 
strong government may have increased coordination among different institutions and 
put under control inter-party pork-barreling.
70
 
Figure 4. Government effectiveness and political voice in Turkey, 2002-2012 (World 
Bank governance indicators). 
 
Source: own elaboration on data from World Bank. 
Preliminary confirmation is offered by another manager from the Ministry of 
Development. Although overall critical about the current government, the official’s 
quote is informative:  
“Today no MP has the power to implement small pork-barrel. The Parliament and the party are 
strongly disciplined.”
71
 
Such finding is interesting because it confirms, at least in part, the basic intuition put 
forward by Lizzeri and Persico (2005) on the potential drawbacks of electoral 
competition. The aim of their paper, as well as this analysis, is not to argue that 
                                                     
70
 Such hypothesis is, somehow, similar to the idea of a ‘benevolent dictator’, that is, an 
authoritarian leader exercising absolute power but doing so for the benefit of the population.  
71
 Interview number 12.  
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electoral competition is necessarily bad. Much literature shows how a many-party 
system is essential to allow different ethnic and ideological cleavages to find 
expression in the political system (ibid.). Nonetheless, their argument is to highlight 
the possibility that electoral completion can have unexpected and counterintuitive 
effects, such as on the strategic use of public goods for electoral rewarding.    
As Filiztekin and Bakış (2015) point out, the continuous electoral victories 
experience by the AK Party since its unexpected success in 2002 deserves careful 
investigation. While earlier research has mostly linked such political success to the 
country’s positive economic performance experienced in the 2000s, or to Turkey’s 
rooted ideological cleavages (cf. Akarca and Tansel, 2006; Çarkoğlu, 2008), the 
current analysis points to the ability of the government to, somehow, ‘deliver’ public 
goods as another explanation (cf. Müftüler-Baç and Keyman, 2012, for a partly 
similar argument).
72
  
If the interviews somehow confirm how the strong powers of the government may 
have streamlined decision-making, such result should not be confounded with a 
completely positive narrative. As a matter of fact, evidence seems to suggest that, 
although the government is now more able to implement policy, such change is not 
without drawbacks. A manager from the Ministry of Development, for example, 
stressed out how the economic bureaucracy has experienced a reduction in its 
autonomy and, hence, its technical ability to manage the investment project cycle: 
 “Before the arrival of AKP into power, in coalition times, Ministries were under the control of 
separate parties. Now institutions are all closer so coordination is faster, even though this may 
determine that agreements occur at high, political level instead of the technical level.”
73 
 
Relatedly, some of the interviewees stress how investments are increasingly driven by 
populist choices. In other words, as the following quote by another manager from the 
Ministry of Development suggests, the increasing power of the government over 
policy-making and the specular reduced autonomy of the economic bureaucracy (cf. 
                                                     
72
 As Filiztekin and Bakış (2015) point out, structural explanations are further influenced by 
location, in the sense that the same variables seem to have different impacts on voting behaviours 
depending on the context where voters live. 
73
 Interview number 18. 
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Luca, 2015) may have simply determined a shift from pork-barrelling to populist 
spending. The following quote provide clear prima-facie evidence in support of such 
hypothesis:  
 “In the 1990s governments had very short life. So people [politicians, A./N.] would try to do as 
much as possible to get things done for themselves and their supporters and constituencies. They 
would try to do pork-barrelling. Now we have a single political pressure. For example, roads are 
very costly for Turkey. So the biggest priority would be to enlarge the train network. But the 
government prefers the High Speed Train, and other big projects such as the Third Airport, the 
Third Bridge, Marmaray, etc. […]. This is political pressure. And it’s costly for Turkey. […] We 
moved from pork-barrelling to big projects.”
74
   
Complaining about how his department struggles to shield from political pressure in 
the selection of projects, a senior manager indeed provides a very pessimistic opinion 
of how public investment in transport infrastructure has been used and managed in 
recent years:  
 “[Today] investments are not selected by need or by cost criteria. They are selected by General 
Directors. The Prime Minister, or the Ministry of Transport, is just looking for the total number of 
km of highways you did, for how many airports, or how much high speed rail you built. Whether 
the terminal is efficient, whether it is effective does not matter. There are public-private 
partnerships, such as the Gebze-Izmir Highway or the Third Bridge projects. They are technically 
very careful, because they invest their own money. Transport investment is beyond 
management.”
75
  
While the figures provided are overestimated, the following excerpt by a planning 
expert offers another concrete example of such dynamic: 
“If you read page 236 of the 2014 programme, you understand that we should not invest at all in 
motorways but invest in other means of transport. But in the last years there have been 70 trillion 
TL investments in motorways. We allocate 4 trillion at the beginning of the year, and at the end 
they have become 9. We send reports saying that projects are good/bad, giving technical opinions. 
[…] Yet, so far, I cannot remember even one case when they rejected a project after our 
                                                     
74
 Interview number 12.  
75
 Interview number 17. 
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evaluation. At the end, unless you get politicians away from populist approaches, all the ideas 
about effective planning rest on paper.”
76
 
To conclude, the qualitative analysis provides evidence in support of two main 
findings. First, the stronger government seems to have streamlined policy decisions. 
Second, while such trend may have had some positive effects on policy effectiveness, 
there is nevertheless evidence suggesting that a partial shift from pork-barrelling to 
the selection of populist projects whose logics run above partisanship may have 
occurred. Drawing from the interview findings, as well as from the case of Istanbul 
discussed by Christie-miller (2014), we can speculate that two main reasons may 
have led the government to embark into populist investment spending: first, they may 
have done so as a way to build mass support (Magaloni and Kricheli, 2010). 
Relatedly, the move may also be linked to Erdoğan and his party’s desire to show 
their grand ‘New Turkey’ – a term rhetorically used to describe the allegedly ‘new 
era’ the country is experiencing under the AKP ruling. A second, complementary 
explanation is that the AK Party may simply have reduced its focus on pork-
barrellling and, instead, become increasingly sensitive to special interest groups. 
Explaining why the institutional structure of the project cycle management was 
transformed in 2008, the following quote by a senior manager provides preliminary 
support in favour of this second hypothesis: 
“Today […] billion of Turkish Liras are spent just for the highway sector. This is pumping 
money into Turkey. Construction firms were getting irritated. The Ministry of Transport wants to 
show people that things are done. And the best way is to build highways. So they changed the 
institutional structure. This reduced the power of the State Planning Organisation [currently 
Ministry of Development, A./N.], and increased the power of firms. We were asking for 
performance indicators. So [the reason why operational powers were transformed] was mainly 
political.”
77
 
Buğra and Savaşkan (2014) as well as Özcan and Gündüz (2015) indeed put forward 
empirical evidence showing how firms with political connections with the 
government have experienced abnormal performances and growth over the recent 
years.  
                                                     
76
 Interview number 25. 
77
 Interview number 17. 
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4. Conclusion 
Drawing from the analysis of public transport investment between 2004 and 2012, the 
paper aimed to answer the following closely related questions: (1) is the 
transformation of Turkey’s political scene from a competitive political system 
towards the electoral hegemony of Erdoğan and his party correlated to an increase in 
the way public investment is allocated for tactical redistribution? (2) If yes, what 
potential dynamics help explain such results? The research aim is informed by the 
literature: in spite of a significant increase in the research focused on distributive 
politics, there is still contrasting evidence on whether shifts from highly competitive 
electoral environments towards electoral one-party dominance may lead to higher – o 
lower – levels of pork-barrelling. The empirical methodology featured a two-step 
mixed-methodology. Specifically, it drew on the triangulation of econometric 
analysis, based on a panel data on the allocation of public transportation investment 
to Turkey’s 81 provinces over 2004-2012, with elite, semi-structured interviews 
carried out among Turkey’s economic bureaucracy in charge of investment allocation 
and management.  
The empirical analysis provides evidence of how the increase in the government 
power is unexpectedly correlated to a reduction in the way investment allocations to 
Turkish provinces are used to reward supporters and punish opponents. Such 
reduction in pork-barrelling was nonetheless determined only partly by a virtuous 
increase in policy effectiveness. Political influence over investment decisions seems 
to have comparatively shifted from inter-party pork-barrelling to the selection of 
projects motivated by populist rationales and whose logics run above partisan 
politics. Further research could perhaps explore the extent to which such shift was 
driven by a ‘grand’ desire to show the ‘New Turkey’ – a term rhetorically used to 
describe the allegedly ‘new era’ the country is experiencing under the AKP ruling – 
or, instead, by the increasing influence of big interest groups, as the findings by 
Buğra and Savaşkan (2014) and Özcan and Gündüz (2015) may lead to surmise.   
Two analytical caveats must be taken into account. The first one relates to potential 
biases caused by endogeneity. Earlier research conducted on similar data and for the 
same period (Luca and Rodríguez-Pose, 2015) suggests that endogeneity caused by 
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reverse causality is not a serious concern. Nevertheless, we cannot entirely rule out 
such potential risk. Second, the results suggest that the strategic use of public 
investment in transport infrastructure to reward supporting provinces and punish 
opponents has decreased through AKP’s incumbency. Yet, it must be borne in mind 
that public investment is a public good which, by its own nature, is not excludable. 
Diaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni (2012, p. 27) for example discuss the 
hypothesis of portfolio diversification – that is, the possibility that political machines 
may use different goods for different targets . They suggest how “machines [may] use 
private benefits to buy off core voters, and public goods to attract swing voters” 
(ibid., p. 27). Research on the management of private, excludable goods such as 
welfare care, or public tenders, may hence uncover results different from the ones 
documented in the current study.  
The analysis’ implications for theory and policy are twofold. First, the results 
contribute to the current debate on the reasons and societal implications of the AK 
Party’s electoral hegemony over Turkey’s politics. While earlier research has 
frequently linked such political success to the country’s positive economic 
performance experienced in the 2000s, and to Turkey’s rooted ideological cleavages 
(cf. Akarca and Tansel, 2006, Çarkoğlu, 2008), the findings of the current analysis 
points to the ability of the government to, somehow, ‘deliver’ public goods as a 
further reason (cf. Müftüler-Baç, Keyman, 2012 for a partly similar argument). At the 
same time, the qualitative preliminary evidence on the shift from pork-barrelling to 
populist spending raises concerns about the sustainability of current investment 
practices. Future research should be devoted to explore such issue. 
More broadly, the results contribute to the literature on distributive politics by 
addressing a previously unexplored gap. The empirical evidence seems to overall 
support the analysis’ alternative hypothesis, according to which shifts from 
democracy towards more authoritarian regimes can lead to a reduction in the 
allocation of public goods following electoral interests – and not an increase, as the 
literature on democracy and public goods (Bueno De Mesquita et al., 2002) would 
lead to surmise. We explain such unexpected finding drawing on Lizzeri and Persico's 
(2005) theoretical intuition that projects with narrow benefits may be more appealing 
to office-motivated politicians than to leaders with very large electoral bases and less 
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concerns about winning elections. The aim of the analysis is not to claim that 
electoral competition is necessarily bad. A significant amount of research has argued 
that democracies are overall better than autocracies at fostering effective 
policymaking. Besides, much literature shows how a many-party system is essential 
to allow different ethnic and ideological cleavages to find expression in the political 
system (Lizzeri and Persico, 2005). Relatedly, recent in-depth research on Turkey’s 
central management of public investment has raised concerns on whether the increase 
of the AKP government’s discretionary power over state institutions may have long-
term negative consequences on the effective management of investment projects 
(Luca, 2015). Nevertheless, the current analysis adds to the literature by showing that 
the reduction in electoral competition can lead to unexpected and counterintuitive 
effects, such as on the strategic use of public goods as a mean for pork-barrelling. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Description of variables and sources of data.  
Variable Variable description  Source 
Public investment Ln of the amount of per-capita fixed 
capital investment annually allocated to 
each province in transport and 
communication infrastructure projects 
Ministry of Development (former 
State Planning Organisation) 
AKP votes % of votes for the AKP Turkey’s electoral High 
Committee, European Election 
Database 
CHP votes % of votes for the CHP Turkey’s electoral High 
Committee, European Election 
Database 
MHP votes % of votes for the MHP Turkey’s electoral High 
Committee, European Election 
Database 
Kurdish party votes % of votes for the Kurdish party and for 
independent candidates 
Turkey’s electoral High 
Committee, European Election 
Database 
Electoral competition Negative absolute value of the vote 
difference between the incumbent party 
and its main challenger in each 
province 
Own calculation on data from the 
Turkey’s electoral High 
Committee, European Election 
Database  
Development index Provincial Development Index Own calculation from: State 
Planning Organisation (1996, 
2003a), Baday-Yıldız, Sivri and 
Berber (2010) 
Manufacturing 
employment 
% employment in manufacturing Turkstat Regional Database 
Education attainments % high education (vocational training 
and university) students on the total 
population 
Turkstat Regional Database 
Rural population % of rural population Turkstat Regional Database 
Population Total number of inhabitants per 
province 
OECD, Turkstat Regional 
Database 
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Appendix 2. Summary statistics. 
Variable Mean St. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Public investments 3.025 1.423 0 9.215 
AKP votes 45.037 14.811 6.5 84.82 
CHP votes 18.541 9.506 2.01 52.5 
MHP votes 12.759 7.129 0 44.9 
Kurdish party votes 9.345 16.417 0 70.8 
Electoral competition -26.18 15.363 -70.4 -0.1 
Development index -0.001 0.987 -1.659 4.138 
Manufacturing employment 20.963 9.444 4.7 46.3 
Education attainments 4.557 19.931 0.039 254.955 
Rural population 37.849 13.5677 1.01 70.084 
Population 898500.2 1538670 65126 1.40e+07 
Source: own elaboration. 
 
Appendix 3.  Pairwise correlations among variables. 
 Invest. AKP  
votes 
CHP 
votes  
MHP 
votes  
Kurd. 
votes 
El.  
comp. 
Dev.  
Index 
Manuf.  
Empl. 
Educ. 
Attain. 
Rural  
pop. 
Pop. 
Investments 1           
AKP votes 0.116* 1          
CHP votes 0.078* -0.304* 1         
MHP votes -0.120* 0.072 0.189* 1        
Kurdish v. -0.034 -0.396* -0.311* -0.538* 1       
El. Comp. -0.103* -0.641* 0.430* 0.117* 0.065 1      
Dev. Index 0.091* -0.073 0.484* 0.272* -0.523* 0.221* 1     
Man. Emp. -0.041 -0.005 0.301* 0.072 -0.305* 0.050 0.596* 1    
Educ. Att. 0.084* 0.001 0.122* 0.051 -0.095* 0.068 0.159* 0.265* 1   
Rural pop. -0.120* -0.087* -0.168* -0.114* 0.166* 0.020 -0.668* -0.557 -0.216* 1  
Population 0.158* -0.020 0.206* -0.059 -0.063 0.127* 0.655* 0.320* -0.014 -0.526* 1 
Source: own elaboration. * p<0.05. 
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Appendix 4. Geographical distribution of average fixed-capital public investment in 
transport and communication infrastructures until (above) and after 2008 (below).  
 
 
Source: own elaboration on data from Ministry of Development database. 
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Appendix 5. List of interviewees. 
(1) Retired manager, Undersecretary of Treasury, Ankara, 24/10/2014.  
(2) Senior manager, Ministry of Development, Ankara, 2/10/2014. 
(3) Senior planning expert, Ministry of Development, Ankara, 3/10/2014. 
(4) Director, Turkey’s Economic Policy Research Foundation (Türkiye Ekonomi Politikaları 
Araştırma Vakfı, TEPAV), Ankara, 27/10/2014.  
(5) Senior planning expert, Ministry of Development, Ankara, 27/10/2014. 
(6) Manager, Ministry of Development, Ankara, 28/10/2014. 
(7) Senior planning expert, Ministry of Development, Ankara, 30/10/2014. 
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Appendix 6. Multivariate regressions of the provincial per-capita public investment 
in transport and communication infrastructures: robust Fixed Effects estimates 
excluding Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir (2004-2012).  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
AKP votes 0.0516** 0.0334* 0.0331* 0.0333* 0.0343* 0.0199 0.0343* 0.0150 0.0152 
 (0.0196) (0.0176) (0.0180) (0.0175) (0.0179) (0.0196) (0.0176) (0.0205) (0.0203) 
CHP votes -0.0334** -0.0425*** -0.0436*** -0.0354 -0.0483*** -0.0425*** -0.0415** -0.0768*** -0.0759*** 
 (0.0159) (0.0152) (0.0165) (0.0237) (0.0153) (0.0150) (0.0164) (0.0275) (0.0275) 
MHP votes 0.0285 0.0362 0.0354 0.0370 0.0939** 0.0510* 0.0378 0.0854** 0.0855** 
 (0.0317) (0.0284) (0.0294) (0.0286) (0.0430) (0.0293) (0.0302) (0.0428) (0.0429) 
Kurdish votes 0.0136 0.00274 0.00200 0.00349 0.00149 -0.0159 0.00289 -0.0249 -0.0244 
 (0.0199) (0.0186) (0.0196) (0.0188) (0.0194) (0.0215) (0.0184) (0.0246) (0.0241) 
El. Comp. 0.00840 0.00253 0.00195 0.00265 0.00107 -0.00420 0.00412 -0.00424 -0.00414 
 (0.00866) (0.00850) (0.00844) (0.00849) (0.00877) (0.00845) (0.0109) (0.0115) (0.0115) 
Post-2008   1.157 1.131** 1.450*** 0.739 0.920 0 0 
   (0.842) (0.505) (0.497) (0.460) (0.562) (0) (0) 
Post#AKP   -0.00249     0.0264 0.0255 
   (0.00982)     (0.0186) (0.0181) 
Post#CHP    -0.00771    0.0463* 0.0447* 
    (0.0141)    (0.0243) (0.0231) 
Post#MHP     -0.0532**   -0.0196 -0.0198 
     (0.0205)   (0.0257) (0.0256) 
Post#Kurd      0.0242**  0.0396** 0.0389** 
      (0.00978)  (0.0164) (0.0157) 
Post#El. Comp.       -0.00282 0.00124 0.00101 
       (0.00869) (0.0134) (0.0132) 
Constant 1.052 -6.306** -6.175** -6.367** -5.857** -3.961 -6.398** -3.284 -3.295 
 (0.910) (2.728) (2.776) (2.758) (2.798) (2.734) (2.770) (3.006) (2.993) 
          
Observations 624 624 624 624 624 624 624 624 624 
R-squared 0.085 0.117 0.117 0.117 0.137 0.138 0.117 0.152 0.152 
Number of id 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 
Prov FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Controls  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Prov*year FE         yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls include: 
provincial development index, manufacturing employment, education attainments, rural 
population, total population. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
